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Preface
This book deals with the relationship between tradition and modernity and the modernness of objectifying, representing and studying folklore and 
oral traditions. The ﬁrst section focuses on modern and tradition as modern 
concepts, and the conception of folklore and its study as a modern trajec-
tory. The second section discusses the politics of folklore with regard to 
nationalism, and the role of folk tradition in the production of nation-state 
identity in Finland.
My discussion of these issues emerges from selected perspectives on 
postmodernism and postmodernist thinking. These were topical, and in some 
circles radical issues in the early 1990s, when I was taking graduate courses 
at the Department of Folklore and Folklife at the University of Pennsylvania 
in the United States and writing my doctoral dissertation. I am aware that 
today, more than ten years after, postmodernism seems like out-dated rheto-
ric, but I can excuse myself by saying that I have an antiquarian interest in 
things postmodern. The ﬁrst section of the book draws heavily on literature 
from the 1980s and early 1990s because that part was originally written for 
the dissertation. I have used it here – changing in places the present tense 
to the past and adding newer references – with the belief that it still func-
tions as a theoretical and research historical orientation to the discussion on 
the politics of folk tradition in the second section. I also believe that many 
of the points made in conjunction with postmodernism continue to deserve 
consideration. This is especially so in the ﬁeld of folklore studies, which 
was never saturated with the postmodernist critique of modernism. There are 
academic environments in which such ‘postmodernist’ issues as reﬂexivity 
and representation and their implications for both ethnographic and archival 
research still await discovery.
In addition to my doctoral dissertation, the research conducted for this 
book has encompassed four different research projects and networks which 
all have been concerned with the politics of identity and the construction of 
tradition, history and heritage. Some of them have dealt directly with the 
topic of the present book, while others have also served as frameworks for 
enhancing and developing my parallel research on a multi-faceted and con-
troversial item of political mythology and heritage production in Finland: 
the folklore-based narrative construction of the birth of the nation and the 
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killing of its allegedly ﬁrst foreign visitor. I will be presenting the results of 
this study in a forthcoming publication.
The ﬁrst of my formative research projects and networks was ‘Europe 
and the Nordic Countries: Modernization, Identiﬁcation, and the Making 
of Traditions and Folklore’, launched in 1992 with me as the project leader 
and sponsored by the Nordic Institute of Folklore. The work of the project 
culminated in the book Making Europe in Nordic Contexts (1996), which 
I edited. I hereby wish to extend my thanks to the other members of this 
project: Ey¦un Andreassen on the Faroe Islands, Jan Garnert in Sweden, 
Stein R. Mathisen in Norway and Gísli Sigur¦sson in Iceland.
The second international network to help me push my research forward was 
the project ‘National Heroes: Construction and Deconstruction’, sponsored 
by the French Ministry of Culture and Mission du Patrimoine ethnologique in 
Paris, together with L’Ecomusée du Creusot-Montceau (Le Creusot, France), 
Deutsches Hygiene-Museum (Dresden, Germany), and Verein für Volkskunde 
(Vienna, Austria). The network comprised of approximately 30 scholars from 
across Europe, culminating in three seminal meetings in 1995 and 1996 in Le 
Creusot, France, in Dresden, Germany and in Vienna, Austria, respectively. 
The project work was ﬁnalized in the book La Fabrique des Héros, edited 
by Pierre Centlivres, Daniel Fabre and Françoise Zonabend, and published 
by the Mission du Patrimoine ethnologique in 1998.
Between 1998 and 2001, I was a member of the coordinating commit-
tee for the Nordic research network and project ‘Folklore, Heritage Politics, 
and Ethnic Diversity’. While the network received funding from the Nordic 
Academy of Advanced Study (NorFa), the Joint Committee of the Nordic 
Research Councils for the Humanities (NOS-H) ﬁnanced my own research. 
In addition to these two organizations and their generosity, I wish to express 
my appreciation to our networkers of many nationalities as well as my fel-
low members in the steering group: Academy Professor Anna-Leena Siikala; 
Professor Barbro Klein, Director at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced 
Study in the Social Sciences (SCASSS) in Uppsala, Sweden; and Associate 
Professor Stein R. Mathisen at Finnmark College in Alta, Norway. The work 
of the network and project is well represented in two books. Folklore, Heritage 
Politics, and Ethnic Diversity: A Festschrift for Barbro Klein was published 
in 2000 by the Multicultural Centre in Botkyrka, Sweden. The second book, 
Creating Diversities: Folklore, Religion and the Politics of Heritage, was 
published in 2004 in the Studia Fennica Folkloristica series.
For three months in the fall of 1999, I had the pleasure to work as a guest 
researcher at the Centre for the Study of European Civilization (Senter for 
Europeiske Kulturstudier, SEK) at the University of Bergen in Norway. I 
hereby wish to express my gratitude to Professor Siri Meyer for inviting 
me to participate in the SEK project ‘Det Nye’ (The New). From among 
the many colleagues in Bergen, I especially wish to thank Professors Bente 
Alver and Torunn Selberg at the Department of Cultural Studies and History 
of Art (Institutt for Kulturstudier og Kunsthistorie, IKK). My thanks also go 
to the initiator of my visit, Line Alice Ytrehus, and her husband Hans-Jakob 
Ågotnes. Since the beginning of 2001, I have been able to concentrate full-
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time on my research as an Academy Research Fellow at the Academy of 
Finland. I thank the Research Council for Culture and Society at the Academy 
for granting me this position, and Academy Professor Anna-Leena Siikala 
for including me in her group of researchers in the project ‘Myth, History, 
Society. Ethnic/National Traditions in the Age of Globalisation’.
In addition to those already mentioned, I wish to thank the following 
persons for being sources of inspiration, support and recognition: my wife 
Mikako Iwatake (University of Helsinki), my brother Veikko Anttonen (Uni-
versity of Turku), Pasi Saukkonen (University of Helsinki), Leila Virtanen, 
Lotte Tarkka, Ulla-Maija Peltonen and Laura Stark (University of Helsinki), 
Senni Timonen (Finnish Literature Society Folklore Archives in Helsinki), 
Seppo Knuuttila (University of Joensuu), Jorma Kalela (University of Turku), 
Bo Lönnqvist (University of Jyväskylä), Roger D. Abrahams (University of 
Pennsylvania), Alan Dundes (University of California, Berkeley), Orvar Löf-
gren and Jonas Frykman (University of Lund), Regina Bendix (Universität 
Göttingen), and Ãlo Valk (University of Tartu).
An earlier version of Chapter 1 was published as ‘Folklore, Modernity, 
and Postmodernism: A Theoretical Overview’ in Nordic Frontiers: Recent 
Issues in Modern Traditional Culture in the Nordic Countries, edited by Pertti 
J. Anttonen and Reimund Kvideland. NIF Publications No. 27. Pp. 17–33. 
Turku: Nordic Institute of Folklore, 1993. Chapter 5 was ﬁrst published as 
‘Nationalism, Ethnicity, and the Making of Antiquities as a Strategy in Cultural 
Representation’ in Suomen Antropologi – Journal of the Finnish Anthropo-
logical Society 1/1994 (vol. 19/1): 19–42. It has been revised. Chapter 6 was 
ﬁrst published as ‘Introduction: Tradition and Political Identity’ in Making 
Europe in Nordic Contexts, edited by Pertti J. Anttonen. NIF Publications 
No. 35. Pp. 7–40. Turku: Nordic Institute of Folklore, 1996. It has been re-
vised and it also contains material from the article ‘Nationalism in the Face 
of National and Transnational Integration and European Union Federalism’, 
published in Identities in Transition: Perspectives on Cultural Interaction 
and Integration, edited by Jarmo Kervinen, Anu Korhonen, Keijo Virtanen. 
Publications of the Doctoral Program on Cultural Interaction and Integration. 
Pp. 67–84. Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1996.
Chapter 7 was ﬁrst published as ‘What is Globalization?’ in Norveg, Jour-
nal of Norwegian Folklore 1/1999 (Vol. 42): 3–18. It has been revised. Chapter 
8 was ﬁrst published as ‘Cultural Homogeneity and the National Uniﬁcation of 
a Political Community’ in Folklore, Heritage Politics, and Ethnic Diversity: A 
Festschrift for Barbro Klein, edited by Pertti J. Anttonen in collaboration with 
Anna-Leena Siikala, Stein R. Mathisen and Leif Magnusson. Pp. 253–278. 
Botkyrka, Sweden: Multicultural Centre, 2000. It has been revised. Chapter 
9 was ﬁrst published as ‘Folklore, History, and ‘the Story of Finland’ in the 
book Dynamics of Tradition: Perspectives on Oral Poetry and Folk Belief. 
Essays in Honour of Anna-Leena Siikala on her 60th Birthday 1st January 
2003, edited by Lotte Tarkka. Studia Fennica Folkloristica 13. Pp. 48–66. 
Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2003. The revised version also contains 
material from the article ‘Tradition, Modernity and Otherness: On the Po-
litical Role of History, Ethnic Diversity and ‘Folk Tradition’ in the Making 
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of Modern Finland’, published in Forestillinger om ‘den andre’: Images of 
Otherness, edited by Line Alice Ytrehus. Pp. 58–83. Kristiansand, Norway: 
HøyskoleForlaget / Norwegian Academic Press, 2001.
Despite the fact that most of the chapters are based on previously pub-
lished articles, this book is not an anthology. The chapters are meant to form 
a monographic entity consisting of a theoretical foundation and an empirical 
application aiming to formulate a general argument concerning the topic in 
question, the concepts of tradition and modernity in folklore scholarship 
and the historically speciﬁc, sociopolitical context of its practice. I thank the 
two anonymous referees for the valuable insights that helped me ﬁnalize the 
textual framework. I also thank Leila Virtanen for checking the language and 
Maria Vasenkari for compiling the name index. I am honored to have the book 
published by the Finnish Literature Society in the Studia Fennica series.
Helsinki, 22 June 2004.
Pertti J. Anttonen
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A Short Introduction
Discussing the concept of ‘nation’, Eric Hobsbawm points out that “con-cepts are not part of free-ﬂoating philosophical discourse, but socially, 
historically and locally rooted, and must be explained in terms of these reali-
ties” (Hobsbawm 1990: 9). One of the main purposes of this book is to apply 
this proposition to the idea and concept of tradition, especially in the ways 
in which it has been used and circulated in folklore scholarship. In taking 
up this task, I wish to continue the ‘tradition’ well represented in Finnish 
folklore studies by Jouko Hautala: the examination of scholarly concepts 
(see Hautala 1957).
When studying social practices that are regarded as traditional, we must 
reﬂect upon what we mean by traditional, which is usually seen as an ele-
ment of meaning in the practices that we are studying. Whose meaning is it? 
Is it a meaning generated by those who study tradition or those who are be-
ing studied? In both cases, particular criteria for traditionality are employed, 
whether these are explicated or not. The individuals, groups of people and 
institutions that are studied may continue to uphold their traditions or name 
their practices traditions without having to state in analytical terms their cri-
teria for traditionality. The political charge inscribed in the idea of tradition 
does not require the explication of its cultural logics. This is a familiar phe-
nomenon from classic nationalism and the use of traditions to legitimate the 
consolidation of territorial and administrative control. In recent decades, the 
notion of tradition has gained attention for being introduced in postcolonial 
arenas as a political strategy for creating (or inventing) a past that serves to 
legitimate aspirations for indigenous rights (see e.g. Linnekin 1983; Kees-
ing 1989; Briggs 1996).
The licence to keep the criteria for traditionality inexplicit cannot apply 
to people who make the study of traditions their profession. This especially 
concerns those engaged in the academic ﬁeld of the ‘science of tradition,’ a 
paraphrase given to folklore studies (e.g. Honko 1983; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 
1996: 252). Although interest in oral tradition, as I have written elsewhere, 
“usually means interest in the specimens of oral tradition, the scholarly study 
of oral tradition cannot do without analytical reﬂection on the theories of 
tradition and traditionality that are applied in the selection, construction, and 
representation of such specimens” (Anttonen 2003: 116–117). Traditions call 
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for explanation, instead of being merely described or used as explanations 
for apparent repetitions, reiterations, replications, continuations or symbolic 
linking in social practice, values, meaning, culture, and history. In order to 
explain the concept of tradition and the category of the traditional, we must 
situate its use in particular historically speciﬁc discourses – ways of know-
ing, speaking, conceptualization and representation – in which social acts 
receive their meanings as traditional.
Obviously, I do not presume to be the ﬁrst to draw analytical attention to 
the concept of tradition. Important works have been written on the subject 
not only in folklore studies but also in anthropology, sociology, history and 
philosophy. In folklore, as mentioned by Regina Bendix, tradition is “a core 
term” (Bendix 2002: 110). Richard Bauman writes that “Few concepts have 
played a more central role in the development and practice of anthropology 
than tradition” (Bauman 2001: 15819). In folklore studies, the coreness of 
this concept means that it is frequently used to both denote and qualify the 
folklorists’ research object, oral traditions and traditional culture. But it be-
comes apparent in Bendix’s discussion that the idea of coreness may also 
come to mean that the concept is somehow the property of the folklorists, as 
if marked by their inherited ownership. She writes that a mixture of “unease 
and amazement pervaded in the early 1980s” when Tradition by the sociolo-
gist Edward Shils (1981) and The Invention of Tradition by the historians 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) attracted wide attention, but 
“Neither book acknowledged folklorists’ extensive work on, or perhaps more 
accurately, with the concept of ‘tradition’” (Bendix 2002: 110). Bendix may 
have a point in lamenting the tendency that “the labors and insights of the 
small discipline of folklore” seem to go unnoticed by representatives of other 
ﬁelds (see also Ben-Amos 1998: 272). But I wish to put more stress on the 
last comment in the quotation, which suggests that the concept of tradition is 
in frequent use in the vocabulary of folklorists, but to a much lesser degree 
in the focus of their scholarly analysis.
In taking up the agenda of studying tradition here, my purpose is not se-
mantic, in the sense of mapping out the various ways in which the concept 
has been, can be or should be used. Instead, the approach that I have adopted 
emerges from an interest in epistemology and phenomenology, on the one 
hand, and political analysis, on the other. My starting point is that the concept 
of tradition is inseparable from the idea and experience of modernity, both as 
its discursively constructed opposition and as a rather modern metaphor for 
cultural continuity and historical patterning. For this reason, the discussion 
of the concept of tradition as well as those social processes that are regarded 
as traditional must be related to and contextualized within the socially con-
stituted discourses on modernity and modernism.
The same applies to the concept of folklore, which especially in folklore 
scholarship conducted in languages other than English is commonly, and often 
without methodological reﬂection, treated as a synonym for the concept of 
tradition. Folklore as a Western and English-language concept has its foun-
dation in the modern interest in objectifying the past and the non-modern, 
both temporally and spatially deﬁned, and in documenting and conserving 
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selected types of communication discovered in that cultural otherness. In the 
course of this documentation and conservation process, representations are 
produced mainly in entextualized form in literary collections, to be kept in 
such modern institutions as museums, archives and universities.
To call such representations traditions is a discursive practice that operates 
with particular criteria for traditionality, such as those incorporated into the 
discourse on nationalism, heritage, indigenous rights, or the taxonomy of 
folklore genres. This may – possibly intentionally – limit the discussion on 
traditionality to those phenomena that are classiﬁed as folklore and/or incor-
porated into the political rhetoric of heritage making. My preference, however, 
is to contextualize the folkloristic use of the idea and concept of tradition in 
a variety of other discourses on tradition. I realize that this is a larger under-
taking to which this book can only provide a small contribution.
I wish to emphasize that my discussion on the concepts of tradition and 
folklore do not strive to formulate a theory of tradition, which has been called 
for by Pascal Boyer (1990). I am more concerned here with the constitution 
of the category of tradition within the discourse on the modern than in a 
cognitive analysis of repetition. I also wish to emphasize that I am not tak-
ing a stand in the debate concerning the so-called crisis of the ﬁeld of folk-
lore, regarding its institutional marginalization, the constraints and negative 
connotations of its name, and the gap between the name and its present-day 
scholarly signiﬁcation (Bendix 1998; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998a). I would 
contend that folklore is a rhetorical construction that has possibly outlived 
its modernist agenda, but still, I see its value in identifying a discursive ﬁeld 
that makes the production of tradition and traditionality its main target of 
scientiﬁc analysis. Surely, its best legacies could be continued under a dif-
ferent name, but as a particular type of a modernist project, folklore lives 
and dies with the term.
Regarding my approach in discussing tradition as a category constituted 
within discourse on the modern, I wish to emphasize that it is not my aim 
to argue for the newness of that which has been claimed old, or to argue for 
the inauthenticity of that which has been claimed authentic. I have not set 
out to reveal misconceptions or ‘myths’. I align myself with the so-called 
Hobsbawmian perspective in considering traditions as modern constructions, 
attributed to Hobsbawm because of his seminal book, but this perspective by 
no means applies literally to everything that is deﬁned or researched as tradi-
tions. Many of the selected cultural products and practices that are studied in 
folklore scholarship and conserved in textual representations have a long his-
tory behind them. Their circulation is not necessarily a modern invention.
I will, however, argue that since the concepts of tradition and modern are 
fundamentally modern, what they aim to and are able to describe, report and 
denote is epistemologically modern, as that which is regarded as non-modern 
and traditional is appropriated into modern social knowledge through modern 
concepts and discursive means. While modernity, according to the classic 
tenet, destroys tradition, it – epistemologically speaking – creates tradition 
and makes tradition a modern product. For this reason, both tradition and 
its representation are modern, even if they signify that which is not modern. 
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Modernity cannot represent non-modernity without modern mediation, which 
therefore makes the representations of non-modernity also modern. In other 
words, that which is regarded – and literally, gazed at – as a specimen of non-
modern traditionality does not receive its cultural meanings merely from its 
own history. As an object of modern study, such a specimen is inseparable 
from modern discourses on non-modernity. Since non-modernity can only 
be discussed as modernity’s otherness, modern discourses on non-modernity 
are at the same time modern discourses on modernity. Hence the title: tradi-
tion through modernity.
15
Artikkelin nimi
Part 1
The Modernness of the Non-Modern
16
Kirjoittaja
17
Folklore, Modernity and Postmodernism: A Theoretical Overview
1. Folklore, Modernity and Postmodernism: 
A Theoretical Overview
What is Postmodernism?
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, modernism as a historical period and an ideological current of modernist ideas and ideals became an object of 
criticism in a topic of discourse called postmodernism. This critical discourse 
came into fashion especially in the visual arts, media, architecture, theater, 
literary studies, philosophy, and the social sciences.
Some of the major issues raised in conjunction with postmodernism were 
the call for cultural and semantic heterogeneity, multivocality, and the ques-
tioning of what was perceived as positivistic universalism, identiﬁed with 
the belief in unilinear progress, the Enlightenment ideology as the pursuit of 
a uniﬁed and rational image of the human being, absolute truths, universal 
structures, totalizing discourses and master narratives (see e.g. Harvey 1989). 
The discourse on postmodernism is probably best known for the French post-
structuralists’ emphasis upon discontinuity and difference in history (Fou-
cault 1972), the deconstruction of metanarratives about universal historical 
development (Lyotard 1984) and the deconstruction of the metaphysics of 
language, writing and signiﬁcation (Derrida 1976, 1981).
Semantically, postmodernism would imply temporal succession to mod-
ernism, and some postmodernists actually declared ‘the end of modernity’ in 
the sense of modern progress having become routine and lost its teleological 
basis as a movement forward (Vattimo 1988). The new is no longer quali-
tatively different from what precedes it, and thus signals the end of history. 
Another perspective would emphasize postmodernism as a new perspective 
on modernity and modernism, rather than being something that succeeds the 
modern in a temporal sense. Indeed, modernity continues to prevail while 
postmodernism provides reﬂexive distance from the premises of particular 
‘modernist’ modes of experience, lifestyles, art styles, values, theories, and 
politics. For Zygmunt Bauman, postmodern stands for an opportunity; the po-
tential for tolerance and solidarity and coming to terms with the ambivalence 
and ambiguity of modernity (Bauman 1991). Rather than ending modernity, 
postmodernism objectiﬁes the modern age and the ideology of modernism 
for critical analysis by bringing into the center of attention that which mod-
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ernism is regarded as having marginalized. For Néstor García Canclini, in 
a similar manner, postmodernity is not a stage or tendency that replaces the 
modern world, but rather “a way of problematizing the equivocal links that 
the latter has formed with the traditions it tried to exclude or overcome in 
constituting itself” (García Canclini 1995: 9). Matei Calinescu (1987) calls 
postmodernism another face of modernity.
Postmodernism has never been a strictly deﬁned style, dogma, or ideology, 
and in fact, those who have participated in the discourse on postmodern-
ism have not only found its contents or characteristics disputable but might 
have called into question the very existence of the postmodern as a category. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that postmodernism soon lost much of its rhe-
torical force as well as its popularity and function as an umbrella term for 
the critique of the modern. In fact, many of the protagonists of perspectives 
discussed under the umbrella of postmodernism never considered themselves 
postmodernists, or their perspectives in any way postmodern. The term had 
a certain fashionable and cliché-like ring to it, which many scholars wished 
to avoid. The fact that the term was even applied to mutually contradictory 
and exclusive perspectives added to its lack of speciﬁcity.
Since the postmodern has mainly stood for the critique of the modern, the 
question of what is postmodern depends on what is counted as modern. If, 
for example, postmodernism argues that reality is socially constructed and 
social categories cannot be deﬁned ‘objectively’ as lists of essential traits and 
characteristics, such a perspective would have to be applied to the category 
of the postmodern as well. Since postmodernism is constructed as distinct 
from modernism because of its critical stance, the postmodern critique of 
modernism constructs modernism with its own critical gaze. As is pointed 
out by P. Steven Sangren, “The creation of the category ‘postmodern’ itself 
necessarily creates an ‘other’” (Sangren 1988: 413).
For example, since for Jean-François Lyotard postmodern stands for incre-
dulity toward metanarratives (see Lyotard 1984, xxiii–xxiv), any metanarra-
tive that is found to exist represents modernism. Similarly, the Enlightenment 
has been evoked in postmodernism as the archetype of a one-dimensional 
and uncontested modernity (Calhoun 1993: 75). Indeed, modernity must 
itself be seen as a multivocal discourse embedded with elements or ‘roots’ 
for many of the postmodernist arguments. In addition, modernity must be 
seen as containing and even encouraging both critical and uncritical senti-
ments in conﬂicting, paradoxical, and often dialectical relationships to each 
other, which for their part contribute to the quite diverse characterizations 
and deﬁnitions that the postmodern as a critique of the modern has received. 
Consequently, in terms of political arguments, postmodernist ideas have at 
the same time been antimodernist and promodernist, progressive as well as 
counter-progressive. Bruno Latour makes a point by characterizing post-
modernism as a symptom, not a fresh solution. “It lives under the modern 
Constitution, but it no longer believes in the guarantees the Constitution 
offers.” (Latour 1993: 46.)
The ‘ideological’ concept of postmodernism is closely related to the ‘cul-
tural’ concept of postmodernity. Postmodernity has generally been used to 
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denote the culture of post-industrial societies and late capitalism, presuppos-
ing, in the words of Fredric Jameson, “some radical difference between what 
is sometimes called consumer society and earlier moments of the capitalism 
from which it emerged” (Jameson 1988: 103). Postmodernization would thus 
stand for a cultural shift from an industrial to a post-industrial information 
society, from ‘high modernity’ to ‘late modernity’, including a movement 
from centralized mass production towards ‘post-Fordism’, decentralized in-
dividualized production, and a myriad of ‘taste cultures’ (see e.g. Bell 1976; 
Featherstone 1987; Albertsen 1988; Harvey 1989).
Such a trend has, among other things, been linked to the idea of postma-
terialism, which includes such elements as the rise of quality-of-life issues, 
new social movements such as those evolved around ecological and envi-
ronmental concerns, women’s and minority rights, alternative life-styles, etc. 
(Inglehart 1990; Dalton & Kuechler 1990). In urban areas, postmodernity 
came to stand for the gentriﬁcation of industrial neighborhoods, especially 
the changing of waterfronts from docks and factories into parks, residential 
areas and centers of cultural activity, as well as for the landscape of consump-
tion in the gentriﬁed city (Smith 1987).
Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Social Construction of 
Reality
In social scientiﬁc and humanistic research, postmodernization basically 
came to stand for approaches that reject the Cartesian-Kantian epistemol-
ogy, which modeled social logics and the social and humanistic sciences 
after the positivistic natural sciences. Newer approaches were sparked off 
especially by Thomas S. Kuhn’s perspectives on the structure of scientiﬁc 
culture and its revolutions (Kuhn 1962). Another major impact came from 
the ‘phenomenologization’ of social philosophical theories. In addition to 
the French post-structuralists, this trend included the reappraisal of William 
James’ pragmatism (see e.g. Rorty 1979; Abrahams 1985; Mechling 1985) 
and Aristotelian rhetoric (see e.g. Edmondson 1984; Ricoeur 1986; White 
1987), the rediscovery and recentralization of Giambattista Vico, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, early phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz, the phenomenological hermeneutics of Wil-
helm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, etc., 
as well as the critical theory and neopragmatism of Jürgen Habermas and 
Richard Rorty.
According to the philosopher G. B. Madison, the postmodernization of 
philosophy and the emphasis on rhetoric and interpretation shufﬂed relations 
between two competing traditions, of which the previously marginalized 
one was now put in the center. In what he calls the metaphysical tradition of 
philosophy, from Plato through René Descartes and Immanuel Kant to Georg 
Wilhelm Hegel and Edmund Husserl, philosophy has been considered ‘serious 
business’, thus claiming the status of Science. This came to be contested by 
what he calls the counter-tradition: the Greek sophists and rhetoricians, the 
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Pyrrhonian skeptics, Michel de Montaigne, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich 
Nietzsche (Madison 1988: 106).
Similar ‘lack of seriousness’ or a playful spirit of negativity, deconstruc-
tion, suspicion, unmasking, satire, ridicule, jokes and punning, is claimed 
by Richard Bernstein to pervade in postmodern philosophy, for instance in 
the writings of Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend and Jacques Derrida (see 
Bernstein 1986: 59). Indeed, in its agenda to question established modernist 
constructions, postmodernism has often been understood as playing with 
categories that modernism has purported to keep separate, such as authentic 
and inauthentic, art and kitsch, real and fake (cf. also such folkloristic cat-
egories as ‘folklore’ and ‘fakelore’). However, instead of merely for the fun 
of it, postmodern perspectives, rather seriously, challenge representations 
that are claimed to be authentic and thus call attention to their constructed 
and rhetorical character.
Accordingly, some of the most important perspectives in the study of social 
phenomena that followed the shift in the philosophical, epistemological and 
ontological premises of social sciences concern the study of social life – in-
stead of universal structures – as processes of social praxis (Pierre Bourdieu, 
Clifford Geertz), experience (Victor Turner, Roger Abrahams), performance 
(Erving Goffman), language, dialogue, and polyphony (Mikhail Bakhtin), and 
intersubjectivity and intertextuality (Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva). Other 
contributing insights concerned the growing emphasis on narration and rheto-
ric in the social construction of reality. In what has been called postmodern 
reﬂexivity, there was a turn “away from positivist and formalist epistemologies 
to an epistemology that sees reality as created, mediated, and sustained by 
human narratives” (Mechling 1991: 43; see also Clifford 1986).
Thus, instead of objectivism and positivistic empiricism, which would 
make claims for ‘true representations of objective reality’, social processes 
came to be analyzed from a hermeneutic and constructivist perspective, ac-
cording to which reality and human categories are socially constructed and 
reconstructed in a continuous process of interpretation and contextualization. 
As emphasized by Hans-Georg Gadamer, all understanding is interpretation 
instead of a correct representation of an objective state of affairs (Gadamer 
1976: 350). As a pragmatic process, the understanding of a given text is in-
separable from its application (Gadamer 1975: 264, 274), which also signiﬁes 
that understanding is transformative, producing new meanings.
Accordingly, as meaning lies in the realm of the existential-practical, that 
is, in the transformations that texts produce in the reading and interpreting 
subject, the study of meaning came to concern such questions as what a text 
has to say here and now, in a particular historical moment and situation for 
a particular individual or a group of human agents. Yet, this would not deny 
textual history, as the history of a text and its existence as a transtemporal 
entity is part of its meaning in a particular interpretative context.
The phenomenological fact that there is always a context for a text 
– whether a written text or a social act that is ‘read’ in the sense of interpreted 
– anchors it in social reality and allows it to have decidable meanings. Thus, 
in phenomenological hermeneutics, the object of understanding has a tem-
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poral mode of being, for which reason it is never something static or time-
less but always historically speciﬁc and changing, in a process of becoming. 
For this reason, as claimed by Gary B. Madison, phenomenological herme-
neutics provides models for the theoretical and methodological grounding 
of interpretation as practical reasoning, rhetoric or persuasive argumentation 
(Madison 1988: 114).
It must be stressed in this connection that when discussing hermeneutics, 
one should make a distinction between the ‘classical’ hermeneutical tradition 
of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Emilio Betti, and E. D. Hirsch, which is founded 
upon logical positivism, and the phenomenological hermeneutics of Gadamer 
and Ricoeur. Gadamer distances himself from classical hermeneutics by not 
creating a method or technique for reading and interpreting texts, as is the 
case in classical hermeneutics, which seeks better ways of determining the 
correct meaning of texts (Madison 1988: 110). Dialogic anthropology is based 
on Gadamerian and phenomenological hermeneutics (see e.g. Crapanzano 
1990; Maranhão 1990). Its point about the dialogical nature of the creation 
of meaning can be juxtaposed with Aristotelian rhetoric, which emphasizes 
how logos – text – never receives its meanings independently – that is, in 
abstraction – but as situated knowledge created by ethos and pathos; ethos 
denoting how the speaker makes him or herself authoritative and persuasive, 
and pathos, how the speaker adopts particular ways to speak to a particular 
audience (see e.g. Edmondson 1984; Ricoeur 1986; Kalela 1993).
Politics, Poetics and Reﬂexivity
The awareness of the interpretative and rhetorical basis of social action, and 
therefore also of the rhetorical basis of the study of social action – that is, 
social and humanistic sciences, including folklore research – has meant, in 
the language of postmodernism, not only the end of objectivism but the end 
of totalizing discourses. Modernist innocence, in accordance with Cartesian 
dualism, claimed independence for the subject from the object, as well as 
mind from body, spirit from matter. Modernist innocence also claimed im-
partiality for the scholar. This innocence has in postmodernism been replaced 
by what could be described as a Merleau-Pontian duality between the object 
and the subject, the exterior and the interior, the corporeal and the psychic 
– and by the awareness of the fact that far from being innocent and non-ar-
gumentative, all social scientiﬁc and humanistic research makes statements 
and can therefore be utterly argumentative and political.
In the duality and dialectics of matter and spirit, verbal expressions receive 
their meanings in relation to material objects and socially constructed space, 
and conversely, matter receives its meanings in relation to verbal construc-
tions in social discourses. Thus, the rejection of Cartesian dualism can also 
be regarded as a call to the relativization of the academic division between 
social and natural sciences. Within research into culture – including studies 
of traditional culture – this would mean the deconstruction of its conventional 
division into studies of ‘spiritual culture’ and ‘material culture’.
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Similarly, instead of regarding time and space as mere settings for social 
action, or spatial and social relations as epistemically separate, postmodern 
perspectives emphasize the dialectical relationship between the spatial and 
the temporal in the constitution of the social and in the construction of social 
and cultural meaning. Spatiality in social action is not a representation of 
spatiality as a mental ordering (Soja 1985: 102), but instead, social relations 
create spatial relations and spatial relations create social relations (Gregory 
& Urry 1985: 3). Since spatiality is reciprocal and dialectic with temporal-
ity, the temporality of social life is rooted in spatiality and the spatiality of 
social life is rooted in temporality (Soja 1989: 129–130).
Such perspectives on the spatiality and temporality of social processes 
have questioned the idea of cultures as holistic systems, and called for a re-
evaluation of cultural boundaries as not ﬁxed but ﬂexible and questionable, 
as blurred (see e.g. Geertz 1980). The task of cultural research is no longer 
to ‘discover’ overarching, functionalistic, structuralistic, or metaphysical 
systems behind observable representations but, from a hermeneutic perspec-
tive, to describe the social praxis in which culture is continuously recreated 
and reconstructed through public symbols and symbolic behavior by actors 
making interpretations (see e.g. Geertz 1973), producing social transforma-
tions (see e.g. Turner 1969, 1974) or playing games (e.g. Goffman 1959, 
1974, 1981).
While for Lévi-Strauss, for example, scientiﬁc anthropology meant ab-
staining from making judgments, both at home and in the ﬁeld (see Lévi-
Strauss 1967: 384–385), today the ethnographer’s attempt to be objective 
and impartial is deemed impossible, since knowledge is understood to exist 
in direct relationship with power (see e.g. Foucault 1980). As “objects of 
knowledge are not things-in-themselves but discursive objects which are the 
products of rules of discourse” (Turner 1984: 174), for the ethnographer, the 
truth about “how things really are out there”, or, for the historian, “wie es 
eigentlich gewesen” cannot exist independently from the discursive character 
of knowledge and its production. “No history is innocent of the purposes of 
its author”, writes Peter Hamilton (2000: 21). In a social sense – as already 
pointed out by Giambattista Vico in the late 18th century (see e.g. Herzfeld 
1987; Dick 1989) – truth cannot be anything but a construction and a repre-
sentation, and as such, subjective, interpretative, rhetorical, and political.
The awareness of the rhetorical and political character of scholarship and 
the discursive nature of knowledge, based on particular relationships between 
the subject and the object, has been part of the heightened interest in reﬂexiv-
ity, that is, consciousness of being conscious, thinking about thinking (My-
erhoff & Ruby 1982: 1; see also Babcock 1980; Klein 1993). The awareness 
of looking at oneself looking at the other, and how these simultaneous gazes 
qualify and construct each other, has made the anthropologist / ethnologist / 
folklorist aware of how ethnography is in a fundamental way an act of rep-
resentation that cannot be independent of the discursive processes in which 
the objectiﬁed other is made an object. In addition, the objectiﬁed social 
processes of the other are in essential ways mediated through the subjective 
processes of the self. Therefore, the study of social action as processes of 
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interpretation cannot take place without the scholar’s awareness of his or her 
own or other scholars’ processes of interpretation when trying to make sense 
of and report on other people’s behavior. From this perspective, reﬂexivity 
about the metalevels of signiﬁcation has become virtually synonymous with 
being scientiﬁc (Myerhoff & Ruby 1982: 28), and conversely, ignorance of 
such matters and aspects of meaning is doomed to produce quasi-science.
The call for reﬂexivity about knowledge claims as a criterion for scientiﬁc 
validity has paralleled the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy and social 
sciences, which has foregrounded language as discourse in all social studies. 
Meaning, from this perspective, is actively produced in discursive practices, 
in processes of language use. In accordance with this trend, scholars have 
become reﬂexive about how they themselves ‘invent’ their objects through their 
own discursive and metadiscursive processes. This has meant, among other 
things, the understanding of how scholarly analyses of social life are intrin-
sically works of textualization and writing. In anthropology, this awareness 
has led to the understanding of ethnography as a text-making activity and a 
particular literary genre (Marcus 1980; Marcus & Cushman 1982; Sperber 
1987). From a phenomenological perspective, this means that the observation 
of culture is inseparable from the ways in which one both structures experi-
ence and reports on that experience. Writing thus constructs the culture and 
social reality that is being depicted. Therefore, instead of ‘telling as it is’, 
the ethnographer ‘invents’ and ‘writes’ culture (see Clifford & Marcus 1986; 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988; Clifford 1988b; Sanjek 1990).
As a literary genre with its particular generic features and means of ar-
gumentation and persuasion, ethnography – as practiced in anthropology, 
folklore studies and other cultural sciences – produces narratives that are 
evaluated and authorized according to how they employ the particular generic 
requirements expected from such literary products. Since such products are 
made to exist because of particular motivations and argumentative purposes, 
which are both academic and non-academic, claiming them as scientiﬁc calls 
for the explication of the ways of writing – the poetics and aesthetics – as 
well as the motivations and meanings – the politics – of the ethnographic 
practice and the entire research process as a process of objectiﬁcation.
Such explication can be said to be essentially important in folklore stud-
ies, which not only employs particular literary and rhetorical means in the 
production and publication of research, as do other disciplines in cultural 
sciences, but studies verbal artistry through texts often created – entextualized 
into writing – by the scholar him or herself. This does not only call for the 
problematization of entextualization and transcription, as has been done in 
ethnopoetics (see e.g. Briggs 1988; Anttonen 1994a), but makes it essential 
to see how orality, in the process of adopting oral products into a folklore 
taxonomy, is transformed into literature, following models that are taken 
from literary categories and traditions (see also Tarkka 1993).
In anthropology, in which there has been a great deal of reﬂexive discus-
sion on the poetics and politics of research for a couple of decades now, eth-
nographic accounts have lost the epistemic power that was earlier attached 
to them as objective truths, as testimonies of those ‘who were there’. As a 
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consequence of understanding this, anthropology faced a crisis of repre-
sentation, which caused scholars to call for research that would relocate its 
epistemic power, without claiming to represent the cultural subject in any 
‘real’ or ‘objective’ manner but emphasizing its own selective and political 
nature. Similar discussion in folklore studies was called for by, for example, 
Margaret Mills, who urged folklorists to reﬂect upon
the verbal constructions of ourselves and others and the rhetorics that 
frame them as the products of our particular historical positions (macro 
as well as micro) and of the distribution of power within our social groups, 
which makes certain rhetorical strategies count as ‘truth’ (i.e. ‘convincing 
representation’) and others not. (Mills 1990: 7.)
Such reﬂexivity on the politics of representation and argumentation is an epis-
temological question, but it is often also seen as a question concerning ethics 
and morals. As regards the difference between ethics and morals, sometimes 
used interchangeably, it is suggested here that ethics refer to the issues of 
accurateness and fairness in representation and reconstruction, while morals 
refer to the scholar’s rhetorical and political purposes and goals in relation 
to his or her audience and the society and community in which he or she 
lives and functions. In other words, the way in which scholars reconstruct 
the sociocultural reality they have studied and the way they represent (speak 
for and give voice to) the people involved is an ethical question. The way 
in which scholars use their knowledge and social position as mediators and 
interpreters of this knowledge for their own ends is a moral question. Such 
a perspective is, of course, based on the notion that knowledge always exists 
in a rhetorical context, both in relation to its source and its target (audience), 
and therefore, all scholarship ﬁnds its motivation and argumentative basis 
from being an activity that produces knowledge for a purpose. For this reason, 
these varying purposes can and should be reﬂected upon.
Anthropology is a ﬁeld of scholarship that has traditionally focused on non-
Western cultures, thus representing a scholarly interest that is at the same time 
embedded with an exoticizing gaze extended from the West to the Rest, as 
well as from ‘modernity’ to ‘tradition’. There is also an undeniable racialist 
aspect in this, as emphasized, for example, by William S. Willis, Jr. He says 
in his “minimal deﬁnition of anthropology” that “To a considerable extent, 
anthropology has been the social science that studies dominated colored peo-
ples – and their ancestors – living outside the boundaries of modern white 
societies” (Willis 1974: 123).
Anthropology’s issue with representation has not only been academic but 
also concerns the people and communities that anthropologists make as their 
objects. Indeed, one of the most important features of postmodernization in 
anthropology has been the critique of modernism as an epistemic system 
that has supported Western hegemony over the non-Western as a cultural 
and political subject. Not only are non-Western peoples today contesting 
the authority with which Western ethnographers have represented them, but 
anthropologists themselves have sought to deconstruct the discipline’s co-
lonial encounter (e.g. Asad 1973; Said 1978; Crapanzano 1980; Clifford & 
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Marcus 1986). A postcolonial and ‘postmodern’ ethnography acknowledges a 
‘postmodern world system’ based on new kinds of global relations, in which 
the decline of Western hegemony and the growing inﬂuence of non-Western 
countries and non-governmental interest groups in global economics and 
politics challenge the center–periphery structures that the colonizing West 
established in its modernization and industrialization process (see e.g. Breck-
enridge & van der Veer 1993; Appadurai 1996; Hall 2000b).
Postmodernity and the subsequent new global relations have resulted 
in, among other things, the deconstruction of the ideological practice that 
separated the anthropologist’s present from the objectiﬁed non-Western cul-
tures not only in space but also in time. Johannes Fabian showed in his book 
Time and the Other (1983) how by constructing the ‘ethnographic present’, 
in which a culture is depicted in its imagined state prior to its ‘corruption in 
modernization’, anthropologists have distanced their research objects from 
coevalness and co-existence, from participating in the same space and time 
relations of the present with the anthropologists and their societies. Accord-
ing to Fabian, there has been “a persistent and systematic tendency to place 
the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the pro-
ducer of anthropological discourse” (Fabian 1983: 31). Fabian’s arguments 
are also essential when discussing the practices by which the discipline of 
folklore – with its allochronic synonym of ‘tradition research’ – has made 
its objects.
To be sure, folklore research has been moving towards the aforementioned 
perspectives ever since the 1960s. It is the adoption of phenomenological 
thinking by way of William James’s pragmatism that led many folklorists to 
reconsider, for example, Saussurean structural linguistics as the foundation 
for the study of language and linguistic phenomena. Pragmatistic folklore 
research also emerged to replace the traditional item-centered notion, ac-
cording to which folklore in performance is a manifestation of folklore as a 
system, as language is for the structuralist. One of the scholars responsible 
for this development is Dell Hymes, under whose inﬂuence many American 
performance-school folklorists moved closer to sociolinguistics and the eth-
nography of speaking, which emphasize language and linguistic phenomena 
as constructions that receive their forms and meanings in social interaction, 
in use, praxis, and application. Accordingly, the pragmatic approach adopted 
by such scholars as Richard Bauman, Roger Abrahams and Dan Ben-Amos 
is based on the understanding that social life is communicatively constituted 
in practice, and therefore that which is called folklore is the situated use of 
particular communicative means in the accomplishment of social life (Bau-
man 1989: 177).
For many folklorists in the 1970s and 1980s this trend came to mean a fo-
cus on ‘folklore in context’, with a general emphasis on context dependence 
in the understanding of cultural phenomena and their meaning. Yet, a more 
pragmatistically oriented approach would call attention to the ways in which 
texts and performances are embedded with cues for their decontextualization, 
entextualization, and recontextualization (Bauman & Briggs 1990; Briggs & 
Bauman 1992; see also Bauman & Briggs 2003: 312). Instead of focusing 
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on how folklore is context-dependent, such scholars as Charles Briggs and 
Richard Bauman, following Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogical approach to lan-
guage (see Bakhtin 1981; Todorov 1984a), would look at elements that make 
it possible for folklore to be detached from particular contexts and attached 
to others. These are factors that make folklore transmissible and therefore 
usable as formalized arguments in social interaction.
The change of perspective in which folklore has come to be studied in terms 
of its argumentative purposes and rhetorical means – in terms of politics and 
poetics – may not seem ‘postmodern’ to all scholars involved. Yet, it is not 
without foundation to conceive of the adoption of sociolinguistic, phenom-
enological and pragmatistic perspectives as a way to oppose the modernist 
project of folklore studies as an inheritor to Romantic Nationalism on the one 
hand and positivism on the other, and as an unreﬂected ideological servant 
to the identity politics of the nation-state.
Whether postmodern or not, a great deal of present-day folklore research 
follows the theoretical premises established as a result of the linguistic turn 
in philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. This should not, however, be 
seen as a one-way street, since these perspectives have led cultural analysis 
in general, and sociologically oriented cultural studies in particular, to the 
expressive forms that have been of special interest to folklorists. As stated 
by Alessandro Duranti, “a theory of culture can be expressed not only in the 
symbolic oppositions found in ritual performances or in the meta-statements 
about what counts and what doesn’t count, or what is appropriate and what 
is not appropriate, but also in the words and turns exchanged among people 
while teasing, arguing, instructing, gossiping, joking, or telling – rather, co-
telling – narratives of personal signiﬁcance.” (Duranti 1993: 215–216.)
It is the strong belief of the present writer that scholars in folklore studies 
would raise the analytical level of their ﬁeld if they paid even more atten-
tion to the ideological, theoretical and methodological premises of folklore 
scholarship, to the way it makes its object, the rhetorics of its practice, and 
its assumed role and contribution in the making of modernity and modern 
society. To be sure, folklore studies became its own branch of social and 
academic discourse not only through its focus on particular expressive forms 
known among a particular section of the population (poetry, memory, or lore 
of ‘the folk’, which in Europe has generally meant the non-elite, especially 
the peasant class), or through dealing with these in particular methodological 
ways. Folklore studies became its own branch of scholarship through particu-
lar argumentative and ideological positions in the modern and modernizing 
societies in which it was practiced. One of the main purposes of this book is 
to try and show how postmodernism and postmodernity provide apt frame-
works for discussing the discipline and how the assignments and expectations 
set for it are fundamentally entwined and embedded in modernism and the 
experience of modernity. Another main purpose is to apply this understand-
ing to a particular historical setting where representations of vanishing folk 
traditions have served the production of modernity.
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2. Tradition In and Out of Modernity
Modern and Traditional – A Contradiction in Terms?
The word ‘modern’ is simultaneously an old word and a modern word. Meaning ‘recent’, ‘up-to-date’, ’new’ or ’fashionable’, it is derived from 
the Latin adjective and noun modernus, which was coined during the Middle 
Ages from the adverb modo, meaning ‘just now’ (Calinescu 1987: 13; see 
also Williams 1976: 174; Wallgren 1989: 36). Since the Middle Ages, it has 
taken root in many modern languages and become one of the most impor-
tant concepts in the categorization of time and in the perception of temporal 
change. As a temporal category, the word ‘modern’ predicates the present, 
that which is ‘just now’. Discourse on the modern is discourse on the present, 
about making propositions concerning that which is now, what the present 
arguably is like. Yet, since the adverb ‘modo’ is the ablative form of ‘modus’, 
meaning measure or manner, modern as a temporal category does not merely 
predicate time but measures it as well. As such, it creates relations.1
Indeed, one of the key elements in the word ‘modern’ is that it is a tem-
poral category that also constructs its own otherness. It is not only used to 
predicate the present, but also to mark how this predication draws a distinc-
tion between the present and the non-present. It emphasizes that the present 
– meaning both the present time and the present moment – represents a fun-
damental break from the past, the past time and the past moment. ‘Modern’ 
in the sense of ‘just now’ breaks away from that which is not ‘just now’. It 
does not simply indicate succession, but emphatically separates the present 
from the past, from that which is not modern. Bruno Latour notes that ‘mod-
ern’ – in the sense of a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution 
in time – is doubly asymmetrical, as “it designates a break in the regular 
passage of time, and it designates a combat in which there are victors and 
vanquished” (Latour 1993: 10).
Yet, instead of denoting any given break between any given moments of the 
present and the past, the concept of modern has come to denote a particular 
historical period, style, socio-cultural formation and mode of experience. 
It is Western modernity, the post-medieval era in the history of European 
or Western civilization that is regarded as being intrinsically different from 
what precedes it in time and space. This is called the ‘modern age’ or the 
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‘modern period’, signifying a stage of cultural development called Modernity. 
According to Stuart Hall, David Held and Gregor McLennan, modernity “is 
that distinct and unique form of social life which characterizes modern so-
cieties” (Hall et al. 2000: 426). This is regarded as being markedly distinct 
from all other eras before it as well as from coevally existing civilizations, 
cultures, or ways of life elsewhere in the world. In this regard, ‘modern’ is 
both a temporal and a spatial concept – a reiﬁed category of time, history, 
civilization and development.
The discourse on modernity is discourse on change, accelerating change 
(Wallgren 1999: 195). As such, it is discourse on the surpassing, even rejec-
tion, of that which prevailed prior to a given change, or what seems to have 
suspended this change. Within this discourse, the changes in lifestyles and 
values, social organization, styles in artistic expression, technology, etc., that 
have taken place due to modernization, industrialization, enlightenment, the 
rationalization of society, the secularization of political power and sciences, 
nationalization, market capitalism, the development of parliamentary de-
mocracy, etc., have been conceptualized in ways which have emphasized the 
uniqueness of modernity in human history. Modernity is regarded as being 
fundamentally different from all previous times – and by conclusion, from 
all previous modernities.
The inclusion of such changes and processes in the category of the ‘mod-
ern’ is not merely descriptive. Calling them aspects of modernization and/or 
manifestations of modernity ‘premodernizes’ earlier social institutions and 
practices in more than temporal ways. The distinction constructs a qualitative 
difference. Conveying the meaning of improvement and advance, modernity 
is conceived of as modern in relation to the non-modern, which is attributed 
with a variety of denominations, labels and characterizations. These include 
premodern, old, antique, old-fashioned, conservative, classic, classical, primi-
tive, feudal, and traditional.
The discursive practice of creating and constructing difference makes mo-
dernity not only an arena of perpetual novelties but also a perpetual process 
of comparison. The discourse on modernity is a comparative discourse that 
does not merely register apparent differences between that which is regarded 
as modern and that which is categorized outside the sphere of the modern. 
Instead of merely registering differences, discourse on modernity constructs 
these differences in accordance with their argumentative position to that 
which is regarded as modern. Modernity and the modern are, consequently, 
constructed through their constitutive others. The observed or discovered 
spatiotemporal cultural differences outside the sphere of modernity receive 
their meanings through these discursive comparisons – through the discourse 
of difference.
In the context of Western or European modernity and civilization, the 
cultural otherness of the non-modern has been projected onto at least four 
domains of knowledge: The earlier times in European history; the non- or 
semi-Christian socio-cultural formations, beliefs and practices in the geo-
graphically marginal areas of Europe and its high culture; the non-Western 
societies, cultures and civilizations outside of Christian Europe and its 
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extensions in North America; and human childhood, making the mental 
and cultural development from childhood to adulthood appear a process of 
modernization. The story of European modernity is a story about these hier-
archical oppositions. The discourse on modernity aligns cultural distinctions 
with other hierarchical oppositions such as universal versus singular, form 
versus substance, and sensible versus sensuous.
In the Renaissance a contrast was established between ‘modern’ and 
‘ancient’. Western history came to be divided into three eras: Antiquity, the 
Middle Ages, and Modernity. This division indicated a historical development 
that was characterized and evaluated with the metaphors of light and dark-
ness, as well as wakefulness and sleep. Light as a metaphor for knowledge, 
reason and intellect was adopted from Aristotle, but it was also one of the 
key symbols of Christianity. Such language symbolism associated classical 
antiquity with resplendent light, conceived of the Middle Ages as the noc-
turnal and oblivious ‘Dark Ages’, and made modernity a time of emergence 
from darkness, a time of awakening and ‘renascence’ (Calinescu 1987: 20). 
The Enlightenment ideology continued this symbolism in its very name (see 
e.g. Hulme and Jordanova 1990: 3–4) as well as in viewing pre-Christianity 
as ‘pagan darkness’.
The symbolism of light was not only applied to temporal but also to spatial 
relations. Modern Christian Europe, especially its predominantly Protestant 
countries, together with their civilizational extensions in North America, 
came to be seen as representing the time and space of light. Europe was 
synonymized with Christendom, while in contrast, the ‘dark’, pagan and 
medieval ages found a cognitive parallel with the ‘Dark Africa’.
The establishing of the roots of the Renaissance and Enlightenment sym-
bolism of light in the philosophical tradition of Hellenic Antiquity created 
a civilizational genealogy that was yet another indication of the changing 
view on European history and its periodization. While in the Middle Ages 
antiquus had denoted anyone in the undifferentiated past, whether Christian 
or not, in the early Renaissance ‘antiquity’ came to denote a privileged and 
exemplary portion of the past: the pagan classical times and the authors of 
Greece and Rome (Calinescu 1987: 59). Antiquity and classicism as tem-
poral others were regarded as sources of inspiration for the making of the 
Renaissance present.
This relationship continued in 19th-century Romanticism and Neo-Hu-
manism and it is still present in the idea that the core of Europe (including 
the present-day European Union) and its civilizational identity lies in its 
Latin and Hellenic heritage. The politics of such heritage making has been 
discussed by, among others, Jonathan Friedman, according to whom Greece, 
throughout European development after the Renaissance, was incorporated 
into an emergent European identity as a legitimate ancestor, making the 
Greeks primordial Europeans. In this process, Europe came to be imagined 
as a cultural landscape in which its claimed heritage drew a genealogical 
link to that which was regarded as modernity’s temporal other, antiquity. 
Simultaneously this heritage line would deny a link to its spatial others: the 
symbolic systems and constructions of Islam and the Orient. The heritage 
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of Antiquity (now with a capital A) would contribute to making Europe the 
sphere of modernity, while its spatial otherness came to signify the lack of 
modernity. In addition to becoming a political opposition whose inﬂuence 
must be monitored and controlled by Christian Europe, Islam became – in 
a discourse that Edward Said in his ground-breaking work (1978) termed 
Orientalism – an exotic, romantic and mysterious Other.
As modernity became a synonym for the European and the Western – in a 
process that Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) discusses as the deprovincialization 
of Europe – it denied modernity elsewhere and privileged the West in being 
modern in more than temporal sense. In addition, it also served to indicate 
how ‘modern’ is an ideational and as such, an ideological category, a product 
of Western modernism. From this ideological perspective, non-Western cul-
tures or civilizations are not modern unless they become modern by adopting 
features of Western modernity. Modernity is thus a Western export product.
This perspective has also resulted in producing the present-day tendency 
to view both the political conﬂicts and cultural differences between, for exam-
ple, Islamic countries and Christian Western countries as collisions between 
tradition and modernity. Tradition here means, among other things, a close 
link between religion and politics while modernity is regarded as being 
characterized by secular politics. A recent example of this in current world 
politics is the characterization of Islamic fundamentalism and anti-American 
terrorism as antimodernism. Such a proposition is based not only on the syno-
nymization of modernity with Western civilization, which allegedly makes 
a clear distinction between religion and politics, but also on the equation 
of modernity with given economic and global policies by governments and 
multinational enterprises representing countries within the sphere of Western 
civilization. From this perspective, political, religious and moral opposition, 
for example, to the international or global interests of the United States or 
American commercial enterprises might be regarded as a refusal to adopt 
Western modernity, a refusal to modernize.
Let me take a couple of recent statements as cases in point. The ﬁrst one 
is from the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, whose tele-
ologically oriented book – as well as his famous 1989 article – on the end of 
history and the victory of modern liberalist democracy after the collapse of 
Soviet Communism gained wide publicity in the early 1990s (see Held 2000: 
442–447). After the September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center tow-
ers in New York City, Fukuyama asked whether there is something inherent 
about Islam that makes Muslim societies “particularly resistant to modernity” 
(Fukuyama 2001; also quoted in Dyer 2001). For Fukuyama, modernity 
has its cultural basis in Christianity and its universalism. By deﬁnition, this 
approach categorizes all cultural production within the Islamic sphere as 
modernity’s otherness.
The second example comes from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who served as 
a special assistant to the U.S. presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson in the 1960s and is a recipient of two Pulitzer Prizes. He said in a 
widely publicized interview that Islamic civilization today conveys “a great 
resentment of modernity” (Katsuta 2002: 1). The terrorists who attacked 
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the World Trade Center with airplanes and communicated with transistor 
radios and by email were, according to Schlesinger, “using the instruments 
of modernity against modernity” (loc. cit.).
Modernity’s Temporal Others
In the late 17th century, modernity and the modern were polarized against 
the ancient in a cultural debate – or a Culture War (see DeJean 1997) – that 
is generally known as the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns. 
Those identiﬁed as the Ancients preferred to continue valorizing Antiquity 
and the classical literary models, while those identiﬁed as the Moderns did 
not. According to Matei Calinescu, such thinkers and writers as Montaigne, 
Francis Bacon, Descartes, Charles Perrault and Fontenelle attempted to 
liberate reason from medieval Scholasticism as well as from what has been 
described as the Renaissance idolatry of classical antiquity. In this project, 
modernity represented rationalism and progress against antiquity’s authority, 
on the one hand, and its barbaric customs, on the other (see Calinescu 1987: 
23ff.; see also Levine 1999).
The so-called discovery of the American Continent and of non-European 
cultures elsewhere during the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries created an aware-
ness of ways of life that differed or were felt to differ from those known in 
Europe at the time (see Cocchiara 1981; Todorov 1984b; Sörlin 1986; Lopez 
1986; Hall 2000b). Most of these discoveries were legitimated with economic, 
political, religious and ideological (self-)interests, which, among other things, 
included the argument for Europe’s central position in the world (see Hall 
2000b: 197–201). In addition to the Eurocentric worldview, the discoveries 
as well as the eventual colonization of the discovered created a new way of 
talking about the modern, and provided for new cultural positions against 
which the modern was conceptualized. In addition to a temporal category, 
with which modernity had been distinguished from earlier forms of European 
civilization, modern also came to denote a spatial category that was used 
to distinguish Western civilization from coeval non-Western socio-cultural 
formations.
Because of an evolutionary framework, the other socio-cultural formations 
were not only regarded as belonging to spatial otherness. Since they were seen 
as representing earlier phases in the allegedly linear development of mankind, 
they were regarded as belonging to temporal otherness as well – regardless 
of their coevalness. Non-Western societies were distinguished from Western 
modern societies by characterizing them as’traditional’ or ‘primitive’ – and 
eventually as ‘developing’ – thus referring not only to their alleged simplicity 
or crudity but also to their belonging to an earlier stage in the human devel-
opment towards modernity. Especially for the evolutionist anthropologists 
in the 19th century, the customs of contemporary primitives were of interest 
only because these were regarded as primeval (Leach 1970: 10). One hundred 
years later, the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote how “I went to the 
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ends of the earth in search of what Rousseau called ‘the barely perceptible 
advances of the earliest times’” (Lévi-Strauss 1967: 310).
The evolutionary scheme of modernity has also characterized the historical 
process in which the culture of the European lower classes, and especially 
the cultural practices of the rural and other marginal populations, have be-
come objects in a similar ‘discourse of discovery’ (see e.g. Cocchiara 1981). 
Much of the scholarly interest in folk and peasant cultures has been histori-
cal and has been aimed at the reconstruction of past social knowledge. But 
in addition to historical reconstruction, this process has entailed historical 
construction in the political context of producing modernity. In the histori-
cally speciﬁc process of making modern Europe and its others, the culture of 
selected marginal groups, for example the material objects, ritual practices 
and ‘lore’ of those that are called the ‘folk’, has received much of its mean-
ing as an object of discovery. The objectiﬁed cultural practices and products 
have not only provided representations of difference and otherness but they 
have also functioned as prerequisites for constructing the category of the 
modern from which they are separated.
In addition to being objects of historical interest, the cultural practices and 
products of selected marginal groups have become objects of a ‘discovering 
gaze’ that does not merely discover but appropriates the ‘discovered’ into 
discourses on application. I will discuss in later chapters how the use value 
of the discovered as ethnographic discoveries and sources of collectibles 
is determined on the basis of their capacity to yield symbols and tokens of 
both difference and historical progression – especially for the making of 
the modern nation-state and its modern discourses on national symbolism. 
The subjects of traditionality are thus both objects and subjects of modern 
nationalism and the modern practice of ethnography. The collectibles from 
non-modernity, as specimens of antiquities and historical documents, speak 
for the modernness of the societies that collect and display them.
For this reason, the motivation to ‘discover’ has a crucial effect on the 
meaning and value that is attached to the objects of the said discovery. When 
social and cultural practices in particular historically speciﬁc contexts be-
come objects of research through being objects of discovery, the discourse 
on discovery becomes an essential framework in the conceptualization of 
such practices. Accordingly, their status and meaning as objects of research 
cannot be discussed independently from their status and meaning as objects 
of discovery. Indeed, any study of cultural and social practices is inseparable 
from the ideological and political motivations that draw the scholar’s atten-
tion to such practices and thus transform them into study objects.
Another aspect of this issue is that the modern discoveries of the non-
modern do not merely discover but also cover up, just as the projection 
of light onto one spot casts a shadow on another. The discoveries can be 
metaphorically characterized as gazes, and like light, gaze creates differ-
ence. Conceptualized as modernity’s otherness, the culture of the people in 
the rural and pre-industrial societies of Europe and in other, perhaps more 
‘exotic’ societies elsewhere, has in modern times become key material for a 
discourse on difference, which is also a discourse on the standard and the 
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deviation. A classic example of such discourse on difference is the idealiza-
tion of the non-moderns, for example in Montaigne or Rousseau’s tradition, 
as ‘free peasants’ or ‘noble savages’ (see e.g. Cocchiara 1981: 13–28; Hall 
2000b: 217–219; Mathisen 2004). Their communities in ‘primitive happiness’ 
have been regarded as being free from private property and other Western 
and modern ‘corruptions’. Such ideas correspond to the tendency of viewing 
modernity as a site of inauthenticity, of which Dean MacCannell writes as 
follows: “For moderns, reality and authenticity are thought to be elsewhere: 
in other historical periods and other cultures, in purer, simpler lifestyles.” 
(MacCannell 1989: 3.)
In accordance with this tendency, modern people continue to locate posi-
tively charged aspects of cultural continuity and collectiveness in places or 
chronotopes (see Bakhtin 1981: 84) that are conceptualized as otherness to 
Western modernity. Such timeplaces include, in addition to the ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘innocence’ of childhood, the medieval age in Europe or the present-day 
Orient, where ‘ageless’ and ‘profound’ traditions are felt to speak for a kind 
of social well-being that Westerners have lost due to their modernization. 
Not all of this discourse on non-modern virtuousness is mere Romantic es-
capism or condescending rhetoric to the noble non-Westener. As has been 
pointed out by Eric Hobsbawm, it has played a notable role in the formation 
of Western social criticism (Hobsbawm 1982: 3).
Tradition as Modernity’s Otherness
Both instead of and in addition to antiquity and classicism, it became com-
mon during the 19th and 20th centuries to characterize that which modernity 
is distinguished from as ‘tradition’ and ‘traditionality’. This temporal cat-
egorization has contributed to the common practice of conceptualizing tra-
dition and modernity as oppositions. In other words, directly related to the 
processes of modernization and the idea of cultural evolution in it, tradition 
and modernity have been constructed as dichotomous categories. Tradition is 
placed in the cultural otherness of modernity and on a unilinear continuum in 
which modernity succeeds and replaces chronologically – and even destroys 
– that which is traditional.
According to Diarmuid Ó Giolláin, the dichotomy between modernity and 
tradition has a historical foundation in the change in meaning of the word 
‘modern’. Ó Giolláin writes that in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the word modern “took on the connotation of ‘improved’ from the older 
– though surviving – connotation of ‘belonging to the present’, as opposed 
to ‘ancient’. ‘Modernization’ originally referred to the alteration of buildings 
and of spelling, but it came to mean something undoubtedly desirable. (…) 
A key implication of modernization is that tradition prevents societies from 
achieving progress. Hence to be modern is to turn one’s back on tradition, 
to live in the present and be orientated only towards the future.” (Ó Giolláin 
2000: 12–13.) For this reason, according to Ó Giolláin, “The modern age is 
inherently destructive of traditions” (Ó Giolláin 2000: 12).
34
Tradition In and Out of Modernity
The dichotomy of modernity and tradition constructs a historical narra-
tive according to which social life and societies are ﬁrst based on tradition, 
signifying thus static cultural continuity and conservatism, while modernity 
follows tradition, signifying cultural change and the end of tradition. Tra-
dition here is a metaphor for permanence and stability (see e.g. Eisenstadt 
1974: 2; Finnegan 1991: 107), while modern is a metaphor for change and 
innovation (see e.g. Calinescu 1987: 3). But in addition to exemplifying a 
metaphorical relationship, the synonymization of change and modernity 
makes all changes agents in the eradication of tradition, which then makes 
‘tradition’ a denomination for pre-change.
The dichotomy of tradition and modernity is a modern theoretical axiom 
on social change, according to which modernization stands for the decrease 
and eventual disappearance of tradition. The dichotomy is built upon a theory 
that has become so inﬂuential that it can be argued to direct cognitive pat-
terns in conceptualizing and discussing modernity – as well as tradition and 
traditionality. As put by Harold Rosenberg, “The famous ‘modern break 
with tradition’ has lasted long enough to have produced its own tradition” 
(Rosenberg 1959: 9).
More and more criticism in anthropology and sociology has been targeted 
at this dichotomy. Paul Gilroy wants to rethink “the concept of tradition so 
that it can no longer function as modernity’s polar opposite” (Gilroy 1995: 
188). Arjun Appadurai writes that “One of the most problematic legacies of 
grand Western social science (Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Ferdinand Toen-
nies, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim) is that it has steadily reinforced the sense 
of some single moment – call it the modern moment – that by its appear-
ance creates a dramatic and unprecedented break between past and present” 
(Appadurai 1996: 2–3). John B. Thompson writes in a similar manner that 
the notion that tradition disappears in the face of modernity has come to be 
regarded as “one of the most powerful legacies of classical social thought” 
(Thompson 1996: 91). Because of this legacy, ‘tradition’ continues to denote, 
in sociological discourse all that is regarded as conservative, static and undy-
namic. In these conceptualizations, change takes place only in the modern, 
and in fact, change denotes and is indicative of modernity, while tradition 
denotes the lack of change and the lack of modernity, even resistance to 
change. Recent discussions on detraditionalization and post-traditionality 
have offered renewed insights into the idea of a fundamental rupture as well 
as the dichotomous relationship between tradition and modernity (see e.g. 
Giddens 1994). To what extent these provide a dramatic departure from the 
sociological legacy remains to be debated (see e.g. Thompson 1996: 89–90; 
Siikala 2000: 64–68; Bauman & Briggs 2003: 306–307).
As a social theory, the dichotomy of tradition and modernity has been used 
to designate two different types of societies and communities, traditional and 
modern, which are regarded as mutually exclusive and standing in historically 
succeeding positions to each other. In sociology and anthropology, some 
of the major ways of discussing the historical process from premodernity 
to modernity have been the polarization of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
(Ferdinand Tönnies), mechanical and organic solidarity (Émile Durkheim), 
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traditional and rational hegemony (Max Weber), and small tradition and great 
tradition (Robert Redﬁeld). Similar polarizations include simple and complex 
societies, folk culture and ofﬁcial culture, and folk culture and mass culture. 
In folklore studies, it has not been uncommon to operate with the temporal 
opposition of ‘in the olden times’ and ‘nowadays’. The former implies the 
presence of tradition, and the latter, the lack of it.
The difference between these polarities is not only temporal but also con-
cerns the nature of social organization. For Tönnies, Gemeinschaft stands 
for intimacy, close personal knowledge, and stability, while Gesellschaft is 
a society characterized by ego-focused and specialized relationships. For 
Durkheim, mechanical solidarity refers to a society founded upon likeness, 
with no tolerance for difference, while organic solidarity stands for a society 
founded upon the integration of difference into a collaborative and harmo-
nious whole (see e.g. Cohen 1985: 22). A common view running through 
these various approaches is that of individuals’ social lives becoming more 
and more specialized, not only in their labor but also in all of their social 
relations (Cohen 1985: 22; see also Collins 1994). Modernization, therefore, 
is a process of individualization and specialization.
In the Weberian perspective, which is based on the binary opposition 
between reason and tradition, modernity stands for rationality, in terms of 
overcoming superstition, while tradition denotes lack of such rationality. 
In the spirit of the Enlightenment, modernization denotes the opposite of 
‘traditional religious authority’ and the subsequent increase of individual ra-
tional reﬂection – even though for Weber the development would eventually 
result in an increase of bureaucratization. In all of these dichotomizations, 
that which precedes the modern is conceptualized as traditional. Traditional 
societies lack the propensities of modern societies.
Tradition as Model and Pattern
Tradition is not, however, always conceptualized as being in opposition to 
modernity or denoting resistance to it. As an act of interpretation, as dis-
cussed by Richard Handler and Jocelyn Linnekin, tradition as a model of 
the past is inseparable from the interpretation of tradition in the present. “To 
do something because it is traditional is already to reinterpret, and hence to 
change it.” (Handler & Linnekin 1984: 281.) Indeed, as processes of change, 
appropriation, and interpretation, and as authoritative relationships created 
between the present and the past, traditions appear as rhetorical construc-
tions that denote an active and political process of creating historical mean-
ing. Thus, instead of traditions being ‘handed down’ from the past to the 
present, from one generation to the next in the manner of inherited property, 
they are ‘lifted up’, as it were, in a process of traditionalization (see Hymes 
1975: 353–354). As is pointed out by Linnekin, “the content of the past is 
modiﬁed and redeﬁned according to a modern signiﬁcance” (Linnekin 1983: 
241). It is worth noting, though, that the perspective that puts emphasis on 
political agency in the present continues to construct tradition as past author-
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ity, in the Weberian sense, and thus signify both modernness and opposition 
to the modern.
As far as human cognitive ability for individual reﬂection and social access 
to political agency is concerned, the categorical distinction drawn between 
modern and traditional societies has been severely criticized in recent years. 
At the same time it has also become clear that modernist theories of the tra-
ditional society and its alleged communal and communitarian orientation 
have ignored or played down the explicit policies, ideologies and discursive 
practices with which modern societies have been directed towards communal 
orientation, conventionality, normative control, as well as towards cultural, 
political and racial homogeneity. In fact, the idea of racial homogeneity 
gained popularity in both laypeople’s views and medical science in the late 
19th century and in the early 20th as modern progress (see Mattila 1999).
Tradition is un-oppositional to modernity also when used as a metaphor for 
cultural continuity, as an indication of the presence of history in the present. 
Even though tradition and history have in afore-mentioned discourses been 
treated as binary oppositions, and Eric Hobsbawm in his seminal book 
(1983) tried to show that traditions do not qualify as history, it has become 
common, especially in the current heritage industry boom, to use tradition 
and history as nearly synonymous concepts. An interest in tradition means 
interest in history. Tradition is seen as a historical resource in the making 
of the present.
When tradition and history are treated as being closely related, they oc-
cupy a similar position vis-à-vis modernity. In heritage discourses they are 
given a positive function in the service of the modern; the presence of their 
representations suggests a sense of cultural continuity over the general sense 
of rupture. This is a positively charged quality as it enables the use of tradi-
tions as statements in identity politics; traditions can be said, for example, 
to symbolize the inner cohesion of a given group and the continuation of its 
existence as a recognized social entity. However, such continuity may also 
receive a negative charge when tradition stands for persisting attitudes or 
practices that appear to be difﬁcult to eradicate – when, for example, tradi-
tion as a continued cultural practice is in conﬂict with the law.
Tradition as history may mean two mutually opposite things. In addition 
to pastness as past history, tradition and traditionality can refer to pastness 
in the present, the continuation of the past in models and patterns of speech, 
thought, belief, cultural practice, etc. Most apparently, such continuations 
are interpretations of and arguments for continuity, as that which is called 
a tradition to be continued is a symbolic construction. In scholarship, as 
discussed by E. A. Tiryakian – albeit with regard to sociology – traditions 
stand for “models of social reality that provide normative and cognitive 
orientations having heuristic signiﬁcance in the devising of research and 
the interpretation of established data” (Tiryakian 2001: 15825). From this 
perspective, tradition is equated with the notion of the scholarly paradigm 
and its institutionalizations. It is worth noting that when conceptualized as 
models and patterns and as symbolic constructions of cultural continuity, 
whether literary or mass mediated, traditions exist just as well in modernity 
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as in non-modernity. “All societies, all institutions except for some brief char-
ismatic moments when ‘all things are born new’ are marked to some extent 
by tradition.” (Tiryakian 2001: 15824.) Indeed, modern societies can be said 
to be full of – even based on or legitimated by – traditions in the sense of 
following established collective models and cognitive patterns of repetition. 
Such traditionality can be argued to have as much centrality in the minds of 
modern people as it has had in so-called traditional societies.
This view corresponds to what Paul Heelas has called the coexistence the-
sis between detraditionalization, tradition-maintenance, retraditionalization, 
and the construction of new traditions: “Most comprehensibly formulated, 
coexistence theory holds that people – whether ‘premodern’ / ‘traditional’, 
‘modern’ or even ‘postmodern’ / ‘post-traditional’ – always live in terms of 
those typically conﬂicting demands associated, on the one hand, with voices 
of authority emanating from realms transcending the self qua self, and on the 
other, with those voices emanating from the desires, expectations, and com-
petitive or idiosyncratic aspirations of the individual.” (Heelas 1996: 7.)
From this one can conclude that tradition and modernity must not be seen 
as oppositional, since modernity contains traditionality. Yet, the dichotomiza-
tion of tradition and modern cannot escape its temporal dimension, because 
the traditions to be followed or no longer followed may be very different. 
The use of ‘tradition’ to designate societies and sociocultural formations 
that no longer exist is consonant with the tendency to call traditional that, 
which is not up-to-date or most recent. While ‘modern’ stands for novel-
ties and innovation, ‘tradition’, as distinct from the ‘modern’, refers to that 
which is regarded as belonging to the past or representing past ways, styles 
or techniques. Even though recent scholarship has argued against the classic 
idea of dichotomizing traditional and modern, the dichotomy persists as a 
cognitive model parallel to such other fundamental dichotomies as old and 
new, right and left, warm and cold, north and south, east and west, raw and 
cooked, etc. Tradition is a temporal concept, its referential meaning being 
constituted as distinct from modern. It emerges from the comparison and 
the making of a distinction.
Everyday language will sufﬁce here as evidence, and we can take any 
modern innovation, such as the development of digital cameras, as a case 
in point. Making print-outs from negatives used to be the standard way in 
which photographs were produced, but digitalization and the technical ease 
of transferring camera shots directly to the personal computer for editing and 
viewing have made paper print-outs a ‘traditional’ format. This type of novelty 
production is appropriated into a discursive practice that generates traditional-
ity. Thus, by representing, manifesting and arguing for modernity, novelties 
create traditions. Similarly, a microwave oven is a modern oven, while an 
electric oven, which used to be considered modern before the microwave 
oven was invented, is nowadays called a traditional oven. A wood-burning 
oven is not only considered traditional but even primitive, and as such, it is 
subject to either rejection or exoticization. When exoticized in modern use, 
for example in retro fashion, it may even become ‘postmodern’.
Again, in scholarship we talk about modern methodology in relation to 
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those methods that used to be dominant but are either no longer employed 
or are used by a decreasing minority; the old methods are called traditional 
methods. As an analogy to this usage, societies that are non-present are tradi-
tional for the very reason that they are not modern, that is, in the present. Ac-
cordingly, the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe may now appear as 
‘traditional societies’. In the same way, people whose life is not characterized 
by the most recent technological innovations and most modern social institu-
tions, live a traditional way of life – not necessarily because their life would 
be founded upon long established and unquestioned traditions, but because 
of not being characterized by the most modern elements. Such qualiﬁcations 
and predications are based on the use of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ as tempo-
ral qualiﬁers, as synonyms to ‘old’ and ‘new’. It is only by extension – by a 
social theory – that ‘traditional’ is also conceptualized as denoting stability 
and lack of change in society or continuity and legitimacy,
A case in point about the idea of tradition as legitimacy is provided by 
John Keane with his commentary on the fate of civil society in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries under Communism. Keane writes that “one-party systems 
can function only by frustrating or extirpating this region’s old traditions of 
civil society” (Keane 1988: 2). Slightly later in his article he refers to the 
same processes as “besieged democratic traditions” (op. cit.: 4). ‘Tradition’ 
does not only refer to the political institutions and practices that used to 
characterize and lay the democratic foundation for the civil society in these 
countries, but it also makes a reference to their pastness, that they no longer 
exist (or rather, did not exist at the time of writing). Keane elucidates his own 
political commentary by employing the term ‘tradition’ or ‘old traditions’ for 
the pre-Communist political institutions. This is to valorize the legitimacy of 
these institutions and thus comment critically on their extermination.
The use of tradition and modern both as temporal qualiﬁers and as quali-
ﬁers of way of life and social structuration is highly relevant in relation to the 
rather common idea that in modernity, traditions disappear and die. Traditions 
in this rhetoric usually refer to particular social practices, which are con-
ceptualized as social organisms having a life and a death. This metaphorical 
usage, which has been prevalent for example among folklore scholars, may 
undermine the use of the concept as an analytical tool. Yet, at the same time it 
reveals something fundamental about the complicated concept of tradition.
It is worth noting that when we call traditional that which has been sur-
passed by something new, we are naming traditional that which is disappear-
ing, for the very reason that it has been surpassed by something new and 
modern. In other words, instead of traditions necessarily disappearing, that 
which disappears or falls out of use is named traditional. Change itself is con-
ceptualized through a distinction or conﬂict between tradition and modernity, 
and that which yields to change is categorized as tradition. This rhetorical 
practice tends to create an impression that traditions are constantly vanish-
ing, as things constantly change and fall into oblivion in the ephemerality of 
human life and social communication. As all things pass, phenomena that 
were once considered traditions to be followed disappear into history, as they 
fall out of use. However, if ‘tradition’ denotes a model and a pattern, it is a 
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contradiction in terms to talk about traditions vanishing, since that which 
has vanished is no longer a tradition – in the sense of a model for social ac-
tion or practice. It has stopped being a tradition, and therefore it cannot be 
documented as one. Attempts at their documentation produce representations 
that are reports of bygone traditions rather than representations of practices 
or thoughts that would continue to be circulated and transmitted and in that 
way indicate the continuation of a tradition. Most commonly, such report-
type representations are produced in ethnography and folklore collecting, 
often with the politically charged motivation of constructing heritage for a 
given social or political group.
Thus, interestingly enough, in our modern language, or in our language 
of modernity, ‘tradition’ is a term that refers to both that which continues 
to exist and that which no longer exists. Social phenomena are called tradi-
tional when they exist as socially constituted models and patterns, as their 
existence signiﬁes continuity and for that reason, also stability. Yet, they are 
called traditional also when they no longer function as models and patterns 
but have been surpassed by something new and modern. Indeed, in addition 
to the fact that we make constant observations of how social life is transient 
and once-established ways yield to changes and new formations, it is our use 
of language to predicate time with the qualiﬁers of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ 
that creates and reafﬁrms the idea of traditions as constantly yielding and 
being on the verge of extinction. In such an experience, we also determine 
whether this yielding of elements in social life is charged with positive or 
negative value, and we construct ideological discourses on whether that 
which yields ‘deserves’ to do so or not.
This calls attention to the temporality of modernity and thus demands a 
slight re-evaluation of the critical stance against the modern–tradition dichot-
omy. There are good reasons why it has become common in recent decades 
to attribute reﬂexive agency to the processes of traditionalization, and some 
of this criticism has been justly targeted at questioning the classic scheme 
of modern versus tradition. Gisela Welz, for example, writes that tradition 
is no longer seen as “a mindless reproduction of past habits, but instead a 
response to contemporary challenges”, and she suggests that “being mod-
ern means to be self-reﬂexive about tradition” (Welz 2000: 10–11). Still, the 
emphasis given to reﬂexive agency in the conceptualization of tradition in the 
present cannot escape its temporal dimension, which, by deﬁnition, reproduces 
the distinction that it purports to negate. This makes tradition versus moder-
nity a tricky dichotomy. There is no categorical opposition when tradition 
refers to cognitive models of repetition, but there is one when the two terms 
denote a temporal difference, as well as a difference in value. The categori-
cal opposition can be easily observed in the heritage-making processes that 
employ the language of tradition versus modernity by presenting heritage 
and tradition as synonymous. The cultural representations that are selected 
for making heritage-political claims are commonly called traditions, with a 
special emphasis on their character as cultural properties; that is, representa-
tions with an ownership label.
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3. Folklore in Modernism
Promodern and Antimodern
When the dichotomization of tradition and modernity is employed as a social theory, tradition has been used in two kinds of ideological and 
value-laden statements about modernity: one that can be called ‘promodern’ 
and the other ‘antimodern’. It has been customary to regard these as bipolar 
oppositions, but I would rather regard them as two expressions of one and 
the same project of modernism, that is, of the construction of difference and 
otherness between the modern and the non-modern. They are thus two ver-
sions of the same narrative of modernization.
To be promodern is to favor modernness, modernism and modernization; 
to take a positive and optimistic attitude towards modernity and the innova-
tions brought along with it. From the promodern perspective, to be modern 
is to be progressive. The promodern orientation may contain, for example, a 
belief that modernity brings blessings to the humankind through technologi-
cal, economic, social, and moral development. Such an idea – sometimes 
presented with a heroic narrative ethos – ﬁnds its purest expression in the 
project of the Enlightenment, established originally by Montesquieu, Voltaire, 
Immanuel Kant, David Hume, among others, in the eighteenth century.
Based on a universalistic idea of reason and rationality, and the belief 
in its unlimited increase and a steady evolution of science and technology, 
Enlightenment ideology argued for an irreversible force of civilization that 
was expected to bring about continuous improvement for all mankind. This 
was supposed to happen by emancipating people with critical rationalism 
from normativeness and the alleged restraints of traditionality, especially 
from ‘traditional religious authority’, and by liberating them from irrational 
beliefs and behavior.
To be traditional is to be non-modern, but since non-modernity is here a 
linguistic construction only, to be traditional is to be modern in a different 
way than in explicit promodernism. In traditionalism, one orients towards the 
past in the making of the modern, with a preference for older ways, beliefs, 
values and technologies. From the promodern perspective, to be traditional 
is to be regressive.
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Traditionalism also denotes a critical, skeptical, pessimistic or disapproving 
attitude towards changes that (are made to) represent modernization. Such 
changes are caused by industrialization, technologization, bureaucratization, 
standardization, urbanization, social fragmentation, individualization, com-
mercialization, etc. One of the core tenets in traditionalism – often manifested 
in a narrative ethos of loss and decadence – is the notion that modernization 
has destroyed or threatens to destroy traditions as representations of com-
munity and collective identiﬁcations, regarded by many as key elements in 
human spirituality and social well-being, its core meanings and its cultural 
heritage.
Traditionalism can present itself in antimodernism, which means resist-
ance to modernization or a refusal to modernize. Well-known examples of 
antimodernism are such religious groups as the Old Order Amish and the 
Old-Believers. The Amish are a group of Mennonites and Anabaptists who 
wish to separate themselves from the rest of the world and resort to self-suf-
ﬁciency, declining to adopt such modern conveniences as electricity. The 
Old-Believers refuse to recognize the reforms introduced in the seventeenth 
century by Patriarch Nikon (1605–1681) to the liturgical texts and practices 
of the Russian Orthodox Church (see e.g. Čistov 1976: 224–225; Pentikäinen 
1999a). Paradoxically, as pointed out by K. V. Čistov, the Old-Believers, 
despite their conservatism, enhanced the spread of modern literacy, as they 
needed to be able to read and copy old, pre-Nikon liturgical texts without 
the help of priests and other Church ofﬁcials.
Yet another example of antimodernism is provided by Luddism, which 
has its historical origin in a revolt in 1811 against English textile factories 
when these started to replace craftsmen with machines. According to the 
Internet pages of the School of Education at the University of Colorado at 
Denver, “Today’s Luddites continue to raise moral and ethical arguments 
against the excesses of modern technology to the extent that our inventions 
and our technical systems have evolved to control us rather than to serve us 
and to the extent that such leviathans can threaten our essential humanity” 
(Luddism 2002). As this quote, at least partially, exempliﬁes, the antimodern 
orientation is based on a notion that modernization causes alienation from a 
number of social values ranging from work, nature and the sacred to human-
ity, collectivity, community, localness and traditionality. This alienation, then, 
results in a lack of authenticity in the rationalistic, secularist, technological 
and commercial culture of the industrialized, mass-mediated and allegedly ‘de-
vernacularized’, ‘de-localized’ and ‘detraditionalized’ Western modernity.
The making of rural life as a pastoral idyll from an urban perspective 
represents yet another example of antimodernism. In American transcenden-
talism, which paralleled early 19th-century Herderian nationalism in Europe, 
the rural folk were regarded as “emblems of spiritual truth” (Bustin 1988: 2). 
In a manner familiar from the Cartesian dualism of spirit and matter, which 
implies that the excess of one means the lack of the other, antimodernism 
conveys the idea that modernization through technologization brings about 
materialism, which then alienates people from spiritualism. Thus, the less 
modernized, the more spiritual people are, and vice versa.
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Antimodernism is not, however, mere criticism of modern developments. 
In addition, it participates in the conceptualization of spatial relations (also 
on a global scale) by constructing non-modern othernesses that are seen to 
(still) possess that which modernity is felt to destroy. While the modern self 
is seen as being subject to fragmentation and detraditionalization, attention 
is directed to sites where the positively valued aspects of community mak-
ing apparently continue to exist. Elements of culture, philosophy and social 
values originating from these sites are then appropriated as novelties in the 
making of a ‘better’ modernity and modern selfhood. This is a form of edi-
ﬁcation that makes antimodernism, too, orientate towards the future. When 
antimodernism ﬁnds expression in the making of the allegedly non-modern 
a source for spiritual, moral, mystical, exotic, or nostalgic compensation for 
the alleged lack of tradition and authenticity in the experience of the modern, 
it is fundamentally a modern project.
This is one of the reasons why the bipolar opposition of promodern and 
antimodern as well as that of tradition and modernity must be regarded as 
conceptual and rhetorical constructions. Per se, they exemplify a major char-
acteristic in modernism to construct reality into one-dimensional and seem-
ingly separate categories and domains of thought. Indeed, Randall Collins 
argues that modernism arises from a propensity of the West to categorize its 
social conﬂicts and its trajectories of historical change in terms of a single 
continuum. “In politics”, Collins writes, “we attempt to array our factions 
along the spectrum from ‘Right’ to ‘Left’; in religion we label ‘traditionalists’ 
and ‘liberal reformers’, just as in arguments over cultural styles we generally 
distinguish ‘conservatives’ and ‘progressives’ ” (Collins 1992: 171). Collins 
points out how such polarizations as ‘liberal’ progressive, leftist modernist, 
on the one hand, and ‘conservative’ traditionalist, rightist anti-modernist on 
the other, are one-dimensional distinctions and ideological myths imposed 
upon a multidimensional and a more complex organizational reality (Col-
lins 1992: 172).
Thus, the stereotypical linking of tradition and conservatism, on the one 
hand, and modernism and progressiveness on the other, hardly qualiﬁes for 
an operational social classiﬁcation except in particular historically speciﬁc 
contexts. Such links are prescriptions instead of descriptions. That which is 
regarded as promodernist can appear antimodernist as well, and that which 
is progressive in a particular setting can from another viewpoint seem quite 
conservative. This applies especially well to the use of traditions as histori-
cal styles in the making of the present and its collective symbolism. It also 
applies, for example, to musical and visual arts, including those verbally 
artistic expressions that folklorists call folklore. An artistically progressive 
and innovative approach to past models and styles can create either progres-
sive or conservative political statements, depending on a variety of factors. 
Manifestations of ‘counter culture’ or ‘going native’, and preference for ‘soft 
technology’ and ‘recycling’ against ‘hard technology’ or ‘technocracy’, are at 
the same time antimodernist and promodernist, conservative and progressive. 
Nationalism is a modern ideology, but nationalists are often traditionalists. 
Thus, the promodernist and antimodernist perspectives on modernity are in 
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a dialectical rather than in a categorically oppositional relationship to one 
another.
Modernity’s Paradox
Modernity, as sensed and described by Charles Baudelaire, is an experience 
of life as transient, ﬂeeting and ephemeral (see Calinescu 1987: 4–5, 48; 
Harvey 1989: 10; Baudelaire 1989; cf. Wallgren 1989: 37). In addition to 
creating a continuous desire for novelties, especially for new technological 
innovations, such an experience has also given rise to discourse on the loss 
of that which recedes in time beyond recovery. One aspect of this discourse 
on loss is that the ephemerality of the present creates a longing for the eter-
nal and the immutable. Tradition, and folklore as its synonym in folkloristic 
discourse, serves as a metaphor for that which is solid, ﬁxed, and crystallized. 
It may provide a psychological anchor in the experience of ephemerality, as 
it manifests permanence that lasts through time.
In recent decades, the biological metaphor of root has been adopted and 
employed for the same purpose. It denotes spatio-temporal continuation in 
social life and a sense of belonging that is founded upon biologically deter-
mined genealogies, family histories or the presence of preferred references 
to the past. Traditions and roots are thus synonymous when placed as op-
posites to the continuous and rapid cultural and social changes, which are 
felt to be the trademark of modernity and ‘the modern lifestyle’. Tradition, 
folklore, and roots are, in this sense, discursive responses to the experienced 
ephemerality of modernity.
When ‘tradition’, associated and synonymized with ‘root’, connotes with 
permanence and timelessness, any change is potentially felt as a loss and a 
threat to the sense of cultural continuation. Change, from this perspective, 
comes to mean a rupture in what is conceptualized either as a static system 
or a ‘smooth’ and anticipated development in time and history. It therefore 
receives a negative charge. As an idea of an irreversible process, change 
– in addition to producing novelties – creates a discourse on loss. The sense 
of the loss of cultural traditions, folk traditions or roots ﬁnds a parallel in 
the more and more concerned discourses on the irreversible loss of natural 
resources, making the discourse on the loss of culture and cultural diversity 
a metadiscourse on eco-catastrophes and the loss of biodiversity (see e.g. Ó 
Giolláin 2003: 42–45).
Writing is a practice with which people prevent spoken words from vanish-
ing into thin air – provided that the written text can be preserved. Language 
is thus a means to produce both ephemerality and a sense of permanence, 
but paradoxically, languages are themselves subject to disappearance. Indeed, 
languages are often likened to endangered species and their loss is paral-
leled to the decline of cultural and biological diversity. Payal Sampat at the 
Worldwatch Institute highlighted this connection in her article ‘Last Words: 
The Dying of Languages’ (Sampat 2001), which was publicized as reporting 
that out of the world’s 6,800 languages, 3,400 to 6,120 may be extinct by 
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the year 2100. When the Tokyo-based English-language newspaper Japan 
Times reported on the contents of this article, the heading dramatized the 
loss: “World’s 6,800 languages are dying as we speak” (Japan Times, June 
21, 2001: 7).
The modern awareness and sense of loss is closely related to what has been 
called the modern sense of alienation. Yet, instead of a psychological state of 
estrangement, alienation here denotes a sense of lack in direct, unmediated 
experience and control of meaning. This is how alienation is present in Karl 
Marx’s highly inﬂuential economic theory, in which it stands for the lack of 
directness and control in the relationship between the product and its pro-
ducer, between the commodity and its manufacturer, in the capitalist society 
(e.g. McLellan 1982: 37–38). Rather similar are Henri Lefèbvre’s Marxist 
ideas on the commodity as an agent of capitalist domination and colonialism 
in the modern everyday (e.g. Lefèbvre 1991), as well as Jean Baudrillard’s 
views on mass consumption as disciplined waste that ultimately destroys 
the individual, social relations and the environment (Baudrillard 1975). This 
sense of alienation is also referred to when modern ‘neo-liberalist’ society is 
said to be manipulated by invisible ‘market forces’ over which individuals as 
producers and consumers have no control. Alienation denotes here the loss 
of an allegedly once-possessed political inﬂuence and cognitive control.
Because of the sense of loss and alienation caused by drastic social changes, 
perpetual technological innovations, increase in the mediated forms of pro-
duction and consumption as well as politics and policy making, moderniza-
tion, while creating a sense of progress and representing the progress of sci-
ence and technology, is at the same time embedded with critical discourses 
about itself and its own project. This criticism is not a total rejection of the 
modern but, rather, an expression of the dilemma in which, as phrased by 
David Harvey, one has to destroy in order to create (see Harvey 1989: 16–17). 
Modernity is, therefore, a fundamentally paradoxical experience. James Clif-
ford describes this by saying that “modern ethnographic histories are perhaps 
condemned to oscillate between two metanarratives: one of homogenization, 
the other of emergence; one of loss, the other of invention. In most speciﬁc 
conjunctures both narratives are relevant, each undermining the other’s claim 
to tell ‘the whole story,’ each denying to the other a privileged, Hegelian vi-
sion. Everywhere in the world distinctions are being destroyed and created.” 
(Clifford 1988a: 17.)
Many others have pointed to the same paradoxical or contradictory nature 
of modernity. Marshall Berman has noted how being modern is to be “both 
revolutionary and conservative: alive to new possibilities for experience and 
adventure, frightened by the nihilistic depths to which so many modern ad-
ventures lead, longing to create and to hold on to something real as everything 
melts. We might even say that to be fully modern is to be anti-modern: from 
Marx’s and Dostoyevski’s time to our own, it has been impossible to grasp 
and embrace the modern world’s potentialities without loathing and ﬁghting 
against some of its most palpable realities.” (Berman 1982: 13.)
Thus, according to Calinescu, there are two conﬂicting and interdependent 
modernities: one socially progressive, rationalistic, competitive, and techno-
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logical, the other culturally critical and self-critical, bent on demystifying the 
basic values of the ﬁrst (Calinescu 1987: 265). One aspect of people’s intrinsi-
cally contradictory way of experiencing modernity is the sense that “modern 
civilization has brought about a loss of something precious, the dissolution 
of a great integrative paradigm, the fragmentation of what once was a mighty 
unity” (Calinescu 1987: 265). For this reason, it is part of being modern to 
lament, in an antimodernist stance, the loss of an imagined traditional order, 
a ‘lost community’ and ‘true values’, and then project this onto sites or times 
that are made representations and ruins of such an order.
Modernity is also paradoxical in its diffusion, as those who escape moder-
nity in their search of non-modern authenticity and lost communities inescap-
ably take modernity with them. When modernity’s otherness is constructed 
through modern criticism, the sites of such otherness grow distant as they 
are approached. Claude Lévi-Strauss claims that anthropology is the study 
of a society that sets itself to destroy precisely those things that give it most 
ﬂavor. Accordingly, he has suggested that ‘entropology’, not anthropology, 
“should be the word for the discipline that devotes itself to the study of this 
process of disintegration in its most highly evolved forms” (Lévi-Strauss 
1967: 397). Discussing the theme of the ‘vanishing primitive’ as a narrative 
structure, James Clifford quotes Adolph Bastian as saying “For us, primitive 
societies [Naturvölker] are ephemeral. At the very instant they become known 
to us they are doomed.” Similarly, Clifford quotes Bronislaw Malinowski as 
saying “Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic position, that 
at the very moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its 
proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its 
study melts away with hopeless rapidity.” (Clifford 1986: 112.)
The feeling of the object disappearing just as it becomes an object is closely 
related to the touristic experience of looking for ‘authentic’ places where 
no (other) tourist has entered before (see MacCannell 1989). Paradoxically, 
authenticity is lost upon the visit by the ﬁrst tourist. There may be a parallel 
to this in the way in which male humans yearn for ‘authenticity’ and ‘purity’ 
in females – as spaces where no man has entered before. In an analogy to 
ethnography, one yearns for a virgin land in order to be the ﬁrst to take its 
virginity. (For a discussion on the way male folklorists have described their 
encounters with female performers in sexual terms, see Kodish 1987.)
Sociology as the Science of the Modern
Both of the two seemingly oppositional modernist projects are represented 
in the academic categorization of scholarly disciplines, which is, of course, 
itself a product of modernity and modernism. The two projects are different 
in their ways of commenting on the processes of modernization, since they 
conceptualize and judge tradition and change in seemingly opposite ways and 
have a seemingly different approach to the ‘irrationalities’ of the premodern. 
While the promodern project distances itself from non-modernity by reject-
ing it or by calling for its rejection, the antimodern one similarly establishes 
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distance by exoticizing non-modernity and by transforming it into critical 
representations through a modern and modernist gaze.
The promodern direction has found its academic foundation mainly in the 
discipline of sociology, which is not only called the science of the modern 
but is regarded as having its matrix in the very process of the Enlightenment. 
According to Stuart Hall, it was in the discourses of the Enlightenment that 
‘the social’ emerged as a separate and distinct form of reality, which could 
be analyzed independently of the ‘other-worldly’ or supernatural – that is, 
‘rationally’ (Hall 1992: 2; see also Hall 2000a: 4). Focusing on the social or-
ganization of modern societies and providing an explanation for “the course 
of the capitalist modernization of traditional societies” (Habermas 1984: 5), 
sociology has been founded upon a narrative of a unilinear movement from 
traditional to modern, and from community to society. This is also a narra-
tive of progress, according to which a specialized, modern society is better 
able to develop continuously and deal with new problems and social forces 
than what is called a traditional society (Eisenstadt 1974: 2).
As such a narrative of progress, the evolution from tradition to moder-
nity has in the main been discussed in sociological research as a process 
of emancipation and detraditionalization. A good example of this is the 
book entitled Detraditionalization (Heelas, Lash & Morris 1996), which 
is “designed to contribute to the growing debate concerning the extent to 
which our age has moved beyond tradition” (Heelas 1996: 1). Based on 
Durkheimian and Weberian perspectives, traditionality in this discourse 
stands for the foundation for intellectual authority and normative commu-
nity bonds – especially those established by the medieval and early modern 
Christian Church – that block individual expression and choice, innovation 
and rational reﬂection. Accordingly, traditional societies are regarded as 
being “informed by belief in established, timeless orders” (Heelas 1996: 
3). By contrast, modernity stands for self-conscious and reﬂexive action 
and for liberation from traditional authority, including freedom of speech 
and thought. Thus, tradition receives negatively charged attributes, while 
modernity is pregnant with positively charged ones. Tradition is seen to 
dominate so-called traditional societies which, because of their traditional-
ity, are regarded as having been marked by collective control, unreﬂexive 
authority and hierarchies, normative worldview, static social structure, lack 
of creativity and lack of rationality.
In an apparent West-centric bias, modern sociology, by claiming rationality 
to the moderns, has constructed the non-modern cultural other as something 
fundamentally irrational. Since this irrationality is associated with collective 
control, mechanical solidarity, and unreﬂecting conventionality, becom-
ing modern means to become a free and self-reﬂective individual (see e.g. 
Jallinoja 1991: 34–42; Giddens 1994). Modernism in sociological theories 
thus rejects and opposes tradition, connoting social bonds with the negatively 
charged concept of traditionality.
It is worthy of noting that in many sociological treatises of the modern/
traditional relationship, tradition is not a canon, a taxonomy or a list of any 
particular social behaviors or cultural practices, but it stands for that which 
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is not modern, whatever is regarded as modern. Like our everyday use of 
‘traditional’, as an opposition to that which is most recent and ‘just now’, 
‘traditional’ in sociological parlance has no referential meaning except in 
contrast to modernity and the social changes identiﬁed within it. As such, 
‘tradition’ is a synonym for the non- or premodern. Tradition stands for that 
which the modern surpasses, and therefore it denotes the social and cultural 
domain that modernity is separated and distinguished from.
Still, the concept of tradition does point in certain directions, as it locates 
the lack of the modern in a number of settings. Such temporal and spatial 
settings include medieval and early modern church authority, religion as the 
dominant source of ideas, peasant irrationality, absolutist political power and 
established systems of control (see e.g. Hamilton 2000: 30). In Weberian 
sociology, tradition makes a general reference to ‘the old rule’ or the past au-
thority of gerontocracy, patriarchalism and patrimonialism (see Weber 1964: 
341–358). It thus argues for restrictions and conventionality in the past and 
individual freedom in the present. As modernization is positively charged, to 
be modern is to be progressive and open to new ideas and values, while to 
resist new things and perspectives is to be old-fashioned, conservative and 
traditional. Tradition is a mode and a motive for being in the world. As put 
by Harriet Bradley, “Traditional motives are based on respect for custom and 
acceptance of long-standing forms of behaviour, often backed by religious 
or superstitious beliefs. People do things ‘because they’ve always been done 
that way’.” (Bradley 2000: 132.)
Since tradition has not been sociology’s research object, very little ana-
lytical attention has been paid to traditionality as a domain of social prac-
tice and cognitive processing. Attention has also escaped traditionality as 
containing active processes of interpretation, reﬂective argumentation and 
political agency. Instead, traditionality has been seen as the very opposite of 
such things. Tradition and modernity appear to follow a sequential order, in 
which tradition ends where modernity – including and indicating reﬂective 
and political action – begins. Since sociology has been regarded as a sci-
ence of the modern, the points of rupture between the past and the present, 
between tradition and modernity, have marked the beginning of the sociolo-
gist’s research territory.
Yet, even though the tradition/modernity opposition continues to make the 
sociologist promodern, not all sociologists have subscribed to the notion of 
modernity as an enduring story of success. Modernization may be viewed 
as a narrative of progress, especially that of rationality, but at the same time 
there have been scholars that are more sensitive to the destructive elements 
in modernity. A well-known example is Max Weber, for whom modernity 
stands for rationalism and liberation of people “from the garden of enchant-
ment in which magic and primitive gods had ruled their lives” (Turner 1984: 
65). Yet, the totality of rationalization in Weber’s scenario for the future of 
modern societies leads to bureaucratization and the loss of humanity. Ration-
ality and reason, in other words, would not bring “a Realm of Freedom but 
the domination of impersonal economic forces and bureaucratically organ-
ized administrations, not a Kingdom of God on Earth but an ‘iron cage’ in 
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which we were henceforth condemned to live” (McCarthy 1985: 176; see 
also Haferkamp 1987; Bernstein 1991: 4).
The Paradigm of Loss in Folklore Studies
While in sociology ‘tradition’ has stood for a lack of perceived historical 
change in social structure and worldview, in anthropology, ethnology and 
folklore scholarship the same concept has meant a form of social and cultural 
order based on oral communication. Tradition has here been a descriptive 
term for the culture of non- or pre-literate societies, in which knowledge, 
rules and social organization are preserved in memory and communicated 
by word of mouth (Ben-Amos 1984: 100–101). Such oral societies tend to 
be presented, especially by folklorists, as collectivities that lack all aspects 
of internal social hierarchization. Modern societies, in contrast, are typically 
characterized as being based on individualization, structural specialization, 
social mobilization, literacy, high levels of urbanization, and exposure to 
mass media (e.g. Eisenstadt 1974: 1–2). All these elements have been inter-
preted to indicate the lack of tradition in modernity both in the sociological 
and folkloristic sense.
From this perspective, folklore scholarship has to a large extent subscribed 
to the same modern–traditional schema as the sociologist, but from a dif-
ferent interest position. Both the folklorist and the sociologist construct and 
represent their object of study within a general discourse of change and a 
grand narrative from tradition to modernity. Yet, one of the central ways in 
which the discourse on change is put forward in folklore studies is the con-
ceptualization of the object of study within a discourse on modernity as loss. 
Loss of culture, loss of tradition, loss of identity, loss of traditional values, 
loss of morality, and loss of exceptionally valued folklore genres.
Like the sociologist, such a discourse positions the folklorist on a threshold. 
This is a crisis position both in the sense of an emergency situation as well 
as a turning point (from the Greek ‘krinein’, to separate; Webster’s 1984: 
s.v. ‘crisis’; cf. Anttonen 1992: 25). The present of the researcher is the very 
moment of ‘just now’ and of change. While the sociologist mainly looks 
towards modernity as a landscape of novelties, the folklorist looks towards 
tradition as a landscape that appears to be closing in on the very spot where 
the researcher is standing (see also Knuuttila 1994: 18–20). According to 
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Ours is a discipline predicated on a vanishing 
subject. The time of our operation is the eleventh hour. Before the eleventh 
hour there is life, after the eleventh hour death.” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996: 
249; see also Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998a: 300.)
Yet, not all folklore studies have been predicated with such a devolu-
tionistic approach. As pointed out by William Wilson (1976: 70–74), the 
historic-geographic method, as originally designed and formulated in the 
1870s by Julius Krohn in Finland, was not based on the idea of a continuous 
degeneration of folklore. On the contrary, Krohn was an evolutionist who 
believed that Finnish-language folk poetry gradually developed from primal 
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motifs and small poetic units into larger entities in the course of time and 
the geographic dissemination of folk poems. His son Kaarle Krohn, however, 
eventually rejected such evolutionism. Krohnian and post-Krohnian folklore 
studies came to be characterized by a quest for the pure, original form or the 
abstracted ‘normal form’, which could be considered, at least in principle, 
the historical origin for all available versions and variants.
Accordingly, the evolutionism of Julius Krohn turned out to be a passing 
note within the longer history of folklore studies. The survival theory of the 
Grimm brothers, as well as that of the British evolutionist anthropologists, 
served as the foundation for an emergent paradigm based on the modern 
discourse on loss and cultural impoverishment. Folklore, with tradition as 
its claimed synonym, became for both 19th and 20th century scholars a con-
tinuous near-death experience, as the research object was perpetually talked 
about in terms of living and dying. Alan Dundes has described this as the 
devolutionistic premise in folklore theory, according to which folklore not 
only deteriorates in time but the universe of folklore is being run down be-
cause of change and progress (see Dundes 1969). Since such a devolutionary 
process is attributed to social, economic and technological changes, this is 
a theory of modernization.
Because of its alleged lack of traditionality, modernity in this paradigm 
is seen as fake, artiﬁcial, superﬁcial and trivial. The dichotomy of moder-
nity and tradition thus authenticates tradition as a cultural other and sees 
deliberate making – that is, faking – of tradition as taking place only in the 
modern. This bias constructs folklore into a travel account from authenticity 
to inauthenticity, from the discovery of its original, ‘living’ and pure state 
to a condition marked by political, scholarly, and commercial intervention, 
appropriation and abuse – something negative that has been termed fakelore 
or folklorism (see Bendix 1992, 1997).
Modernity is also seen as an agent causing standardization. While in the 
‘folk culture’ of premodernity cultural expressions were allegedly spontane-
ous and transmitted spontaneously, in a modern society they are regarded as 
rule-governed and channeled into the regulated activities of associations and 
semi-ofﬁcial activity groups. The premodern social groupings have thus been 
regarded as real, genuine, and authentic communities, while the modern ones 
are considered both artiﬁcial and superﬁcial (see e.g. Kuusi 1974).
Yet, in addition to the social changes brought about by modernization, 
folklore has generated its discourse on loss through an interest in the study 
of immigration and the changes in traditions due to people changing location 
and place of residence. Roger Abrahams points to such discourse on the loss 
of traditions in conjunction of Englishmen and other Europeans migrating 
to America (Abrahams 1992b: 65). Until recent decades, immigrant folklore 
to a great extent meant research on the ‘loss of traditions’ when people mi-
grate, with the research focus set on comparing what kind of folklore people 
had possessed in their places of origin and what they no longer mastered in 
their places of immigration (see e.g. Dorson 1959: 135–136). More recent 
folkloristic research on the making and display of ethnicity in multicultural 
situations, initiated among others by Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1978), 
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tends to emphasize migration as a source for creativity in tradition and tra-
ditionality, instead of regarding it as a loss.
Folklore research as discourse on decadence is not a lone rival to the 
promodernist discourse of sociology. It is part of a set of academic ﬁelds 
– all born in modernity – that have participated in the modern discourse on 
cultural loss by documenting, describing and putting on display representa-
tions of past ways of life and cultural knowledge. Some of these, especially 
the various branches of the discipline of history, are felt to be neutral to the 
processes of modernization. For this reason, cultural or art historical interest 
in the past – which mostly concerns the culture of the educated upper classes, 
the political elites, artists and the intelligentsia – tends to be regarded as 
representing an ‘innocent’, that is, a non-argumentative, interest in history. 
Recent historical scholarship has, however, questioned this notion.
Folklore studies, ethnology and cultural anthropology have tended to 
be ‘pro-traditional’. Focusing on the uneducated lower classes within the 
conﬁnes of the scholar’s own national sphere, or peoples and communities 
on allegedly lower levels of civilization outside the Western world, these 
disciplines have justiﬁed their own existence and manner of representation by 
attaching special value to that which is regarded as being marginalized and 
falling into oblivion because of (Western) modernization. In the 19th century, 
according to Peter Burke, “students of what they called ‘folklore’ were often 
conservatives, who saw themselves as defending traditional values against 
the assaults of modernization” (Burke 1992: 293). Ernst Dick has traced 
this trait in the discipline back to Herder, being in tune with “Herder’s love 
for the simple people, his interest in earlier traditions, and his bias against 
modern civilization” (Dick 1989: 16).
But in addition to being a disposition towards modernity, traditionalism 
and antimodernism have certain methodological consequences. On the one 
hand, the discipline continues its association with the past, and guides its 
practitioners “to search for people who continue to practice certain arts and 
crafts in the old ways” (Abrahams 1993a: 7). The folk are, in other words, to 
be found “in the old-fashioned peoples allegedly living by an earlier mode 
of social organization” (Abrahams 1993a: 4). On the other hand, nostalgia 
is generated for an ‘older sense of community’ or a Gemeinschaft, in which 
communication has allegedly been unmediated and people have experienced 
each other directly, ‘immediately’. As put by Richard Bauman, “There’s more 
than a touch of the nostalgic romantic in most of us, and we’re still under-
standably attracted to the old stuff” (Bauman 1983: 154). Calling attention 
to folklore as antiquity, Roger Abrahams points to the “strange status” of 
the “scarce remains of past cultures (…) as dislocated remnants that carried 
with them a certain mystery and power” (Abrahams 1993a: 3). Indeed, it is 
this mystery and power of the old and the exotic – the antique as a souvenir 
from unvisitable places – that often entices people to folklore studies.
’Face-to-face’ is a metaphor often used by people in general and folklor-
ists in particular to describe direct, unmediated interactions, and it is in such 
communicative and interactive situations that folklore by many folklorists 
is thought to abound. According to Abrahams, “we maintain the impression 
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that folklore is best found at the center of the household operation or in some 
other place commonly characterized by good and friendly talk” (Abrahams 
1993a: 24). Such a characterization bears witness to the fact that even though 
folklore has often been conceptualized as a scholarly taxonomy, even a 
canonized body of texts, it at the same time continues to be referred to as a 
chronotope of ideal communication and unmediated interaction. Recently, 
Diarmuid Ó Giolláin has described this sense in the discipline and its ob-
ject by saying that “Folklore escapes clear deﬁnition, but its aura gives it an 
immediate emotional resonance” (Ó Giolláin 2000: 2). As such, it functions 
as an unspeciﬁed qualitative opposite to that which is regarded as modern 
(cf. Benjamin 1992).
The Collector’s Gaze
Especially in its early stages the folklore discipline was characterized by a 
gaze away from modernity into the cultures of the lower classes, the vulgus 
in populo, the uncivilized, the illiterate, the non-Whites and the ‘ethnics’, 
which all became the designated reference point for the concept of folk 
in folklore (see e.g. Newell 1888; Dundes 1966, 1977). The dichotomy of 
tradition and modernity and the paradigm of loss have continued to model 
both the methodology and the rhetoric of the discipline into two interrelated 
projects: a gaze into the margins of modernity in search for authenticity (see 
Bendix 1997), and a mission to collect folklore in a manner that has been 
termed ‘eleventh-hour ethnography’ (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996), ‘saving 
from the ﬁre’ (Abrahams 1993a), or ‘salvage or redemptive ethnography’ (Clif-
ford 1986: 112–113).
As far as the English-speaking world is concerned, the folkloristic mission 
to collect was chartered in England in 1846 by William Thoms, who coined 
the term ‘folk-lore’ to refer to “a slowly but surely disappearing knowledge” 
(Ben-Amos 1984: 104). Since Thoms characterized his coinage as denoting 
“the manners, customs, observances, superstitions, ballads, proverbs, etc., 
of the olden time” (Thoms 1965: 5), the notion of folklore as a vanishing 
substance was inscribed in the original formulation of the concept. William 
Wells Newell presented this in the American context in the 1880s, establish-
ing the American Folklore Society “to encourage the collection of the fast-
vanishing remains of folk-lore in America” (Newell 1888). The mission to 
collect has continued to characterize the discipline especially in those coun-
tries in which the folklore archive is a central institution. Its vibrancy in the 
1990s can be seen, for example, in the statement by Lauri Honko, who, with 
reference to the Unesco Recommendation for the Safeguarding of Folklore 
and Traditional Culture, encouraged “us all [to] go wherever valuable tradi-
tions are in danger of passing away without a single act of documentation” 
(Honko 1992: 4).
Such documentation can be justiﬁed with a number of good reasons. One 
of them is the fact that the accumulated collections provide indispensable 
means for historical research and cultural analysis. Yet, this is not merely a 
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pragmatic question. As James Clifford has pointed out, “The other is lost, 
in disintegrating time and space, but saved in the text” (Clifford 1986: 112). 
More recently, Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs have rather sardonically 
asked, with reference to the Unesco Recommendation, how “these fragile 
oral traditions, nested protectively in communities” are to be safeguarded 
“against the juggernaut of industrialized culture” (Bauman & Briggs: 308). 
Their ‘answer’ to the question is this:
The solution: more intervention by experts, enabled by [Unesco] Mem-
ber States: encouragement of scientiﬁc, universalizing, rationalized 
tasks and tools (national inventories, global registers, coordinated 
classiﬁcation systems, standard typologies, harmonized collecting and 
archiving methods), establishment of an institutional infrastructure for 
such expert tasks (national archives, documentation centers, libraries, 
museums, seminars, congresses), and support for the specialists who do 
the safeguarding work (training courses, full-time jobs for folklorists). 
(Bauman & Briggs 2003: 308.)
The political value of the created text rests on the transformation of social 
practice and performance into a representation, which is then appropriated 
into discourses on both heritage and its technical production. The archive 
paradigm in folklore studies, which is stronger in some countries than in 
others, implies a political standpoint according to which cultural identity is 
best protected and argued for by depositing representations of both vibrant 
and receding practices in the archive and then selecting material for public 
presentations, for example in the form of museum displays or books targeted 
at the consuming and reading public. Folklore speaks – for example the lan-
guage of nationalism – through collections.
When conceptualized as a vanishing object, folklore calls for immediate 
documentation. As an object to be documented in ethnographic practice, folk-
loric communication becomes a collectible, an item that can and should be 
carried away and included in classiﬁcation systems designed for such collec-
tibles. As pointed out by Dan Ben-Amos, most deﬁnitions of folklore have 
conceived of it as a collection of things. “These could be either narratives, 
melodies, beliefs, or material objects. All of them are completed products or 
formulated ideas; it is possible to collect them.” (Ben-Amos 1972: 9.)
Creating collections is not an innocent form of representation. Instead, it 
is an activity pertaining to the politics of culture and history and contributing 
to the discourses on difference and the political construction of continuities 
and discontinuities. Collections depoliticize the communication from which 
‘folklore’ as entextualized artifacts is extracted. At the same time these artifacts 
are transformed into mimetic representations that create their own politics. 
When conceptualized as collections of items brought back from modernity’s 
otherness, folklore may speak for the politically correct way of constructing 
local or national heritage. Yet, such collections may also carry on the rheto-
ric of conﬁrming the political distinction drawn between the moderns and 
the non-moderns, the educated and the folk, the civilized and the exoticized 
others, the West and the rest.
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Collections both display and generate power. As put by Clifford, eth-
nography’s disappearing object is “a rhetorical construct legitimating a 
representational practice” (Clifford 1986: 112). This practice, as discussed 
by Abrahams, dramatizes the power of the collector. In such practice, the 
rarity of the disappearing object legitimates its status as a representation of 
difference (Abrahams 1993a: 18) – and as discussed by Foster, as an exotic 
object of art (Foster 1982: 30).
Archives and museums are useful modern innovations for the presentation 
and representation of history and culture, but they are not innocent deposito-
ries of collectibles. Instead of providing unmediated material for research and 
learning about other times and places, the collecting as well as the display 
of that which has been collected is always embedded in its own rhetorics 
and politics in terms of who is represented, how, for whom, and for what 
purposes (see e.g. Clifford 1988b, 1988c; Lönnqvist 1989: 29–31; Kirshen-
blatt-Gimblett 1991 and other articles in Karp and Lavine 1991; Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett 1992, 1998b; Stewart 1993; Kurki 2002). In addition to providing 
systematic access to systematized information, archives and museums give 
meaning and value to their possessions by the very act of making them part 
of collections and entities constructed both aesthetically as well as in view 
of their purpose in the representation of culture. Such collections do not only 
create rationalized models and ﬁlters for subsequent collecting (see Frykman 
1979: 235–236), for the selection of that which ‘deserves’ to be collected. In 
addition to this, they also speak of the esteem for large quantities and belief 
in their power and adequacy in metonymic representation.
Archived materials – or any other ethnographic materials, for that matter 
– are never transparent in their ways of mediating and representing the cul-
tural contexts from which they were extracted. They can purport to provide 
future generations with “a chance to get a reliable picture of the traditional 
ways of life in eras past” (Honko 1991: 29), but the reliability of the picture 
is always a question of interpretation and authorization, which the archive 
and the museum through their own institutional power tend to make invisible. 
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett makes the essential point by saying that “lists 
and collections obscure the hand that shapes the representation. They create 
the illusion of genuine, which is to say, unmediated, folklore.” (Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett 1988: 145; see also Briggs 1986: 22.)
James Clifford has called the collecting of folklore “rule-governed, mean-
ingful desire” (Clifford 1988c: 218). Since one cannot possibly document 
everything that falls into oblivion, one must “select, order, classify in hi-
erarchies – to make ‘good’ collections” (loc. cit.). Such systems speak for 
rational, “rule-governed possession” based on the aesthetics of taxonomy, 
instead of a ‘fetishistic’ ﬁxation on single objects (Clifford 1988c: 219; see also 
Stewart 1993). Speaking for rational possession, such systems also constitute 
disciplinary discourses. As put by Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Objects 
become ethnographic by virtue of being deﬁned, segmented, detached, and 
carried away by ethnographers” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991: 387; also 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 17–18). This means that disciplines make their 
objects and in the process make themselves. Indeed, as the gaze creates its 
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object, that which is regarded as folklore becomes a representation of such 
a category within a particular discursive practice constructing the discipline 
of folklore.
Folklore as Literary Text
Folklore in the sense of oral tradition has most commonly become accessible 
in collections through the means of writing. Throughout the history of the 
discipline, the documentation of oral tradition has meant by deﬁnition its 
transformation into a written format, and it is only during the most recent 
decades that writing as a form of representation has come to be discussed 
by folklorists. As documents of orality that the folklorist purports to save 
from oblivion, folklore recordings are fragments that are entextualized and 
transformed into literary imitations of their orality. As such they are arti-
factualized. Yet, unlike in belles lettres, the author of the folklore text has 
been regarded as a mere transcriber, which tends to conceal the subject and 
subjectivity of the authoring and, therefore, the authorization of the text as 
a folklore document.
The documents of orality are mimetic representations of the very com-
municative contexts from which they are extracted, of that which cannot be 
carried away (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991: 389; see also Bauman & Briggs 
1990: 72–78). As such, they are transformed into metonymic representations 
of the cultures and communities in which they were originally produced. As 
pointed out by Susan Stewart, the separation, manipulation and appropriation is 
founded upon particular means of making literary artifacts, the value and aes-
thetic qualities of which are historically speciﬁc and ideologically motivated 
(Stewart 1991: 6–7). Yet, in addition to aesthetic qualities, such metonymic 
representations have to do with territorial identiﬁcations such as the construc-
tion of national and regional cultures and the incorporation of particular areas 
and populations into particular political and ideological entities.
When materials recorded from oral communication, such as songs, prov-
erbs and narratives, receive their value as printed, metonymic representations 
of, for example, the nation and its cultural heritage, folklore as a document 
of orality is in a fundamental way conceptualized as – and entextualized into 
– literature. This has been quite paradigmatic in folkloristic discourse since 
its emergence as a discipline. When coining the word ‘folk-lore’ to replace 
‘popular antiquities’ and ‘popular literature’, William Thoms conceptualized 
the collecting, organizing, and publishing of antiquities as part and servant of 
the country’s literary culture (see Thoms 1965: 5). The same applies to the 
act of collecting and publishing folklore in Finland; the Kalevala epic was 
received as the ﬁrst important work in Finnish literature and continues to be 
valued as such (see e.g. Honko 1980a: 2, 1980b, 1987b: 130–133; Karkama 
2001; Anttonen 2002, 2004a). For Matti Kuusi, folklore is unwritten litera-
ture (see Kuusi 1963).
As a form of literature, folklore is by implication old and ancient, because 
in the historical sequence of orality and literacy, it has to predate written lit-
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erature. It is also regarded as more authentic than written literature, which, 
by deﬁnition, is an individual, and therefore, modern (and in its idiosyncrasy, 
a non-traditional) product of human creativity. Susan Stewart has argued that 
folkloristic genres, such as the epic, fable, proverb, fairy tale, and ballad, are 
artifacts constructed by a literary culture. As such, they are projections of 
authenticity onto oral forms that are thus ‘antiqued’, distressed, made old. 
Stewart emphasizes that “when oral forms are transformed into ‘evidence’ 
and ‘artifacts,’ they acquire all the characteristics of fragmentation, sym-
bolic meaning, and literariness that are most valued by the literary culture” 
(Stewart 1991: 7).
The practice of ‘making old’ is a rhetorical means to embed the collected 
materials and the cultural forms they represent with the value and prestige of 
age. In discourses in which history carries authority, age is the most advanta-
geous property that the folklore materials can have in the argumentative con-
texts into which they are incorporated. Age matters when folklore is presented 
as a testimony of national culture, the political claims made in its name or as 
symbols for an ethnic group aspiring for linguistic and/or cultural rights and/or 
political sovereignty. It embodies the idea according to which the essence of 
the power of tradition is to legitimate the present act with a historical prec-
edence. For this reason, that which is claimed traditional is most prestigious 
when claimed to be old. Proverbs, for example, tend to be rhetorically charged 
with the claim that they are ‘ancient wisdom’. In 19th-century Finland, the 
oral verse found from among the illiterate and preindustrial segments of the 
population was conceptualized as ‘ancient’ poetry, even though no ancient 
document was available, as the earliest recording dates from the 16th century. 
It is indeed the politicization of age that Hobsbawm attacked with his criticism 
of the invention of tradition (see Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).
In addition to its position as part of a collection, the argumentative value 
and force in that which is regarded as folklore or tradition has derived from 
its conceptualization as an antiquity. An antiquity is an object that receives 
its value from being a rarity that comes from a distant timespace and car-
ries, as it were, time and history within itself. In England in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, that which is now called folklore was called ‘popular antiquities’ 
to denote cultural forms and expressions regarded as being relics, remnants 
and curiosities of older times, that is, deriving from premodernity. In this 
coinage, ‘popular’ refers to cultural, spatial and class-based otherness, while 
‘antiquity’ refers to its value as a rare representation of temporal otherness.
Roger Abrahams has called antiquated documents of cultural otherness 
“ruins in the landscape” (Abrahams 1993a: 10–11). In a similar manner, Nicole 
Belmont has argued that folklore scholarship is founded upon such temporal 
distancing in which oral traditions are made representations of ancient times, 
and referred to with the metaphors of monument and ruin (Belmont 1986: 
25–26, cited in Tarkka 1989: 249). Such ruins are not mere glimpses of the 
past. They are monuments that both prescribe and legitimate a particular way 
of writing and representing history. According to Abrahams, they endow a 
piece of land with ancient meanings and thus sacralize the landscape and its 
control as claimed territory (see Abrahams 1993a: 10–11, 17). According to 
56
Folklore in Modernism
Bendix, “collecting reiﬁes the communicative processes that are folklore and 
renders them into a desirable relic” (Bendix 2002: 113). Despite the termi-
nological shift made by the antiquarian William Thoms in 1846 (see Thoms 
1965), ‘folklore’ in folkloristic research has continued its earlier semantic 
meaning as an antiquity. This, then, has emphasized the idea of folklore as 
a thing of the past, despite many present-day folklorists’ efforts and argu-
ments to the contrary. By deﬁnition, antiquity is an item of non-modernity, 
temporally opposite to or distant from modernity.
The same applies to the idea of folklore as classic. Conceptualized through 
the temporal qualiﬁers of modern and its opposites, that which is traditional 
can also be seen as ‘antique’ and ‘classic’. Retaining its sense as ‘popular 
antiquity’, folklore stands for that which in human cultural production and 
communication not only threatens to vanish due to such ‘alien factors’ as 
modernization, but appears to remain – or rather, gain – in value and create 
a sense of historical permanence and continuity in the transitory nature of 
human existence, the ﬂeetingness of time, and the falling into oblivion of 
both natural and human-made products. Those that remain or seem to remain 
are classics. They are timeless by enduring time and persisting through it. 
Folklore is also conceptualized as a ‘classic’ in the sense of ‘ﬁrst class’, as 
the term was understood in the ﬁrst centuries A. D. in Rome (Calinescu 1987: 
14). The search for and display of gems of folk expression and artistry (‘clas-
sics’ among the populus vulgus) have characterized the discipline especially 
through its devolutionistic premise, dominant in the early 20th century. When 
made objects of nostalgia, the classics become qualitative souvenirs from 
places unvisited and unvisitable.
A similar type of distance between the modern and the present is cre-
ated through the continuing and even increasing tendency to synonymize 
‘folklore’ with ‘tradition’. Considering the fact that the concept of tradition 
has, to a great extent, surpassed ‘ancient’ and ‘classical’ as the designated 
term to denote the temporal opposition to ‘modern’, the synonymization of 
‘folklore’ and ‘tradition’ cannot escape from making ‘folklore’ and ‘modern’ 
contradictions in a temporal sense. From this perspective, any argument for 
the occurrence of ‘folklore’ in the modern is an issue of ‘still’. Indeed, any 
such occurrence is by deﬁnition an argument.
Turning instances of orality into antiquities is to embed the documents 
with power not only to represent but also to transform. As an antiquity, a 
text is extracted from those communicative and rhetorical contexts in which 
it has become an object of interest and value for the collector/scholar. As a 
consequence, it is drawn into another communicative and rhetorical context 
in which it receives its status as a representation of not only the communica-
tive and rhetorical context from which it was extracted from (as mimesis) but 
of particular past ways of experiencing life and spatiotemporal otherness in 
general (as metonymy). In other words, folklore as circulating discourse is 
transformed into folklore as the collective representation of a ‘folk’. As such, 
its argumentative value depends on how it fulﬁlls the rhetorical purposes set 
for the contexts into which it has been integrated – in the discourses into 
which it has been recontextualized.
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The conceptualization of tradition as selected artifacts has gone hand in 
hand with the process of folklorization. This is to say that the collecting and 
study of folklore does not ‘ﬁnd’ or ‘discover’ folklore, as if this were an 
objectively existing natural object, independent of its role and position as 
an object for the folklorist’s gaze. Instead, the gaze that looks for folklore, 
whether regarded as vanishing or as vibrant, incorporates particular cul-
tural phenomena into the discourse on folklore and the folklore taxonomy 
designed within this discourse. In this discourse the term ‘folklore’ stands 
metacommunicatively for particular types of acts and utterances in a set of 
classiﬁcations. It also serves as a metaphor for cultural continuity and socially 
constructed models in verbal artistry and poetic expression, and in symbols 
of collectivity and traditionality. The folkloristic gaze, in other words, does 
not only ﬁnd historicity and collectivity in human communication and social 
life; it makes it folklore, that is, folklorizes it.
This does not mean that the phenomena regarded as folklore do not on-
tologically exist. Rather, it means that particular, selected elements in hu-
man culture and communication receive their epistemic meaning and value 
as objects of this selection through their inclusion and appropriation in the 
scholarly category of folklore. In other words, the process of folklorization, 
the collecting and naming of cultural phenomena as folklore and putting them 
on display as collections of such, is to incorporate particular elements and 
processes of communication, for example, particular generic expressions of 
verbal artistry, into a particular type of social knowledge, which is then given 
epistemic power to legitimate the very practice of representation.
To folklorize is to detrivialize. That which gets to be selected and objec-
tiﬁed by the folklorist as a representation of cultural otherness is trivial to the 
scholar when it lies outside its role as an object for the folklorizing gaze. It 
is thus detrivialized as the folklorist recontextualizes it into new discourses 
by objectifying it, collecting it, classifying it and putting it on display. Folk-
lore taxonomy, folklore collection and folklore presentation are discourses of 
detrivialization. The detrivialization is especially conspicuous when folklore 
as representation is made by its very presence to comment on modernity 
and its otherness in a discourse on difference. In addition, as fragments and 
extracts from the ephemerality of human life and interpersonal communica-
tion, folklore recordings also function as means to detrivialize the ephemeral 
and create a sense of permanence (cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991: 391). As 
such, folklore functions like a photograph that captures the passing of time, 
ﬁnitude and death (cf. Turner 1987: 150). In its own permanent, ‘saved-from-
oblivion’ form, it detrivializes the moment of capture, and transforms it into 
a recognizable and recollectable moment that at the same time comments 
on the act of representation. It does this by representing that which signiﬁes 
absence, adding thus to its value as a token of rarity, age, and class.
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The Search for a Lost Community
Representing a conception common at the time, Richard Bauman wrote in 
1983 that it is “one of the great ironies of our intellectual history as folklor-
ists (...) that the discipline of folklore emerged just at the time that traditional 
folk society, as ideally conceived, was recognized as a declining way of life 
under the impact of technological and economic change” (Bauman 1983: 153). 
Since then, there has been an increase in arguments that the discipline did 
not emerge ‘ironically’ at such an eleventh hour, but instead, the discursive 
practice of studying and collecting that which is called folklore has been a 
particular response to the advent of modernity and the effects of moderni-
zation (see e.g. Abrahams 1988, 1992a, 1993a; Becker 1988; Bustin 1988; 
Bauman 1989). Instead of ironically coinciding with modernization, the es-
sence of folkloric practice lies in its argumentative relationship to modernity 
and modernization.
According to Roger Abrahams, the response of the emerging American 
folklore scholarship to modernization was a counter voice to the praise of 
progress, and as such, it was part of a larger intellectual movement that ex-
pressed mistrust in modernity. Like the many European forms of antimodern-
ism, Abrahams writes, American intellectuals “looked to the past and to an 
older sense of community and tradition in order to understand their growing 
sense of alienation and loss” (Abrahams 1988: 61). These “thoughtful Ameri-
cans” looked to earlier epochs (e.g. the Middle Ages), ‘simpler’ societies (e.g. 
the American Indians), and to childhood as “times and cultures exhibiting 
more energy and imagination and encouraging a wider range of vigorous 
experiences” (Abrahams 1988: 62). Abrahams’s account of the antimodernist 
basis of folklore scholarship, which Dillon Bustin also connects with the ro-
manticism of Henry David Thoreau and other transcendentalists (see Bustin 
1988), gives testimony to the notion that that which came to be collected and 
studied as folklore was regarded as providing modernity (at least the alienated 
upper class intellectuals in the American context) with regenerative power 
and moral nourishment found among the illiterate and exotic other.
For this reason we can argue that folklore scholarship, when conceptu-
alized as a moral or a national project, did not emerge from a realization 
that folklore as the cultural heritage and embodiment of moral or symbolic 
properties in peasant culture was just about to vanish due to modernization. 
On the contrary, that which was perceived as vanishing came to be valorized, 
politically established as cultural heritage in a national arena and/or regarded 
as an embodiment of preferred moral properties. Consequently, that which 
was initially marginal and trivial for those in the political and intellectual 
centers of modernity was brought into their symbolic discourses in the center 
by collecting specimens of marginal cultural forms and attaching to them 
special, partly nostalgic and partly moral use value, both as a commentary 
against certain processes of modernization and in the service of certain oth-
ers. As a metaphor for a ‘lost community’, the past, as it was interpreted to 
be represented in folklore, provided a means to criticize particular modern 
changes and innovations which were felt to be lacking in collectivity or 
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moral property or were felt to cause such a lack. Yet, paradoxically, such 
discourse at the same time produced more of the very modernity that was 
seen to produce loss.
Folkloristic discourse on the vanishing object follows the traditionalist 
perspective according to which modernity generates inauthenticity and a 
sense of loss of directness and unmediatedness in production, consumption, 
and communication. Yet, folklore research is not mere nostalgia undermin-
ing its own emancipative power. On the contrary, as pointed out by Bryan 
Turner about nostalgia, by converting the past into a Utopian homestead, it 
may lay the foundations for a radical critique of the modern as a departure 
from authenticity (Turner 1987: 154).
This especially applies to American folklore scholarship, which not only 
in its formative, post-transcendentalist stages but especially in its late 20th-
century developments is to a great extent constructed as a project of ediﬁca-
tion that purports to ﬁght and undo what are regarded as the alienating and 
“disruptive forces of modernity’” (Bauman 1983). Here folklore, as denoting 
‘face-to-face’ interaction and direct, unmediated experience, is conceptual-
ized as a trajectory against modern alienation. The same applies, according 
to Hermann Bausinger, to Germany, where folklore and folklife have been 
“anti-modernist constructions based on a regressive ideology (…) compensat-
ing for the alienation of modern life” (Bausinger 1990: xi). ‘Folk’, ‘folkness’, 
and ‘folk society’ as modernity’s constructed othernesses are projected as 
resources for sites and states in the experience of directness, unmediated-
ness, and intimacy.
Based on the notion that modern society is socially distant and differen-
tiated, the nostalgic projection becomes a form of social commentary that 
uses the concepts of ‘folk’ and ‘folk community’ for the representation and 
defense of the ordinary, the intimate, and the local, which are regarded as 
some of the crucial building blocks of identity making in modern society – as 
much as in a traditional society. Unlike Herderian and Hegelian nationalism 
in Europe, which valorizes folklore as a representation of national symbol-
ism and ancestry, the American transcendentally oriented appropriation of 
nostalgia for a ‘lost community’ looks for alternative ways of making and 
experiencing modernity. Steven Zeitlin has, accordingly, called folklore stud-
ies a discipline of advocates, in which the goal is “fostering webs of cultural 
meaning, linking past and present through tradition and creativity, encourag-
ing the process whereby human beings, as Dell Hymes (1975: 369) puts it, 
shape deeply felt values into meaningful forms” (Zeitlin 2000: 5).
The search for alternative ways to experiencing modernity is a continu-
ous cultural ﬂow between centers and peripheries. The present is actively 
made and created by bringing culture from that which is conceptualized as 
marginal and otherness to that which is conceptualized as a center in one’s 
experience of modernity (cf. Hannerz 1991). For the folklorist, this is an 
issue of bringing culture from among the ‘folk’ to the ‘non-folk’ with the 
intention of making the ‘non-folk’ more ‘folk’. As put by Dillon Bustin, the 
purpose is “to ﬁnd in folk culture the inspiration for improved community life” 
(Bustin 1988: 5). As such, folklore scholarship comes close, as also noted 
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by Zeitlin (2000: 14), to the classic deﬁnition of a revitalization movement 
(see e.g. Wallace 1956: 265), but its philosophical foundation as socio-politi-
cal activity is different. It is noteworthy that both the folk and folklore are 
qualitative categories.
Jane Becker describes the folklorists’ moral agenda as follows: “Living in 
a world of sophisticated technology, politics, and bureaucracy, we still seek to 
give meaning to our lives and perhaps seek an alternative model of living by 
maintaining and reviving folk traditions. Using interpretations of traditional 
culture, we continue to search for ways to identify ourselves as groups and 
as members of particular communities.” (Becker 1988: 55.) Thus, possibly 
because many prominent folklorists in the United States started out as folk 
song revivalists (see Jackson 1985; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988: 141), the 
idea of ‘reviving’ social and community life has become one of the essen-
tial motivational forces in folkloristic activity, especially in the ‘folkloristic 
community work’ of public sector folklore (see e.g. Baron & Spitzer 1992; 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2000). This is a form of practical training and political 
participation which for many of its protagonists means the appropriation of 
the qualities attributed to a folk society as arguments in the making of modern 
national, ethnic and residential communities. Becker writes that Americans 
“seek connections with a perceived simpler, more natural, preindustrial past. 
In this search, we have consistently turned to idealized concepts of ‘folk’ to 
deﬁne and sustain notions of community amid rapid and disruptive change.” 
(Becker 1988: 19.)
Perhaps more than for anybody else in the American context, folklore 
is for Henry Glassie a moral philosophy, its virtue being “that it is charged 
with values, saturated with opinions about how one ought to live in the 
world” (Glassie 1983: 127). With reference to Dan Ben-Amos’s deﬁnition 
of folklore as artistic communication in small groups (see Ben-Amos 1972), 
Glassie points to what he regards as the key moral propositions of folklore: 
First, folklore is artistic, aesthetic and created by someone who is commit-
ted to its creation, and therefore folklore stands against both triviality and 
alienation, “that which prevents people from preserving active control over 
their own creative energies”. Second, folklore is communication, and thus 
it brings people together and stands against radical individualism and sol-
ipsism. Third, folklore is artistic communication in small groups, and thus 
it “engenders personally involved connections among people who exist in 
on-going associations”. And since shared values, according to Glassie, hold 
people together in groups, they have a shared sense of morality, and thus, 
folklore also stands against amorality (Glassie 1983: 131). Interestingly 
enough, that which the founders of American folklore scholarship, accord-
ing to Abrahams, felt they were being alienated from, due to the vanishing 
of that which is called folklore, Henry Glassie ﬁnds residing in that which he 
designates as folklore. Folklore for him stands for – and stands up for – eve-
rything that is good, positive and edifying, and therefore, is opposed to the 
negative aspects of modernity.
In Glassie’s moral philosophy, the negative aspects of modernity constantly 
threaten folklore. “If modernity brings exploitation through alienation, cheap-
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ness through triviality, moral failure through radical individualism, despera-
tion through the destruction of small-group orientation, then folklore ﬁghts 
back. If modernity brings standardization, mass production, then folklore 
results from nonstandardization, from variation. If modernity means con-
stantly changing fashions, folklore means stable traditions. The purpose of 
fashion is to create class disjunction; the purpose of folklore is egalitarian 
integration of the little community” (Glassie 1983: 136.)
Even though Glassie’s perspective is antimodern, it is not non-modern. On 
the contrary, its antimodernism ﬁnds expression in the making of the non-
modern a source of ‘spiritual’ compensation for the alleged lack of tradition 
or authenticity in the experience of the modern. As such, his perspective is 
an inseparable part of modernity and its continuous reconstitution. The same 
applies to other things folkloric – whether considered ‘fakelore’ or ‘real folk-
lore’ – in which people ﬁnd regenerative power and creative force. The moral 
antimodernism of such perspectives is essentially a modern trajectory.
Folklore in the Modern
Most folklorists today will argue that the dichotomy of tradition and moder-
nity no longer applies. Indeed, the general trend in folklore studies during 
the last four or ﬁve decades has been, to borrow a phrase from Seppo Knuut-
tila, “a return to the present” (Knuuttila 1989). This means that originally 
past-oriented research has gradually been adjusted to ﬁnd its study objects 
closer to the scholars’ own present. Accordingly, folklore is no longer re-
garded merely as a thing of the vanishing agricultural past but is also found 
to exist in modern industrialized society. In fact, according to Ilana Harlow, 
“Current folklore theory afﬁrms that folklore is not threatened by modernity 
– that it is a creative response to contemporary conditions” (Harlow 1998: 
232). Similar views continue to proliferate.
This perspective was emphatically put forward by Alan Dundes in the mid-
1960s, when he launched his famous redeﬁnition of ‘the folk’ to refer to “any 
group of people whatsoever who share at least one common factor” (Dundes 
1965: 2). In support of his reformulation of the key concept of the discipline, 
Dundes argued that “If modern folklorists accepted the nineteenth century 
deﬁnition of folk as illiterate, rural, backward peasant, then it might well be 
that the study of the lore of such folk might be a strictly salvage operation 
and that the discipline of folkloristics would in time follow the folk itself 
into oblivion” (Dundes 1977: 22). Thus, in ﬁtting in a number of present-day 
phenomena under the heading of folklore and in disassociating ‘the folk’ from 
the uncivilized and the illiterate, Dundes’s reformulation aimed at deruralizing 
and modernizing not only the concept of folklore but also the discipline of 
folklore. This would also mean taking distance from 19th-century Herderian 
nationalism as the ideological foundation of the discipline.
Dundes’s reformulation was, thus, an issue of the folklorists becoming 
modern. With his explicitly “modern conception of the folk” (Dundes 1977: 
24), Dundes indicated that in order to be modern – instead of being tradi-
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tional – the folklorist is not to accept the traditional deﬁnition of folklore 
that associates it with the past and vanishing rural culture. In other words, a 
modern folklorist “sees members of modern societies as members of many 
different folk groups” (Dundes 1977: 24). A modern folklorist regards 
folklore as thriving in modernity. In addition, as pointed out by Dorothy 
Noyes, the terminological shift to the sociological concept of the group was 
intended to overcome the “classist, racist, and antimodern connotations of 
folk” (Noyes 1995: 452).
The subsequently common and often replicated idea of folklore thriving in 
modernity is not merely a rhetorical catchphrase to convince folklorists that 
they continue to have something to study in modernity. It is also supposed to 
provide a new answer to the old question of how folklore is transmitted and 
disseminated; how it is ‘living’. Dundes’s formulation of the folk argues for a 
close interrelationship between the existence of folklore and the groupness of 
a group. Indeed, in modern folklore scholarship, groupness came to be seen 
as the fundamental soil for folklore to emerge and to persist – in variations. 
As a product of a group, folklore came to be seen as signaling its identity. 
This sociological approach is continued in Dan Ben-Amos’s deﬁnition of 
folklore as artistic communication in small groups (see Ben-Amos 1972) 
as well as in Henry Glassie’s wordings about folklore and tradition: “Folk 
and lore link people and expression in a functional circle. Epic and nation, 
myth and society, custom and community – all conjoin communications and 
groups. The group exists because its members create communications that 
call it together and bring it to order.” (Glassie 1995: 400.)
Lauri Honko presented in Finland similar conceptions as Dundes did in 
the United States, and at the same time. Honko’s basic tenet was that in-
stead of merely existing and traveling, folklore does something: it functions 
socially. This functional orientation correlated with the contemporaneous 
methodological trend of putting the ‘folk’ back into ‘folklore’; that is, to set 
the scholarly focus on singers and narrators and other individual performers 
that in addition to standing out as individuals would still be recognized as 
being members of a given social group. The folk of ‘folklore’ came thus to 
be perceived as individuals in their role as members in a folk group; in other 
words, as individual tradition bearers who are members of a tradition-bearing 
community. For Honko in his modern sociological thinking, folklore became a 
“natural, even a vital element of the life of every member group. The members 
of the group may not all know each other, but they are more or less familiar 
with the group’s common fund of tradition, its values, norms and symbols.” 
(Honko 1991: 25.) Honko even stated that “Familiarity with this collective 
tradition is the true criterion for membership” and that folklore is the factor 
holding the group together (Honko 1991: 25–26). Here, the social basis of 
folklore becomes an even stronger determinant of the category than textual 
corpuses and related taxonomies. Folklore study is, thus, a kind of sociology 
of circulating texts but with a much stronger focus on the group in which a 
given text allegedly circulates than the circulation itself.
Many scholars came to share the view of folklore thriving in modernity 
and contributing to group making in society. This trend was also seen as an 
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indication of the ﬁeld of folklore being ﬁnally detached from antimodernism, 
romanticism and Herderian nationalism. Ruth Finnegan wrote in the early 
1990s that “it has become increasingly acceptable to study new and chang-
ing institutions rather than just those that could be deemed ‘old,’ to consider 
urban as well as rural environments (there is now, for example, the emerging 
branch of study known as ‘urban folklore’), and to include the interaction 
between oral and written forms as potentially equally as interesting as these 
separate modes of human communication once believed to be ‘pure’ and 
‘authentic’.” (Finnegan 1991: 110.)
Because of the rather general acceptance of Dundes’s formulation, as well 
as of similar developments in some countries even prior to the international 
distribution of Dundes’s ideas, the concept of folklore has gradually expanded 
to denote many sorts of traditional culture and expressive forms which do 
not necessarily have anything to do with peasant traditions, lower or vulgar 
classes of society, illiterateness, orality, collectivity, or anything else that used 
to be regarded as the basic characteristics, qualiﬁcations, and requirements 
of ‘traditional’ folklore. In this sense, the concepts of ‘folk’ and ‘folklore’ 
have not only been modernized but they have also been democratized – as 
democracy is a true modern value and political idea. As a consequence, just 
about anything can now be folklore and anybody can be folk (see also Dorson 
1978: 267; Abrahams 1992a: 44).2
To be sure, the process of modernization, deruralization, denationalization, 
contemporarization and democratization of folk and folklore began before 
Dundes formulated it into a deﬁnition. In the 1950s in Germany, Hermann 
Bausinger studied structures of everyday narrative and the ‘folk culture’ of the 
technological world (see Bausinger 1990). In Finland, Matti Kuusi declared 
in his inaugural lecture in 1959, upon attaining the distinguished academic 
position of Professor, that the Schlager, the pop song, is the folk song of today 
(Kuusi 1959; see also Pöysä 1994: 227–228). He was willing to include even 
the university auditorium in the list of sites in which modern folklore could 
be found. In the United States in the early 1960s, Roger Abrahams took a 
step into the urban world and wrote his dissertation on street corner music 
in a big city ghetto (Abrahams 1964). Ever since these landmarks, folklore 
research has continued its move not only from the countryside towards the 
city, but also from non-modernity to modernity.
This development has been characterized by an increasing acceptance of 
modernness in those social processes that are regarded as folkloric, although 
it required an eventual ‘postmodern’ perspective to accept the multitude of 
modern, and especially commercial, phenomena as part of the proper ﬁeld of 
folkloristic topics. For example, instead of seeing the upper classes of society 
or popular, mass-mediated culture as ‘the enemies of folklore’ in the classi-
cal Dorsonian way (see e.g. Dorson 1950; cf. Ben-Amos 1984: 110), there 
has been a growing interest in ﬁnding, collecting, studying, and publishing 
‘modern forms of folklore’. In the 1970s and 1980s, these comprised, for 
example, jokes and urban legends, which do not circulate in oral commu-
nication only but are also found in modern mass media – often published 
and/or edited by folklorists.
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Such perspectives have provided the folklorist with a multitude of reasons 
to continue pursuing the discipline, instead of letting it fall into oblivion with 
those folklore genres that are deemed classic and representative of premod-
ern times. Indeed, the ‘return to modernity’ (to paraphrase Seppo Knuuttila) 
has resulted in a growing tendency to study tradition not only in historical 
and rural settings but also in contemporary contexts. These have provided 
the discipline with new ‘frontiers’, such as the urban one in the 1980s (see 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1983), and more recently, the personal one, compris-
ing personal narratives, family histories, life stories, letters and diaries and 
the sociology of the everyday.
The folklorist’s return to modernity has in many regards followed the so-
ciological paradigm that was ﬁrmly established in the discipline in the 1960s. 
This paradigm was especially conspicuous in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
the popular trend, for example in the Nordic countries, was to study folklore 
as a manifestation of local, regional and national identities. According to 
Lauri Honko, a leading ﬁgure in this trend, collective identity was the key 
to study folklore and its variation, and the study of folklore and its variation 
was instrumental in studying collective identity (Honko 1982: 16; see also 
Honko 1988). Such a perspective makes a direct link between the circulation 
of folklore and the cultural identity of a social group. According to this logic, 
folklore does not only stand for a positively evaluated element in bringing 
cohesion between people, but serves to indicate of the cohesiveness of any 
group that has folklore. Honko continued the functionalistic premise of the 
sociological paradigm to his ﬁnal works (see Honko 1999).
As far as folklore methodology and taxonomy is concerned, the folklor-
ists’ return to modernity has often meant a search for functional equivalents 
between traditional and modern societies. According to Knuuttila, folklor-
ists continue to be traditionalists when they look for the old in the new. By 
this Knuuttila means that only those modern-day phenomena are selected as 
objects of research and scholarly attention which can be derived phenom-
enologically or analogically from the products of preindustrial folk culture 
(Knuuttila 1994: 20–21). Those that are claimed to be items of modern folk-
lore represent new forms of folklore because they are seen to contain elements 
that are familiar to the folklorist from the old forms of folklore.
It is worthy of note that such a perspective makes the earlier conceptions of 
folklore frames of reference against which the ‘folkloreness’ and authentic-
ity of modern phenomena is evaluated. Selected present-day and especially 
urban phenomena are claimed as legitimate folkloristic study objects on the 
basis of their correlation with earlier, agrarian traditions. These can range 
from a variety of professional practices and their recollections to text mes-
sages sent with mobile phones. This has at least two consequences. First, 
the observed similarities yield easily to arguments for cultural continuity 
and the continuation of traditions. Second, as pointed out by Knuuttila, the 
past determines the present and the present is described in light of the past 
(Knuuttila 1994: 20).
Even though research conducted from such premises can produce invalu-
able insights and information about given modern phenomena, the said per-
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spective does a great deal more than just continue the dichotomy between 
modern and traditional. Despite their explicit statement to deny the idea of 
‘fakelore’, folklorists authenticate the earlier, that is, the traditional, forms of 
society and the communicative means and forms employed in them. These 
are still employed by scholars as cognitive models in the conceptualization 
of folklore, even though the expansion of the folklore taxonomy would make 
it appear otherwise. The folklore of the so-called premodern folk society 
continues to be used as a basic conceptual framework, which makes the 
traditional phenomena in the present appear as folklore in ‘modern forms’ 
and ‘modern embodiments’.
Indeed, in a manner reminiscent of Matti Kuusi’s 1959 statement about 
the Schlager being the folk song of today, Dan Ben-Amos writes: “the mass 
media provides the modern world with the equivalent of folk tradition” (Ben-
Amos 1984: 110). Similarly, Henry Glassie states that “the culture of com-
merce in its production, say, of automobiles and ofﬁce buildings is not the 
antagonist of folk art but its embodiment in new forms” (Glassie 1988: 221). 
Here modernity is seen as an agent that has transformed folklore – and the 
observation is embedded with optimism and conﬁdence in modernity.
Such constructions as those denoting the ‘renewal’, ‘revival’ or ‘revitali-
zation’ of tradition also make the given modern phenomena equivalents in 
transformation. The emphasis is on the link that the present-day practices sup-
posedly make with their claimed predecessors. But in addition to indicating 
mere continuation, they are supposed to appear as intentionally made replica-
tions. For this reason, the allegedly present forms of folklore are not that far 
from being regarded as survivals or remains, except that they are attributed 
more agency in social meaning than what survivals or remains might have. 
As such, they continue to be seen as copies that authenticate their origins. At 
the same time, they also continue to represent what Raymond Williams has 
called the residual elements of culture (Williams 1977: 121–127).
The essentialized status of traditional folklore can also be seen in the 
tendency by folklorists to argue that the traditional genres of traditional 
societies are still the proper research object of folklore studies, its symbolic 
center and core materials (see Anttonen 1994b). Each national tradition of 
folklore studies embraces their own nationalized set of ‘classic genres’. A 
somewhat related issue is the motivation by folklorists to travel to far-away 
places to look for authenticity that is allegedly missing or scarce in modern 
Western folklore. Lauri Honko explicated this rather clearly by stating that 
the material available for folklorists in the Third World countries “is many 
times more interesting, at times almost unique, than the materials at the dis-
posal of the folklorists in the West” (Honko 1992: 4). Modernity, from this 
perspective, is seen to produce only second-rate folklore.
The critical comments about folklorists favoring inherited biases in their 
search for functional equivalents apply to my own thinking as well. In some 
of my earlier articles and essays from the 1980s (Anttonen 1982a, 1982b, 
1985) I discussed traditions in modernity in accordance with the devolution-
istic master narrative that constructs the history of traditionality as a unilinear 
process from the ‘original spontaneity of folk culture’ to standardized mass 
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culture. However, instead of categorically regarding mass-mediated culture 
as a destroyer of traditionality, I was looking for such ‘new traditions’ in 
modernity that would correspond to the old ones in unofﬁcialness and in 
spontaneity, in a manner reminiscent of Robert Redﬁeld’s oppositional pair 
‘great tradition’ and ‘small tradition’. I placed the qualities of unofﬁcialness 
and spontaneity in contrast to the ofﬁcial or authorized forms of distributing 
knowledge and power in society.
I obviously continued the practice of deﬁning the categories of the folk 
and folklore in qualitative terms. The ‘folk’ was politically progressive, as 
it was seen to stand both for modernity’s otherness and for democracy and 
democratic aspirations. I found ‘real traditionality’ and folklore production 
in movements for alternative life-styles, counter culture, and the international 
networks of consuming those musical genres whose performers do not receive 
funding from government-subsidized institutions. As regards the regenera-
tive power embedded in such phenomena, my interest and viewpoints even 
retrospectively make sense. If tradition denotes cultural models and patterns, 
I was not mistaken in seeing traditionality in the making in these phenom-
ena. Yet, I was obviously also projecting onto these social processes my own 
(and to some extent collectively shared) idea of authenticity, spontaneity and 
‘direct’, unmediated experience. For the legitimization of this projection, I 
used the term ‘tradition’, which to me appeared prestigious. At the same 
time, this was a move to deny ‘real’ traditionality in those spheres of action 
that looked politically conservative to me.
Folklore as Contestation
The continued dichotomizing of tradition and modernity in modern culture 
springs from the continued use of traditional and modern as temporal quali-
ﬁers. The linguistic opposition constructs the dichotomy in the reality to 
which the signs of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ refer. As traditionality denotes 
both a continuous model and that which is no longer used as a model, the use 
of the term tradition for continuing social processes inescapably constructs 
a polarization with the present.
The dichotomization is also intentional, because it is pregnant with ideo-
logical purposes. For example, the differentiation of the traditional from the 
modern may work for a statement in support – in the conﬁrmation of the 
legitimacy – of traditional institutions, practices, ways of life, values, as well 
as for the conservation of traditional material objects. When ‘modern’ stands 
for bourgeois hegemony, unwanted foreign inﬂuence, or cultural imperialism, 
to speak of the traditional is to take an explicitly political stand for those 
opposing that which is claimed as modern. In fact, to a noticeable extent, 
folklore scholarship has in many institutional settings since the 1970s been 
characterized by a humanistic mission to speak for the underdog, the subal-
tern, the under- and misrepresented populations, and their political rights to 
continue cultural practices that have become – or are intentionally constructed 
as – symbolic of their cultural uniqueness and/or their aspirations for politi-
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cal independence. Roger Abrahams, among others, emphasizes the viability 
of studying folklore “in terms of its contestive motives and its deployment 
for purposes of resistance to dominant cultural practices” (Abrahams 1992a: 
35). In their recently published study on modernist ideologies on language 
in works of philosophy, political theory, anthropology and folklore, Richard 
Bauman and Charles Briggs make it clear in the outset that, having set out 
to locate “ideological charters for persistent practices of oppression” and 
“structures of inequality and domination”, they are looking for “new modes of 
thinking and acts of political resistance” (Bauman & Briggs 2003: viii–x).
Such a political agenda in folklore studies derives at least partially from 
the Marxist perspectives of Antonio Gramsci and Luigi Lombardi-Satriani, 
who equate folk culture with the subordinate class and interpret folklore as 
“a speciﬁc culture that derives from the lower classes with the function to 
oppose the hegemonic culture, the latter being a product of the dominant 
class” (Lombardi-Satriani 1974: 103; see also Cirese 1982; Lears 1985). This 
perspective, by deﬁnition, emphasizes the idea of folklore as an oppositional 
and subversive force. It also exempliﬁes the trend to deﬁne folklore on the 
basis of a political function.
The dichotomizing of folklore and modernity has characterized both the 
Marxist approach as well the ediﬁcation approach that has developed in 
American folklore scholarship, partially in the tradition of William James’s 
pragmatism and the older tradition of transcendentalism. But in addition to 
the ideological framework, folklore and modernity play opposite roles in the 
narrativization of modernity as the diffusion of innovations.
Charging tradition negatively and modern positively characterized the ac-
culturation and innovation theories that became fashionable in the 1950s and 
1960s. These theories would predicate those people that adopt innovations 
with positive qualiﬁcations, while those that oppose or reject innovations 
and remain with the customary are negatively qualiﬁed (Sarmela 1979: 20). 
Those who embraced innovations were considered ‘modern’, while those 
who opposed them were regarded as ‘traditional’ and ‘conservative’. With 
reference to this tendency, Seppo Knuuttila has pointed out that arguments 
that circulate in favor of innovations tend to be taken as representing ra-
tionality, while those against the innovations are retrospectively formulated 
into humorous anecdotes (see Knuuttila 1989: 93–94; Knuuttila 1994: 41). 
Thus, being ‘traditional’ in a context in which the ‘victorious’ side signiﬁes 
modernity is both documented and ridiculed with folklore that dramatizes 
the said opposition.
Folklore and narrativity are here associated with acts and arguments that 
stand for traditionality and as such, for opposition to change and innovation. 
Instead of the breakthrough of novelties, the domain of folklore attracts nar-
ration about the people, objects and ideas located in modernity’s otherness. 
Resistance to technological innovations is one such ﬁeld of topics. A related 
example is provided by jokes that men tell about women’s ineptitude when it 
comes to handling a car and especially in parallel parking. Such jokes suggest 
that women depend on the cultural knowledge and the logics of rationality 
that men choose or do not choose to provide them with (see Anttonen 1998: 
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387). This does not only position women in a domain likened to premodern 
orality, in opposition to the technologically adept men of modernity; it also 
reproduces folklore as discourse that locates its objects and topics in mo-
dernity’s otherness.
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4. Postmodernization in the Making
From Promodern to Antimodern
In the 1980s and 1990s, the traditionally promodern discourse of sociol-ogy started to foreground some of the discipline’s antimodernist lega-
cies. While in classical sociology modernization was viewed as a narrative 
of progress, especially of increasing rationality, there were now a growing 
number of sociologists who became sensitive to the more destructive elements 
in modernity. In what was labeled postmodern theorizing, modern society 
came to be regarded as an organization that not only limits the freedom of 
individual subjects but also, as Marx had argued, alienates people from the 
value of their social and economic action. Modernity was thus criticized for 
having reduced individuals to anonymous masses, and modern technology 
came to be regarded as having made society a “cold press-button society” 
(Mongardini 1992: 59).
Similarly, modernity came to stand for self-preservation and the repression 
of man’s ‘inner nature’ and his “anarchic impulses of happiness” (Wellmer 
1985: 11). From this perspective, postmodernism came as a “liberation from 
the rational mind” and a counter-act for the alienation allegedly caused by 
capitalism. Postmodernism thus stood for a “rediscovery of spirituality” and 
a “rediscovery of the aesthetic justiﬁcation for life” (Mongardini 1992: 61). 
In a manner not so different from what has been regarded as antimodernism, 
postmodernism offered a framework for expressing the feeling that modernity 
had foregrounded material values at the expense of spiritual ones. Indeed, in 
the critique and rejection of the belief in unlimited growth in both material 
wealth and moral enlightenment, postmodernist arguments followed a long 
line of social criticism and cultural pessimism. Yet, while antimodernism 
would denote a turn against modern developments, postmodernism would 
denote a turn against modern establishments.
One of the most famous early manifestations of such perspectives – in ad-
dition to the work by Friedrich Nietzsche – was Untergang des Abendlandes 
(The Decline of the West, 1918) by Oswald Spengler (1959). Cultural pes-
simism emerged from observations that the development of a modern society 
and the ‘disruption of traditional frameworks’ – be they family, community, 
or political mechanisms – may lead more often to disintegration, delinquency, 
70
Postmodernization in the Making
and chaos than to a new viable modern order (Eisenstadt 1974: 2; see also 
Freud 1962).
Critical perspectives on modernity emphasized that instead of progress, 
wealth and happiness, humankind has been cursed with wars, discrimination, 
cruelty, poverty, assembly line factory work, excessive consumption, culture 
industry, waste and environmental problems, ecological catastrophes, etc. 
Here many were reminded of Max Weber’s pessimistic vision of the loss of 
meaning in life as a consequence of the triumph of rationality and scientiﬁc 
reasoning. For modernists and postmodernists alike, modernity – and post-
modernity as accelerated modernity – came to stand for individualization and 
detraditionalization, which may bring emancipation and individual freedom, 
but which, at the same time, deprive people of their communities and ‘true’, 
normative, collective, humanistic and spiritual values.
Accordingly, for the postmodernist Jean Baudrillard, mass consumption 
became disciplined waste that is ultimately destructive of the individual, so-
cial relations and the environment (Baudrillard 1975). Baudrillard perceived 
modern (and postmodern) culture to be in a crisis and loss of authenticity, 
in which the distinction between the real and the illusory disappears into a 
sequence of simulations and simulacra (Baudrillard 1983a). The represen-
tations are more real than the things represented, which eventually leads to 
the end of true social relations and thus, to the end of the social (Baudrillard 
1983b). Similarly, Mike Featherstone saw the simulational world as being 
devoid of all meaning, thus creating a “hyperspace in which we live beyond 
normativity and classiﬁcation in an aesthetic hallucination of reality” (Feath-
erstone 1989: 151–152; cf. Eco 1986). Scott Lash characterized modernity as 
the fragmentation and differentiation of social institutions, both horizontally 
and vertically (Lash 1990).
Such social and cultural criticism may have been a project for social re-
form but it has not always been that distinct from antimodernist statements 
that may undermine emancipative aspirations with nostalgia. While cultural 
criticism can lead to a theoretical understanding of modernity and capitalism 
(see e.g. Haug 1980; Marcus & Fischer 1986), or the contestation of West-
ern hegemony by non-Western societies and aboriginal ethnic groups (see 
e.g. Friedman 1992a), it can also lead to cultural pessimism, which can then 
turn to romanticism and construct idealizations in cultural otherness, in that 
which is placed in the category of the pre- and non-modern. Folklore and 
folk societies may become their projected representations. Indeed, both in 
the name of antimodernism and postmodernism, modernization can come 
to be seen as an evil that allegedly destroyed the paradise of the ‘traditional 
society’. Consequently, we may again start looking for and discovering ‘noble 
savages’ who seem to possess the quality of life that modern people appear 
to have lost. Or, we may argue that such present-day social problems and 
issues as crime, drug abuse, alcoholism, teenage pregnancy, pornography, 
divorce, rootlessness, terrorism, etc., are consequences of a breakdown of 
community traditions, values and public morality due to modernization. The 
call for traditions as positive social forces (and authority), both in collective 
identiﬁcation and moral behavior, often ﬁnd substance in such experiences. 
71
Postmodernization in the Making
Yet, in addition to serving as a binding force, the call for tradition may also 
lead to political fundamentalism.
From Antimodern to Promodern
As I have indicated above, the dualistic categorization of academic disci-
plines into promodern and antimodern as regards their position and stance 
to modernity is not completely valid, even though such ideal conceptualiza-
tions do exist. Anthropologists, ethnologists and folklorists do not always 
differ from sociologists in their social theories and perspectives on modernity 
and modernization, whether these are promodern or antimodern. Since its 
emergence, folklore scholarship, for example, has been antimodernist and 
traditionalist, orienting towards the past and that which is regarded as van-
ishing in modernization. Yet, at the same time, it has in fundamental ways 
been promodern and employed its ‘non-modern’ research materials for the 
making of modernity and for supporting modernization processes, especially 
those of nationalization and the project of enlightenment. Moreover, folklor-
ists have been quick to utilize the latest developments in modern technology 
for the documentation of vanishing lore.
Antimodernism and promodernism are positions and perspectives that are 
historically speciﬁc and subject to change. In the course of the 1980s and 
1990s, new trends emerged in folklore scholarship that indicated a growing 
interest in adopting a more accepting attitude towards modernity, especially 
towards those features that are regarded as some of modernity’s most char-
acteristic traits, namely commercialism and the commodiﬁcation of culture. 
Scholars started to question the classic mass-culture critique and the modern-
ist dichotomy of folk culture and mass culture, which, as Ben-Amos points 
out, attributes the positive value of genuineness to folk culture and regards 
mass culture as corruptive, “shallow and manipulative” (Ben-Amos 1984: 
111). Decades earlier, perspectives that Ben-Amos was referring to used 
to be shared by folklorists and media scholars alike. A quote from Dwight 
MacDonald provides a good example:
Folk Art grew from below, it was a spontaneous, autochthonous expression 
of the people, shaped by themselves, pretty much without the beneﬁt of 
High Culture, to suit their own needs. Mass Culture is imposed from 
above. It is fabricated by technicians hired by businessmen; its audience 
are passive consumers, their participation limited to the choice between 
buying and not buying. (MacDonald 1957: 60.)
Such a dichotomous viewpoint might make it anomalous to argue that ex-
pressions of folk culture would thrive in modern, technological societies. 
Indeed, as is pointed out by Dorothy Noyes, such a view presupposes that 
“The handmade would vanish in the face of the machine, and the products of 
the machine could express nothing but the machine” (Noyes 1991: 58).
In order to promote the idea that folklore is not only a thing of the non-
mass-mediated past, many folklorists started to change their perspective on 
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the nature of mass-mediated communication. If folklore is to be ‘found’ (or 
‘discovered’) in the age of technology, it cannot be something that stands in 
opposition to mass communication and lives outside of it. On the contrary, 
it must be something that lives within the culture of technology. This argu-
ment came up strongly in the work of Hermann Bausinger as early as the late 
1950s. When his book was translated into English in 1990, its main argument 
came to coincide with current debates on a more relaxed approach to com-
mercialism among folklorists. While the modernist dichotomy between folk 
culture and mass culture could still ﬁnd support from such Frankfurt School 
critical theorists as T. W. Adorno and his critical writings on culture industry 
(Adorno 1991; yet, see Bernstein 1991), the idea of folklore thriving in the 
age of technology was seen to require correlations instead of oppositions 
between mass-mediated communication and that which is called folklore.
Accordingly, modern and ‘postmodern’ folklorists started to look for 
symbolic dimensions in the mass media, and to respond to the progressive 
potentials of technological innovation as well as commodiﬁcation. Here such 
media scholars as John Fiske gained importance as sources for folklorists 
to draw upon (see e.g. Fiske 1987, 1989). Indicating an accepting attitude 
towards commodiﬁcation, Dan Ben-Amos called for “a post-modernistic 
folklore in which tradition is not only made self-conscious but often put up 
for sale” (Ben-Amos 1990: ix). While modernist folklore made great efforts 
to distinguish fakelore from folklore, postmodernist folklore, according to 
Ben-Amos, “has acquired new symbolic signiﬁcances in which the spurious 
obtains a new genuineness in its new contexts” (Ben-Amos 1990: ix).
In addition to arousing discussion on what ‘postmodern folklore’ in 
a ‘postmodern age’ might look like (see e.g. Bacchilega 1988; Workman 
1989; Warshaver 1990), the debate on folklore’s relation to mass-mediated 
and commoditized technology kindled new perspectives on the relationship 
between vernacular processes and the mass media. John Dorst, for example, 
asked whether we are “in the historical moment that marks, not the end of 
folk culture or the end of the vernacular mode of production, but the end of 
that discursive practice which sustains the distinction between the vernacu-
lar, the folk, the marginal, and so on, on the one hand, and the dominant, the 
mainstream, the ofﬁcial, the mass, on the other” (Dorst 1990: 189). In the 
name of postmodernity, Dorst called for new possibilities, new concepts, and 
new understanding of the relationship between the “vernacular spheres of 
experience” and consumer culture. Emphasizing that these are not straight-
forward antagonists, as was previously thought, Dorst urged the folklorists 
to pay attention to a given process that takes place under the conditions of 
postmodernity and advanced consumer capitalism. He called this process the 
“vernacularization of the commodity” (Dorst 1988: 218–219).
By ‘vernacularization of the commodity’ Dorst means the process in which 
the commodities that are produced in present-day capitalism are localized in 
meaning and use, and through this localization and vernacularization they 
become, according to Dorst, items of ‘folk expression’. It is noteworthy 
that Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett discussed the same phenomenon some 
years earlier in terms of ‘customizing mass culture’. This concept stands for 
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“the ways in which users modify mass-produced objects to suit their needs, 
interests, and values, and naturalize mass culture items into new systems of 
meaning and activity” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1983: 215).
The perspectives that foreground the dynamics and emergent qualities 
in technological communication do not yield easily to the traditional di-
chotomization of folk culture and mass culture, unless folk culture is made 
to signify all that is dynamic and personally meaningful in mass-mediated 
communication, that is, all that the folklorist would regard as valuable and 
interesting. Indeed, be it in the name of postmodernity or something else, it 
is worth considering how the dichotomy of folk / non-folk as well as that of 
mass culture / folk culture may construct separate communicative realms, 
and background or even obscure the processes in which people in today’s 
societies participate in multiple discourses through different communicative 
channels, face-to-face, and the various forms of electronic communication 
and mass media. The methodological danger in the conceptualization of the 
production of ‘local’ meanings as a ‘folk culture’ is in the potential that it 
might be just another rhetorical move to construct the object of folkloristic 
research through the traditionalist analogy.
To be sure, the dialectics of vernacular and mass-mediated processes have 
their own traditional and traditionalizing forms. There is, for example, tra-
ditionality in mass-mediated products themselves, as they follow or contest 
particular genres of expression and style. There is also traditionality in the 
relationship between the mass media and the consumer. This includes the 
ways in which mass mediated products are made meaningful both person-
ally and collectively – as discussed by both Dorst and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett. 
The desire for consuming mass-produced and mass-mediated novelties is 
not merely a question of trends and fashions but serves to indicate of the 
continuous making of traditions, both in terms of creating collectivity and 
making social distinctions.
Some of these processes, as pointed out by Roger Abrahams, can be dis-
cerned “in the conservationist mood that seeks to resist consumption and to 
privilege recycling, remodeling, renovating, repairing, restoring, customizing, 
and humanizing mass-produced objects and environments” (Abrahams 1993a: 
6). Yet, as this and the above-mentioned perspectives tend to be sensitive only 
to the vernacularized use of mass-products by the consumer, a ‘postmodern’ 
perspective on the folklore of vernacularization would also have to acknowl-
edge the value of things that are ‘from elsewhere’ and stay that way. Adding 
to the complexity, mass production may also ‘learn’ to promote elements of 
vernacularization as a marketing strategy for selected target groups. Accord-
ingly, when ‘traditional meanings’ emerge in the processes and practices of 
customization, tradition-producing agency is not only to be found among the 
‘postmodern equivalent of the folk’, that is, the consumers of late capitalism, 
but also among the designers.
Not all folklore theorists have welcomed postmodernism in all of its 
manifestations. Henry Glassie, as discussed above, chooses not to position 
folklore on the margins of modernity, but instead, locates his moral agenda 
in folklore research in an established modernist tradition. In this tradition, in 
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order to make a comment on the politics and aesthetics of the present and the 
modern, one symbolically turns away from the modern, towards a cultural 
other in the premodern. As is pointed out by John Dorst, Glassie “enjoins 
folklorists to ﬁnd common cause with those great modernist ﬁgures in the arts 
(Yeats, Joyce, Kandinsky, etc.) who turned to the folk for aesthetic renewal 
and critical perspective” (Dorst 1988: 217). Glassie’s open criticism of the 
postmodernist movement in ﬁne arts, as well as his call for an elimination of 
the term postmodernism (Glassie 1988: 222–223) is shared by Dorst, who, 
although encouraging folklorists to enter the discussion on postmodernity, 
opposed postmodernism and its critique of modernism. In fact, Dorst says: 
“Folklorists have much to gain in seeing themselves as participants in the 
ongoing modernist project. The apparent claim of the postmodernists that 
this project is at an end needs to be dismissed.” (Dorst 1988: 217.)
Such standpoints in favor of the modernist tradition in the objectiﬁca-
tion of the cultural other must be viewed in light of the general debate on 
postmodernism and its political agendas. Although both Glassie and Dorst 
made references to postmodernism as a discourse on art, their standpoint 
parallels the reactions against those postmodernist arguments that call for 
the end of all master narratives, including the moral ones. For example, in 
its moral project for social reform, modern folklore scholarship ﬁnds a 
common cause in the position taken by Jürgen Habermas in relation to the 
postmodernists, especially the French post-structuralists, as well as to the 
older critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor W. Adorno, 
Max Horkheimer and Walter Benjamin. Rather than rejecting the Enlight-
enment project, Habermas wishes to complete it, and he stands up for a 
critical social theory that is meant to be a contribution in the transformation 
towards a rational society. In this society, “human beings exercise fully their 
capacity for self-conscious control over social processes, and in [it] there 
is an absence of dominative power relationships and ideological conscious-
ness” (quoted in Keat 1981: 3; see also Rorty 1985: 171; McLennan 2000: 
642–644; Habermas 1981, 1989).
The postmodernist Jean-François Lyotard criticized Habermas for subscrib-
ing to a metanarrative of emancipation (Lyotard 1984: 60), while Habermas 
criticized the French postmodernists for neo-conservatism, that is, for being 
indifferent to the problems of contemporary society. Following Habermas, 
Richard Rorty criticized Michel Foucault for being “a dispassionate observer 
of the present social order, rather than its concerned critic” (Rorty 1985: 172). 
Postmodernist thinkers such as Foucault and Lyotard, according to Rorty, in 
their fear of being caught up in a metanarrative about the human subject, re-
frain from identifying themselves with the culture of the generation to which 
they belong or with any social reform (Rorty 1985: 172).
Similarly, Jacques Derrida came to be criticized for being a hermeneutic 
whose deconstruction of metaphysics has no theoretical-practical point; thus, 
for lack of any practical usefulness, it is pure intellectualism. Therefore, ac-
cording to Madison, “the activity itself becomes purely and simply destruc-
tive, a kind of theoretical vandalism” (Madison 1988: 110). Indeed, when 
postmodernism represents “general dissatisfaction with contemporary society 
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in which everything is regarded as false”, it is not surprising, according to 
Randall Collins, that late 20th century intellectuals turned their philosophical 
admiration “to those existentialists who were most politically conservative 
and most anti-modernist, Nietzsche and Heidegger” (Collins 1992: 182).
So, when folklorists such as Glassie and Dorst in the late 1980s disas-
sociated themselves from antimodernist postmodernism, they associated 
themselves with antimodernist modernism, which, paradoxically, is quite 
promodern in its antimodernism. They welcomed postmodernity as far as it 
served to widen the scope of folkloristic research to include those modern and 
postmodern cultural processes that were earlier excluded from the folklore 
taxonomy. Yet, postmodernism continued to be regarded as a threat to the 
discipline when it was felt to question the modernist practice of constructing 
modernity in the manner established by modern artists in their search for 
authenticity and inspiration in cultural otherness. The folklorist continued 
to liken himself to the modern artist and the ethnographer, instead of the 
modern consumer.
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Folklore and Nationalized Antiquities
All cultural research and representation focus on that which is regarded as having value among those who engage in such activity. This means that 
scholarly practice is always value-laden and therefore also value promoting 
and argumentative by nature. By presenting and representing that which is 
regarded as carrying value, or by contesting given values as well as practices 
that signal these values, research makes statements not only about that which 
it presents and represents but also about itself and the society in which it is 
practiced. As knowledge is not objective but receives its epistemic authority 
in rhetorical contexts, all research is based on an interrelationship between 
the epistemic and the pragmatic.
This tenet also applies to information about past or present culture and 
cultural practice. It is never studied or collected for its own sake, because 
no such ‘own’ sake or intrinsic value exists. The obtaining and collecting of 
that which is regarded as valuable cultural information becomes meaning-
ful only in particular argumentative contexts, both among those who collect 
and those who are positioned as sources of such collecting. The same point 
has been made, among many others, by Virginia Dominguez, who writes 
that objects of ethnography are collected and the people who produce them 
are examined “not because of their intrinsic value but because of their per-
ceived contribution to our understanding of our own historical trajectory” 
(Dominguez 1986: 548). The motivation to ‘discover’ and cast a particular 
discovering gaze lies not in the object itself but in its value for the one who 
discovers it, gazes at it, and puts it on display.
Discussing the scenario of the global homogenization of culture, Ulf Han-
nerz has pointed out how such a vision is directly linked to a line of domestic 
cultural critique. Those who are “grieving for the vanishing Other” are doing 
it in order to bring in “fuel from the periphery for local debates at the center” 
(Hannerz 1991: 109). In fact, all anthropology, in addition to being, in the 
main, research on non-Western cultural forms, or just because of it, is fun-
damentally a commentary on the Western societies in which the research is 
practiced. (See e.g. Lévi-Strauss 1967: 381–392; Marcus & Fischer 1986.) 
Thus, what is categorized as cultural otherness has an ideological, political 
and practical meaning to those who are making such a categorization. When 
the peripheral is objectiﬁed for its value in the redeﬁnition of the center, a 
5. Folklore as Nationalized Antiquities
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gaze from the center to the periphery comments on the conditions in which 
it is cast. It receives its meaning in relation to these. Phenomenologically 
speaking, the object of the gaze cannot be perceived independently of the 
motivations, politics, and rhetorics of the gaze that makes it its object.
Intertwined with economic and political goals, the common Western inter-
est in non-Western cultural formations continues to be based on an exoticizing 
curiosity and on a discourse on difference, which places the exoticized in a 
particular argumentative position vis-à-vis those who exoticize the observed 
or constructed differences. Such exoticization has also been present in the 
antiquarian and nostalgic interest in the marginal cultures of Western his-
tory and modernity – an interest that has especially characterized folklore 
research. This has, however, never been a mere disinterested expression of 
value or longing for otherness and for what is lost due to changes in culture 
and modernization. On the contrary, the value and emotion charged in folk-
loristic activity, in collecting, archiving, indexing and studying traditions of, 
for example, the nationally signiﬁcant cultural other – spatially and/or tem-
porally deﬁned – is always a comment on modernity, on one’s own society, 
and its politics of culture.
Indeed, the rhetorical context of social relevance can be regarded as one of 
the continuous ‘shadow dialogues’ in which the ethnographer, as discussed 
by Vincent Crapanzano, is engaged in his or her dialogic encounter with the 
informant (see Crapanzano 1990, 1992). The meaning of the information and 
representations produced in these encounters is estimated, and therefore also 
anticipated by the ethnographer, in the context of negotiating social values 
and constructing both cultural selfhood and cultural otherness in the socie-
ties in which the ethnographic representations are brought into public and 
scholarly discussion and put on display.
As I have discussed in the earlier chapters, folkloristic activity in modern 
society has to a great extent subscribed to a modernist paradigm of cultural 
loss. In this paradigm, one mourns over that which changes and is lost 
when cultures become modern. In accordance with the dichotomization of 
the modern and the traditional, modernization is conceptualized as the loss 
of tradition. Yet, instead of merely indicating regret or melancholy for the 
vanishing, or longing for what has already been lost or become distant, the 
modern sense of loss has been a projection of the deprived and alienated self. 
In the sense of nostalgia as homesickness, one has longed for the metaphori-
cal home of the constructed and imagined space and time prior to a given 
change, which thus becomes a chronotope of tradition. In accordance with 
an antimodernist theory of modernization, which has argued for the loss of 
Gemeinschaft in the course of modernization, one has felt nostalgia for the 
‘home’ of the lost community of unmediated communication and its allegedly 
moral contents that are perceived as having been destroyed by modernization, 
technologization, media-mediation and by the fragmentation of traditional 
social organization.
Inscribed into one of the most commonly held theories of modernization, 
such a feeling of deprivation and alienation has called for a variety of strat-
egies to deal with the alleged loss of culture and value in modernity. The 
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folkloristic activity of collecting and salvaging vanishing lore is one of these. 
In addition to receiving its moral justiﬁcation from ‘saving’ culture for pos-
terity at the eleventh hour, its agenda is based on the estimation of the value 
that the salvaged material is regarded as carrying and creating for those who 
participate in this activity, as well as those for whom the material is put on 
display as representations of culture, history and heritage.
Thus, as a provider of a picture of the past, that which is regarded as folk-
lore has an explicit role to play in the making of the present. In other words, 
the practical value of collecting and archiving folklore lies in the use that 
it is regarded as having in the making of modernity and in the general de-
bate and competition over collective and normative values in it. This makes 
folklore scholarship not only fundamentally modern, but utterly political 
and rhetorical, as the discipline is continuously making statements through 
the selection of collectibles, through the ways of collecting, and through the 
ways of displaying that which has been collected, both in research publica-
tions and in archives and museums.
Without questioning the cultural historical value of such collections, or 
the many possibilities that they offer and open up for historical research, I 
believe that it is of utmost importance that the collected materials be viewed 
as representations created in particular rhetorical contexts, employing par-
ticular strategies in the making of the present, and that their nature as such 
be integrated into both their analysis and the estimation of their political 
signiﬁcance.
Nationalism as Territorial Symbolism and Control
Contributing to the line of thinking whereby folklore scholarship always 
serves some pragmatic purpose and political agenda, Roger Abrahams points 
out that the discipline was originally formulated by antiquarian scholars who 
saw “the possibility of obtaining political and social advancement” in the 
study of antiquities (Abrahams 1993a: 3). In addition to the antiquarians re-
ceiving public recognition for their interests in the constitution of the public 
sphere in society, Abrahams describes the selection of certain territories and 
ethnicities into the scope of a particular collecting enterprise as a hegemonic 
move to assert political control over these areas. Antiquities, writes Abra-
hams, endow a piece of land with ancient meanings and thus sacralize the 
landscape and legitimate its control.
Such thinking is evident in William Camden’s historical survey of Brit-
ish topography, the collection of antiquities entitled Britannia of 1586, and 
the questionnaires sent out by King Philip II in 1575 and 1578 in New Cas-
tile to survey information on local saints, legends and shrines (Abrahams 
1993a: 16–17). These and similar actions elsewhere in Europe provided an 
apt model for the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf, who in 1630 issued a de-
cree that led to the establishing of a Council on Antiquities in 1666. This 
decree was a call “to search for and collect all kinds of ancient relics and 
objects to glorify the fatherland” (Ben-Amos 1989, viii–ix; see also Sarajas 
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1982: 23–24, 222; Honko 1987a: 67–68; Honko 1987b: 127–128; Stewart 
1993: 140–141). The political context for this was Sweden’s competition 
over control of the Baltic Sea region with Denmark, where a similar call 
for ‘ancient testimonies’ had been made earlier. As concluded by Abrahams, 
“These monarchs were expanding their domains at the same time as they 
consolidated and sacralized their home realms” (Abrahams 1993a: 17). In 
this they used, says Abrahams, “the devices of organized authority made 
possible by the development of a bureaucratic governmental structure, and 
of print technology and its attendant techniques of reporting and organizing 
information” (Abrahams 1993a: 17).
The quest for domination over land by monarchs with the help of histori-
cal information and reports of ancients beliefs and narratives anticipates the 
methods used in nationalism for the creation of national cultures, national 
consciousness and national symbolism. As Benedict Anderson has argued, 
the making of modern nations as cultural units, as ‘imagined communities’, 
became possible only through printing technology and print-capitalism, 
which created uniﬁed ﬁelds of exchange and communication above spoken 
vernaculars (Anderson 1983: 47). Publishing and distributing written texts, 
that is, literature, in a print-language that was standardized from a multiplic-
ity of vernaculars in a particular territorial unit, created a nationally deﬁned 
public sphere and laid the basis for a national consciousness.
Such literature mainly consists of belles lettres and literary representations 
of folk poetry, such as the Kalevala epic in Finland, compiled by the medical 
doctor Elias Lönnrot in the early 1830s and published, in its ﬁrst edition, in 
1835. Yet, it also includes the questionnaires used by royal, state and church 
authorities to gather information about their subjects. One descendant genre 
in this is the printed questionnaires that ethnologists and folklorists in the 
Nordic countries continue to use for collecting material in both nationally 
and regionally signiﬁcant museums and archives, and for surveying past 
and present customs, practices and beliefs. Indeed, as modern citizens have 
learned to be enlisted in the national population register and ﬁll out tax and 
health reports (cf. Frykman & Löfgren 1985; Löfgren 1993b), people have 
also learned to ﬁll out questionnaires concerning old, receding and residual 
ways of life and other topics of cultural historical interest that museums, 
archives, governmental or academic institutions devoted to the preservation 
of national heritage choose to inquire about. People have also learned to use 
their written reports strategically for their individual motivations and goals 
in the representation of past forms of life and specimens of human culture. 
As part of the nationalizing project especially in the Nordic countries, such 
questionnaires are not entirely innocent means of ﬁnding information; they 
function to produce territoriality by mapping territories and both consoli-
dating and monitoring territorial and national identiﬁcation (see also Häkli 
1994, 2000).
In the 19th-century nation-building processes, the collecting of informa-
tion about that which was regarded as premodern became a legitimate activ-
ity in the making of the modern, especially in the deﬁnition of the national 
territory and in the writing and representation of its history. Intellectuals in 
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many countries followed the ideas presented by the German philosopher 
J. G. Herder about national cultures being manifested in the oral traditions 
of the lower classes. Accordingly, in and around Finland, the collecting of 
traditional verbal artistry of the marginally located illiterates, for example 
in the villages and forests of Eastern Finland, Karelia and Ingria, was laden 
with national political interests and goals. The human sources of folklore 
collectibles were expected not only to identify with Finnish nationalism but 
also to provide materials for the symbolic construction of Finnishness.
Similar processes of symbolic appropriation took place during World War 
II, when Finland had occupied parts of Eastern Karelia across the Soviet 
border. Scholars were sent out to collect information about local, Finnish-
language folk culture, in order to preserve it in museums and archives as well 
as to create a national consciousness among the local population (see Laine 
1993; Pimiä 2003). The collecting activity had the argumentative purpose 
of encouraging local people to identify with the Finnish nation-state across 
the political boundary. In a manner reminiscent of the methods employed by 
the early modern rulers, as discussed by Abrahams, the collecting of cultural 
products adopted into the concept of folklore functioned as a direct attempt 
to integrate territories into particular cultural and administrative spheres, and 
to legitimate their control with that which is conceptualized by the collec-
tor as ‘tradition’. In Eastern Karelia, this was part of the project of creating 
Finland’s Lebensraum (see Pimiä 2003: 77–78).
Yet, it is also worthy of note that the collecting of traditional verbal art in 
Eastern Karelia during the Second World War was not the only means used 
in the pursuit to legitimate the inclusion of these territories in the Finnish 
state. More weight was placed on geography and botany to provide ‘natural’ 
grounds to the argument for ‘natural’ borders (see Laine 1993). This followed 
the nationalistic idea supported particularly by Enlightenment philosophers 
in 18th-century France, according to whom “mountains and rivers as such, 
devoid of any historical determination, formed the limits of polities” (Øster-
gaard 1991: 14).
An Issue of Power and Loyalty
The making of modern nation-states and their uniﬁed national cultures has 
taken place in accordance with the modern political ideology of national-
ism. In addition to print-capitalism, it has required the employment of mass 
literacy, mass schooling and mass symbolism. In pursuit of political sover-
eignty in a particular territory, nationalism legitimates states as administra-
tive organizations with the idea that their inhabitants, raised in the name 
of democracy from subjects to citizens, ‘belong together’ by, for example, 
sharing a common origin and history in culture and language (cf. Latin natio 
‘birth’). Such a collective foundation is then expected to yield legitimacy to 
the state institution and its power over the territory. In this light, nationalism 
is a theory of political legitimacy based on the idea of congruence between 
the political and the national units (Gellner 1983: 1; Hobsbawm 1990: 9; 
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Hobsbawm 1992). For Herder, who coined the term nationalism, the only 
rational form of state is based on a Volk, ‘people’, which he used in a rather 
metaphysical sense to describe a collection of special qualities and virtues 
that make each state an identiﬁable culture (Birch 1989: 17–18; see also 
Wilson 1973; Dick 1989).
Nationalism is intrinsically about power and control over a territory and 
the people living within its conﬁnes, excluding from power and political 
decision making those who are regarded as outsiders. It encourages a given 
population to identify with a given nation and discourages separatism as well 
as mixing of those who ‘belong’ and those who ‘do not belong’ in the con-
gruence of culture, history, language, religion, economy, citizenship rights 
and political structure. Territorial protectionism, ethnocentrism and racism 
have, of course, a history extending far beyond the birth of nationalism, but 
in modernity such distinction making is often channeled into the ideology 
of nationalism.
As Benedict Anderson points out, nation-ness has become a norm in mod-
ern political discourse, “the most universally legitimate value in the political 
life of our time” (Anderson 1983: 12). Accordingly, nation is regarded and 
institutionalized as the highest status that a population group can reach, and 
nations form alliances and political institutions (such as the United Nations 
or the European Union) into which only nations are accepted as members. 
Moreover, every individual, in order to enjoy full status as a sovereign in-
dividual, is expected to be a member of some nation. Having a nation and 
national membership has come to be regarded as an inherent attribute of 
humanity (Gellner 1983: 6; see also Østergaard 1991: 22).
Indeed, the ideology of nationalism must be considered a far more impor-
tant watershed between modernity and premodernity as historical periods 
than, for example, technologization, industrialization, secularization, etc. 
These have no doubt caused a number of drastic changes in social structures, 
worldviews and ways of life, but they have not changed individual and col-
lective identiﬁcations as much as the creation and symbolic representation 
of membership in nations and nationhood. As Eric Hobsbawm says, “the 
modern nation, either as a state or as a body of people aspiring to form such 
a state, differs in size, scale and nature from the actual communities with 
which human beings have identiﬁed over most of history, and makes quite 
different demands on them” (Hobsbawm 1990: 46).
According to Roland Robertson, the ideal of nationalism triumphed dur-
ing the period from 1750 to 1920, involving “the attempt to overcome local 
ethnocultural diversity and to produce standardized citizens whose loyalties 
to the nation would be unchallenged by extra-societal allegiances” (Robertson 
1990: 49). Such an expectation of loyalty characterizes all national projects, 
and accordingly, the transnational networks of, for example, the Jews have 
generated suspicions about the extent of their identiﬁcation with the nation-
state and their patriotism, instead of qualifying them with the positively 
charged label of cosmopolitan (Gidlund & Sörlin 1993: 72–73).
Today such expectations of loyalty mainly concern immigrants and ‘guest-
workers’ and, to a lesser degree, refugees and asylum seekers. Their presence 
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in nationalized territories ﬁnds support as a token of modern multiculturalism. 
Yet, at the same time, much public attention is focused on phenomena ap-
parently indicating their lack of adaptation and integration into the national 
culture of their host country. The concepts of modernity and tradition are 
often used to explain – and reconﬁrm – the differences in culture, values and 
social practices between the host country and the origin of the incomers. The 
failure to adapt and integrate, which may be exempliﬁed with the continu-
ation of kinship-centered and male-controlled marriage networks between 
the country of immigration and the country of origin, is in popular, media-
mediated discourse often taken to indicate the incomers’ lack of modernity. 
The idea of traditionality as lack of modernity manifests itself here in the 
tendency to view the so-called traditional societies as organized around kin 
relations and lineages, which would constitute a dramatic difference from 
the modern society (see During 1994: 48).
The Local and the Translocal
Even before present-day multiculturalism, nation-building processes have 
been characterized by the dialectics of the local and the translocal. One of 
the reasons for this is that “language myths are extraordinarily resilient, 
emerging in near-identical form in one ethnie after another, generation after 
generation” (Law 1998: 173). Nation building is embedded with a unifying 
goal to create an entity from among the manifold local and regional cultures 
and languages within the borders of the state, but as Ulf Hannerz and Orvar 
Löfgren emphasize, the nationalization of local culture is itself a transnational 
project, taking place in different nations in more or less similar ways (Han-
nerz & Löfgren 1992). Thus, the deﬁnition of national selfhood, although 
based on local and historically speciﬁc strategies, is not independent of similar 
processes elsewhere, but in a particular historical setting both represents and 
participates in a global discourse on the construction of the national (see also 
Friedman 1988 and 1992b; Löfgren 1989). Such processes are based on what 
Löfgren calls the cultural grammar of nationhood, an established set of sym-
bols that are used transnationally for the making of a nation (Löfgren 1989: 
8–9, 21–22; see also Löfgren 1991: 101; Löfgren 1993a, 1993b).3
Since a national entity requires the homogenization of regional differences 
within its territory, the nation is a semi-artiﬁcial construct, a standardized 
idiom formulated out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms (Hobsbawm 
1990: 54). Such standardization then sets the framework for the making of 
distinctions between the local and the translocal, including the regional within 
the national. When creating local identities in competition with other local 
identities elsewhere in the nation, nationally and internationally standardized 
models are employed to make a particular local distinct from other locals 
and to argue for that which is regarded as giving it competitive advantage 
(Hannerz & Löfgren 1992). Thus, in addition to manifesting a local identity, 
the similarity of the model as well as the contents put on display contribute 
to the construction of a national culture.
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Yet, instead of being a compilation of diverse elements, the arbitrariness 
of a national identity is naturalized with an aura of factuality making it ap-
pear real and unquestionable, ‘natural’ (LiPuma & Meltzoff 1990: 89). The 
naturalness of the constructed entity is created with a variety of political 
mythologies and strategies of representation that set the nation into a nar-
rative (see Bhabha 1994: 139–170), conveying for example a ﬁnalistic idea 
about the nation-state as a natural end-goal for the history of any people 
(Sörlin 1992: 48). Such a project typically includes the nationalization of the 
nation’s history and even prehistory; the production of a historical metanar-
rative about earlier cultural forms in a particular territory leading, as it were, 
to the making of the national unit. This supports Anders Linde-Laursen’s 
point, according to which nationalism not only uses folklore but is folklore 
– national identity being an established narrative tradition about its population, 
politics, economy, and history, and having hegemony over other, alternative 
formulations (Linde-Laursen 1991: 16).
In addition to narrative and mythological constructions, the cultural and 
historical belonging of a nationalized population has also been created 
through the present-day meaning of the word ‘ethnicity’. Ethnos in Greek 
originally referred to ‘the primitive Other’, such as heathens (e.g. Rasila 
1986: 9–10; Viljanen 1994: 143), on the basis of which, until recently, only 
minorities – not the majority of the population and their dominant culture 
– were regarded as being ‘ethnic’. Recently, however, the concept has be-
come rather prestigious in the argumentation for the cultural integrity of 
any linguistic, religious or other social group. In their politics of exclusion, 
based on ‘ethnic nationalism’, many nation-states today deﬁne the marriage 
of the political and the national in such a way that those members that differ 
‘ethnically’ from the majority are regarded as inadequate representatives of 
the national. Yet, also in separatist projects nationalistic aspirations are often 
founded on ethnic grounds, as groups that deﬁne their selfhood as ethnically 
constituted aspire for a nation of their own. Such emancipative aspirations 
are rhetorically supported with the authority placed on history and histori-
cally founded ‘ethnic identity’. In this ‘ethnic historiography’, ethnic groups 
have come to be viewed as locales of traditions and traditional culture. Ac-
cordingly, cultural traditions have become some of the most powerful means 
in representing intragroup historical continuity and integrity, and therefore 
also their ‘heritage’, which is then used as legitimization in their claim for 
political sovereignty.
When nations are constructed on ‘ethnic grounds’, ethnicity is founded on 
the one hand upon a testimony of a traditional, locally grounded culture and 
its history. Yet, on the other hand, the cultural logic of an ‘ethnic’ testimony 
is founded upon a modern, translocal and transnational discourse in which 
elements from a traditional and locally grounded culture are appropriated into 
the construction of such a testimony. The presentation of an ethnic identity 
is, therefore, a process of making distinctions that are not only ethnographic 
but also politically desirable. Ethnic formations are constructed in a proc-
ess that can be called the ethnicization of culture. In this interpretative and 
argumentative process, cultures and local speciﬁcities come to be viewed as 
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distinct through ‘an ethnicizing gaze’ that makes the observed distinctions 
‘ethnically’ relevant.
A Discipline with a National Agenda
As antiquities retained among the lower classes of society, folklore has 
been conceptualized as products of cultural otherness founded upon a class 
distinction. As has been pointed out by, for example, Roger Abrahams and 
Bengt Holbek, the 19th-century interest in folk culture and especially the 
cultural ways of the rural population was directly related to the question 
of the redistribution of power between the bourgeois middle-class and the 
aristocracy (Holbek 1981: 133; Abrahams 1993a: 3–4, 9–10). In order to 
ﬁght the absolute monarchy and the political power of the elite, and in order 
to manipulate the lower classes into the hegemonic control of the middle-
class, the bourgeoisie spoke in the name of the people, and in a nationalistic 
enlightenment project transformed the rural populations into enlightened 
citizens and made them aware of being nationals. Thus, instead of ‘the na-
tion awakens’, as the common metaphoric phrase goes, premodern forms of 
society have become modern by way of nationalizing the rural populations 
and by drawing peasants and other subjects of the state into nationhood and 
constructing their collective identiﬁcation on the basis of their membership 
in the nation-state (see e.g. Weber 1976; Tilly 1990; Østergaard 1991).
Holbek describes folklore’s role in this as follows: “It is the middle-class’s 
enthusiastic rediscovery of ‘the folk’ which raised the traditional songs and 
narratives to a status of ‘national’ treasures, in spite of the fact that very few 
of them are speciﬁc to any ethnic group and in spite of the fact that the im-
poverished persons who entertained themselves with this sort of thing had 
scarcely anything that could be called a national consciousness.” (Holbek 
1981: 134–135.) Here Holbek makes an important point about the recogni-
tion of identities. Nationalistically minded folklorists have tended to collect, 
index and display materials that have received their meanings as nationally 
signiﬁcant symbols not from their performers but from the people who collect 
and display them. Consequently, Lauri Honko has advised folklorists not to 
do this. “Describing group identities means selecting symbols and metaphors. 
It is of crucial importance that we as researchers do not make these selections, 
and that our verbalisations of identity feeling are governed by selections made 
by members of the group to be studied.” (Honko 1988: 8.)
Holbek’s point is in line with the arguments made by Julius Krohn and 
other early diffusionists about the non-national character of folklore (see e.g. 
Hautala 1954: 190–191). Thus, folklore’s relation to nation and nationalism 
is here a question of whether the cognizance of particular folkloric items cor-
relates with national borders. To claim nationalistic signiﬁcance for material 
that, according to Holbek, does not correspond to the national boundaries in 
its area of appearance, is “misuse of folklore”, which “is still promulgated 
by less-informed writers and propagandists”, but which “has gradually been 
abandoned within professional circles in the course of this century” (Holbek 
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1992: 5–6). Here Holbek appears to be guided by the notion that professional 
folklorists in the 20th century no longer hold on to the tenets of Herderian 
nationalism. The same view is also evident in the statement made by Lauri 
Honko, according to whom it was the scientiﬁc task of the new discipline of 
folkloristics, during the second half of the 19th century, to place the national 
folk tradition in its ‘right perspective’, since much of what is assumed to 
be national has in reality been borrowed from other cultures (Honko 1980a: 
2). The awareness of the fact that culture does not always correlate with the 
nation is regarded as a proof against the premises of Herderian romantic 
nationalism in modern folklore study.
However, whether the use of folkloristic material for territorial claims is 
‘misuse’ or not cannot be judged solely on the basis of the material’s cor-
relation – or lack of it – with given territorial boundaries. Holbek’s point 
undermines the power of symbolism and metonymy, which do not require 
such exact correlations. Symbolism and metonymy are argumentative rela-
tions. With its historical background in the legitimization and sacralization 
of territories with antiquities, and in the related Herderian idea of the nation 
as being embodied and voiced in traditional culture, especially in the poetry 
of the folk, folklore scholarship has contributed to nationalist symbolism 
and metonymy by providing ‘ancient testimonies’ of history in the national 
language for the legitimization of the political state as a national unit. By 
transforming tradition into heritage, and by metonymizing tradition in the 
course of its representation, folklore scholarship has created ‘national texts’ 
that are authored by ‘the folk’ and speak in the voice of ‘the nation’.
This is not a coincidental historical development but a scholarly practice. 
Oral traditions do not become nationally signiﬁcant and symbolic merely 
by existing somewhere, but through their transformation into literature and 
literary collections, through their adaptation and entextualization into ma-
terial objects of display preserved in sites that are nationalistically relevant 
and signiﬁcant, such as archives, museums, and universities. Folklorists 
have contributed to the making of modernity and its nationalization by col-
lecting traditional cultural expressions on the margins of modernity, from 
among ‘the folk’, and by bringing these to the symbolic centers of society, 
institutions of history and ethnography in national capitals, sites that have 
obtained prominent roles in the representation of the nation’s history and 
culture. Even though engaging mainly with texts instead of material objects, 
folklorists have been active in what can be described as the monumentaliza-
tion of the patrimony. “In order for traditions today to serve to legitimize 
those who constructed or appropriated them, they must be staged.” (García 
Canclini 1995: 109.) This staging, while it has served national interests and 
employed nationalized raw materials, has been transnational in nature, based 
on models of representation that circulate internationally. The imaging of the 
local follows transnational models of imaging the local.
The nationalization of history, and antiquities as its representations, is em-
bedded in the very name of the folklore discipline, which was coined by the 
English antiquarian William Thoms in 1846. Inﬂuenced by German Romantic 
nationalism, Thoms suggested replacing the Latinate term ‘popular antiqui-
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ties’ with a word of Anglo-Saxon origin (Thoms 1965; see also Dorson 1968: 
75–90; Bustin 1988: 2; Abrahams 1993a: 9). Yet, despite the terminological 
rejection of antiquities in the name, folklore studies in Thoms’s England 
continued to have an antiquarian stance, and, in the spirit of the emerging 
evolutionary anthropology, it focused on survivals and historical reconstruc-
tions (Wilson 1973: 819). Roger Abrahams emphasizes that the antiquarian 
interest in English folklore research was nationalistically charged, and the 
choice of the new term was directly linked to this. Says Abrahams:
Thoms suggested a terminological shift from popular antiquities to angli-
cize the project [of collecting, organizing, and publishing], giving it a 
particularly British nationalist cast in an effort to bring his countrymen 
into line with other national literatures that he had discovered in his 
antiquarian compendia of the ‘lays and legends’ of other European polities. 
(Abrahams 1993a: 9.)
As an Anglo-Saxon compound, Abrahams points out, ‘folklore’ communicates 
the message that “aspects of a British national character might be revealed 
by deploying this new term in discussing old matters and archaic gestures” 
(Abrahams 1993a: 9). Antiquarian study, nationalistically and patriotically 
named as folklore, was therefore pursued “in the service of the British Union, 
and by extension, of the imperial crown” (Abrahams 1993a: 16).4
Close connections with folklore research and nationalism can be found in 
most European countries. In Germany, when the nobility and the Enlighten-
ment ideologists looked to France for cultural inspiration, the doctrines of 
popular sovereignty and individual rights put up by the French Revolution 
were felt by the German elite to threaten their political system, which was 
still based on feudalism. In this situation, the German elite found political 
support in Herder’s metaphysical idea, according to which the traditional 
ways and songs of the lower classes of society represent and manifest the 
‘soul’ of the nation to which the lower classes are regarded as belonging. The 
German elite found refuge “in the historic past and a belief that Germany 
could only be saved if it trusted to tradition and the law of historic continu-
ity rather than to rational experiments” (Aris 1965: 219, cited in Fox 1987: 
566; see also Wilson 1973; Bendix 1992). Thus, particular cultural items or 
phenomena were deﬁned as traditional for particular political purposes: ﬁrst, 
to oppose particular currents of ideology (German Romanticism against the 
rationalism and cosmopolitanism of French Enlightenment), and second, to 
legitimate a particular territory as a nation and a particular form of admin-
istration to control it. 
Similarly, in studying the making of Greek national identity, Michael 
Herzfeld writes how there is always argument on how and by whom the 
past is represented. The competing images of ‘Greekness’ are ideological 
formulations, constructions of history and culture, which are chosen on the 
basis of what is regarded as relevant in the attempt to deﬁne cultural con-
tinuity. The discipline of folklore was created in the process of obtaining 
historical justiﬁcation for identiﬁcation with a nation, “providing intellectual 
reinforcement for the political process of nation building that was already 
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well under way” (Herzfeld 1982: 4). Aiming to show that “the peasants, the 
largest demographic element, retained clear traces of their ancient heritage” 
(Herzfeld 1982: 7), 19th-century Greek folklorists claimed for their independ-
ent Greek nation direct descent in the Hellenic tradition and a corresponding 
role in European civilization.
Indeed, born out of a political interest in legitimating states with oral his-
tory, folklore scholarship has been fundamentally nationalistic in its argu-
mentative position towards the society in which it is practiced. Yet, accord-
ing to Seppo Knuuttila, because of their privileged position in the academic 
representation of the national culture, folklorists have actively warded off 
any reﬂection upon the ideological nature of both their research object and 
their own research in the constitution of knowledge through cultural repre-
sentation (Knuuttila 1993: 68–69; see also Alsmark 1982; Fernandez 1985; 
Löfgren 1989; Abrahams 1993a; Eriksen 1993). The political premises of 
folklore studies come forward in the often-circulated slogan “Anthropology 
is born of colonialism, folklore is born of nationalism” (Köngäs-Maranda 
1982: 53), or “What colonialism is to the history of anthropology, nation-
alism is to the study of folklore” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988: 143). Still, 
one can encounter a rather condescending tendency to locate the national-
ism of folklore only “in smaller European nations”, while “the absence of 
nationalism as a component of folklore” would be “unique to the American 
conﬁguration of folklore” (Ben-Amos 1998: 259).
William Wilson describes folklore’s national agenda as follows:
A driving force behind the development of folklore studies, nationalistic 
studies were in the beginning intimately associated with the efforts 
of zealous scholar-patriots who collected and studied the lore of the 
common folk, not just to satisfy their intellectual curiosity or enlarge their 
understanding of human behavior, but primarily to lay the foundations on 
which their emergent nation-states would one day rest. In this movement, 
the nationalistic attempt to redraw political boundaries to ﬁt the contours 
of ethnic bodies merged with the romantic emphasis on feeling and 
intuition, on nature, and on the past as the source of inspiration for the 
present. (Wilson 1998: 441.)
The close link between folklore studies and nation making has not only been 
taken for granted but it has been seen as constituting one of the cornerstones 
for the discipline and its identity. In 1979 Brynjulf Alver made the follow-
ing identity-political statement on folklore and national identity: “It is of 
course self-evident that folklore and folk poetry in particular must serve the 
cause of the national ideologies. It is a heritage that we must take with us 
when we claim that ethno-folkloristic studies are of importance since they 
serve to strengthen national identity and to give people a sense of historical 
perspective.” (Alver 1979: 4; see also Alver 1980: 15.) Alver follows here 
the discipline’s Herderian legacy in linking folklore studies with “the strug-
gle for cultural and political independence”. His argument also points to a 
preference for viewing the nation as an ideal community, with folklore as a 
token and carrier of communal identity within the ideal community.
91
Folklore and Nationalized Antiquities
Still, around the same period, folklorists adopted a viewpoint accord-
ing to which the discipline is no longer nationalistic, since folklorists have 
active international contacts and their discipline is international in charac-
ter. The presupposition here is that international and national are mutually 
exclusive, and that international activity does not make any nationalistic 
claims. Similarly, nationalism is understood to denote clannishness, which 
international cooperation allegedly has replaced (see e.g. Honko 1980a: 3). 
A counter-argument to this idea would refer to the transnational character of 
making nationalist claims and the production of nationalist symbols. Even 
ultra-nationalist political groups (often in the right wing) are in close contact 
and cooperation with similar groups in other countries.
Recent discussions concerning scholarly agency and the politics and po-
etics of scholarly practices and cultural representation have called attention 
to other aspects in the political advocacy of folklore. Without necessarily 
questioning the argumentative or subversive potentiality of folklore repre-
sentations in the aspiration for cultural or political independence by an ethnic 
group or a stateless nation, scholars have become aware of the processes of 
cultural homogenization and the suppression of diversity that nation-making 
processes also have entailed. If folklore speaks for the nation, it speaks for 
a particular political construct. As such, instead of automatically signaling 
a morally justiﬁed political development, it might also speak against politi-
cal, ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity in the name of the nation’s inner 
unity and cohesion. Abrahams makes a point to this effect:
The recent history of much of Eastern Europe shows that one people’s 
nationalism can be transformed into the means by which other peoples are 
disenfranchised. This process can result in the wholesale displacement, or 
even murder, of the group denied national status. (Abrahams 1993a: 5.)
It remains to be debated whether the juxtaposition of the anthropology/
colonialism relationship with folklore/nationalism relationship provides 
a parallel to the less studied relationship between postcolonial anthropol-
ogy and postnational folklore studies. In any case, ‘postmodern’ reﬂexivity 
on the discipline’s representational practices, textualization, epistemology 
and ideology should not automatically be dismissed as a political argument 
against nationalism. The contribution of folklore research in the making of 
nation-states and national cultures is not an issue that should be categorically 
judged as being morally right or wrong, even though folklore scholarship 
can be characterized as a moral project within the production of modernity. 
If folklorists choose to be nationalists for patriotic reasons, their argumen-
tative position may be critically assessed with another one that questions 
patriotism and nationalism as political premises in scholarship, but neither 
position per se is more scientiﬁc than the other. Having a nationalistic bias is 
a political choice, and therefore our judgment of it cannot be independent of 
our own argumentative positions in relation to the means, goals and identity 
constructions involved.
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Promodernist Antimodernists
When nationalizing individual and local communication and transforming 
it into objects of display with nationalistic claims, folklore scholarship has 
operated in what appears to be a paradox in relation to one of its founding 
arguments about modernity and modernization. Traditionally, folkloristic 
activity has legitimated the collecting of cultural forms and expressions 
with the claim that this material is on the verge of extinction because of 
modernization. Yet, that which is collected and documented is transformed 
into literature and then used for a variety of political statements, including 
the nationalistic one, in the modernization of society. That which is called 
folklore is made to serve and speak for the very process that is argued to be 
the cause for folklore’s alleged extinction.
In a similar paradox, folklore scholarship stands in a close argumentative 
relation to the very enlightenment project that has aimed at uprooting the 
culture that folklorists originally set out to study and preserve in text. The 
scholarly interest as well as the romanticizing and exoticizing gaze into the 
folk beliefs and myths of primitive and premodern societies have coexisted 
with the enlightened scholar’s efforts to spread literacy, Western aesthetics, 
state control, nationalistic sentiments, Christianity, and a rational worldview 
among those regarded as being empowered by irrational beliefs and customs 
(see also Knuuttila 1989: 94–95).
Such ambivalence or dualism has characterized much of earlier folklore 
collecting. A case in point is Jaako Länkelä in 19th-century Finland, a collector 
responsible for making some of the largest and most signiﬁcant collections 
of oral verse from Ingria, partially across the Russian border. He describes 
his informants as preservers of barbarian remains from ancient superstitions. 
Emphasizing that his motivation is that of an observer, without having any 
intention to disparage the “national value of the people”, he depicts the cul-
ture of his informants as being at the dawn of civilization, and looks forward 
to seeing the effects of the school system in uprooting “darkness from the 
minds of the people” (Länkelä 1865; my translation; see also Ilomäki 1992: 
105–106).
Instead of nostalgia for an ‘authentic’ culture destroyed by enlightenment, 
such a statement exempliﬁes the societal position that folklorists and folklore 
collectors take between tradition and modernity. There may be a preference 
for the antimodernist rhetoric of traditions disappearing due to the spread 
of modernity and literacy, but when folklore studies is conceptualized as a 
discipline that has science, enlightenment, patriotism and nationalization 
as its argumentative premises and pragmatic goals, the folklorist does not 
stand for the salvation and preservation of traditions in locations where these 
are found. If the folk have been considered uneducated, unenlightened and 
irrational, as was the case especially in the 19th century, the preservation of 
their folklore, lifestyle or cultural integrity has not been the objective for the 
modern, enlightened ethnographer. Documentation, the act of representation, 
overrides preservation, the act of political partisanship.
In a seeming paradox, the modern discipline of folklore has nostalgized 
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the traditional culture that yields to modernization, but at the same time 
has celebrated the modern progress of science and nation making and thus 
enhanced the modernization that causes the traditional culture to yield. 
Folkloristic activity has conceptualized its study objects with the rhetori-
cal imagery of life and death, but at the same time it has selected symbolic 
representations and transformed them into commodities of higher literary 
quality, in order for them to serve the creation and consolidation of national 
identiﬁcation and nationalistic sentiments. Death to the tradition means life 
to the nation. Making the representations of tradition into national monu-
ments and their historical ruins, folkloristic activity has enhanced not only 
the diffusion of modern methods of collecting, documentation and display, 
but also the modern political culture of representational government that 
draws a signiﬁcant share of its legitimacy from historical symbolism and col-
lective identiﬁcation.
The apparent paradox disappears, however, when we consider the repre-
sentations of tradition as a form of modern possessions. As I will discuss 
in later chapters, the construction of historical symbolism with folklore has 
entailed that the ancient or premodern traditionality that the scholar has 
discovered, together with the making of antiquities as its representations, 
serve to indicate a historical process and thus, the nationalized population’s 
ability to progress and modernize. Selected products of cultural practice are 
collected and put on display as traditions that speak for ‘collective roots’ and 
‘heritage’. But these are not to be continued as cultural practices, because 
their continuation would speak of a lack in people’s capacity to modernize. 
For this reason, traditions as social practices are made into representations 
that are to be possessed, for example, in collections. Possessing traditions 
that speak for bygone antiquity and history serves as evidence of progress 
and modernity.
Indeed, the conception of folklore as an antiquity, the related idea of the 
past as a lost community and folklore as its ruins, has provided a powerful 
means for providing symbolic legitimation for the establishment of new col-
lectivities such as nations. For this reason, the emergence of folklore schol-
arship is just as much related to the symbolic processes in the making of a 
nation-state and the writing of its unwritten history, as to an antimodernist 
moral project against the allegedly alienating forces of modernity. Therefore, 
premodern and preindustrial life as a more or less harmonious ‘folk society’ 
or a site of cultural authenticity with direct, unmediated interaction has not 
been something that some intellectuals – alienated or not alienated – have 
tried to ‘save’ from falling into oblivion at the eleventh hour. Instead, this is 
an image constructed and continuously reconstructed by such modern dis-
courses as folklore scholarship to make modernity’s otherness, which then 
acquires political use and value in the making of that very modernity which 
is regarded as having destroyed that which the image depicts.
As already noted, an important element in the modern and modernist tra-
ditionalism of folkloristic activity is its character as a moral project. Serv-
ing nationalistic aspirations and promoting enlightenment are regarded as 
making a positive and optimistic statement about modernity and the process 
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of modernization, which may otherwise be considered to alienate people 
from the traditional and the historical. Thus, in addition to being a political 
attempt to claim or obtain legislative and juridical authority for a particular 
ethnic group or other community, nationalism is an issue of morality. In other 
words, the antimodernist statement about modernity and the nostalgic gaze on 
the vanishing are essentially moral statements. They are not merely laments 
over lost treasures but an attempt to bring alternative values, meanings and 
technologies to the fore, to make a comment on the present and to partici-
pate in its constitution. Thus, instead of regarding the apparent paradoxes in 
the discourse on folklore as weaknesses, they can, on the contrary, be con-
sidered the strength of folkloristic arguments in the politics of culture. The 
power and mystery of antiquity, that which is claimed to be on the verge of 
disappearance, and that which is claimed as tradition and a manifestation of 
historical continuity, can provide a politically effective means in the making 
of claims in local, regional, and national identiﬁcations and the advancement 
of rights for particular populations and social groups.
As discussed above, the traditional folkloristic strategy is to folklorize 
cultural practices deemed traditional, make them collectibles, and put them 
in large quantities in storage or on display in archives and museums to repre-
sent the national culture metonymically and to make a symbolic claim for the 
preservation of the nation’s cultural heritage. According to such an ‘archive 
strategy’, cultural identity is best protected and argued for by depositing tex-
tual representations of it in the archive and then producing selected and edited 
materials in books for the consuming and reading public – as commodities 
of tradition in which authenticity is claimed as a guarantee of quality. Such 
an archive strategy can be compared and discussed in relation to alternative 
ways in making representations of traditional culture speak out on cultural 
rights and political claims. Without questioning the symbolic or moral value 
of the archive or its practical use in documenting and accessing information, 
it must be acknowledged – in addition to the epistemological questions of 
representation – that in many societies and postcolonial arenas today, building 
a national tradition archive may not be the most effective means in ﬁghting 
cultural hegemony. In a context where the museum has served the staging 
of power, archives may also come to stand for such hegemony (see García 
Canclini 1995: 135–144).
95
Tradition and Political Identity
The development of ethnically integrated nation-states and the near-global distribution of the ideology of nationalism are some of the most important 
political processes of modern times and aspects of modernism. Today this 
development has reached a reﬂexive turning point in which nationalism as a 
model for economic, political and territorial identiﬁcation has in a number 
of arenas been questioned. Many of the old nation-states are going through 
processes of transformation and redeﬁnition in terms of economic and in-
formation systems, cultural and ethnic foundations, political loyalties, and 
geographical boundaries.
Some of the major factors in this development are the increasing interna-
tionalization of capital and the formulation of a world system of production 
and consumption that transcends the territories of the nation-states and na-
tional economies. Local, regional and national economies, cultures, politi-
cal structures and spaces of identiﬁcation are no longer – if they ever were 
– isolated units but integrated parts in a global system of relations. (See e.g. 
Featherstone 1990; King 1991; Friedman 1994a.) As a consequence, “The 
very concepts of homogenous national cultures, the consensual or contigu-
ous transmission of historical traditions, or ‘organic’ ethnic communities 
– as the grounds of cultural compararativism – are in a profound process of 
redeﬁnition” (Bhabha 1994: 5).
This development is also characterized by new technological forms of 
information transmission, such as satellites, cables and computer networks, 
which produce new transnational and postnational geographies and deprive 
the national media of their role in integrating populations into national units 
of audience. Consequently, collective identities are in many symbolic ways 
deterritorialized as alternative networks of communication and identiﬁcation 
and information systems have become available through the transnationaliza-
tion and globalization of culture, economy and the media (see e.g. Morley & 
Robins 1995; Castells 1996; Elkins 1997; García Canclini 2001).
Moreover, the increasing ﬂow of people of various origins, cultural and 
religious backgrounds and political loyalties across ethnic, religious, politi-
cal, economic, and geographical borders have changed cultural landscapes 
and turned ethnically more or less homogeneous nation-states, some more 
and some less, into multiethnic and multicultural societies. Even more than 
6. Tradition and Political Identity
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the emerging new economic networks across old state boundaries, voluntary 
and involuntary migration and the growing number of refugees and other 
displaced and diasporic people have brought new, both powerful and prob-
lematic, dimensions to the making of state-based, national, regional, local, 
and ethnic identities. This also applies to those territories that are not directly 
affected by new political borders (see e.g. Bendix & Klein 1993; Abrahams 
2000; Klein 1997, 2000).
In Europe, the general discussion about recent changes in the global 
economic, political and cultural map has primarily concerned Europe it-
self. Throughout the 1990s, the major element in this was the simultane-
ous integration and disintegration of Europe, which took place politically, 
economically and culturally. The still on-going economic integration – the 
making of a European ecumene5 – has been composed and executed ﬁrst 
and foremost by the European Union (EU), formerly known as the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC). Some 
of the major goals of this centrally governed organization of member states 
are the partial and/or gradual disintegration of many national institutions 
and the integration of large parts of Europe into a common market free of 
customs regulations, protectionist legislation and different currencies. After 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and its coming into effect in 
1993 – which also marked the beginning of the Union as it now exists – the 
EU has gained more and more political meaning and power. Ever since then, 
one of the most heated issues in its development has been the extent to which 
national democracies and national economies – the cornerstones of nation-
states – should yield to a postnational economic and political federation, a 
European federal state.
In contrast, since the late 1980s Eastern Europe was characterized by a 
geopolitical disintegration, which in major ways shook up the whole of Eu-
rope politically and culturally. The 50-year political and military status quo 
established after World War II and manifested in many practical and ideo-
logical ways in the division of Europe into two blocs and an ‘Iron Curtain’ 
in between, was shattered into pieces when, ﬁrst, the symbol of the division, 
the Berlin Wall, came down in November 1989, and second, the other half 
of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, was, as a result of domestic intrigues, 
wiped off both the political and the geographical map in December 1991. 
In related turmoils, the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe gained sov-
ereignty, the two Germanys were reunited, the Baltic states regained their 
independence, Belarus and the Ukraine disconnected their nation-state ties 
with the Russians, the Czechs disbanded with the Slovaks, and Yugoslavia 
dissolved into a brutal ethnic war.
In a seeming contradiction, the Western European countries took steps 
towards integration in the name of supranationalism, postnationalism, fed-
eralism, confederalism or, in more familiar terms, post-industrial capital-
ism and economic pragmatism stripped of national loyalties, while Eastern 
European countries, including Russia and the other countries that arose into 
sovereignty from the ruins of the Soviet Union, discarded the Soviet-based 
state-nationalism and took steps towards ethno-nationalism and ethnic 
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separatism – in addition to discarding socialism and beginning to integrate 
into the Western European economic networks. After the initial euphoria of 
the nationalist and separatist revolution in the East, many of these countries 
mapped themselves geopolitically in Central Europe or ‘the Europe Between’ 
and started to search for security guarantees in the West, in membership in 
the European Union and/or NATO.
As regards the major cultural and political identiﬁcations in Europe today, 
one of the most signiﬁcant outgrowths of the European economic and political 
integration has been the heated debate concerning the future of the nation-state 
and the ideology of nationalism. The increasing internationalization of eco-
nomic and information networks has given many people a reason to declare 
the end of nationalism, to be replaced by, among other things, federalism, 
pan-Europeanism, cosmopolitanism or neo-regionalism. Eric Hobsbawm 
concluded his seminal book on nationalism – written just before the great 
turmoils – with the notion that because of “the supranational restructuring 
of the globe”, the phenomenon of nationalism is “past its peak” (Hobsbawm 
1990: 182–183). More emphatically, in building a stronger economic entity, 
the European Union has tended to consider the old national boundaries not 
only artiﬁcial but also necessary to be nulliﬁed, as nationalism is viewed 
as a ‘disintegrative force’ and national cultures and national economies are 
regarded as ‘selﬁsh’ and considered to block the realization of ‘common 
European interests’ – that is, the development of the European Union as 
envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty.
Much of the logic and motivation behind this reasoning has been cred-
ited to the aftermath of the Second World War and the political will to avoid 
the kind of nationalistic developments that led to it. Yet, the increase in the 
value of ‘common European interests’ must also be attributed to the post-
war political situation in which the major European countries were forced 
to rearrange the colonialist structures of their respective national economies. 
The integration of European economies and political structures has thus 
paralleled the disintegration of colonial economies and politics both in the 
West-and-the-rest relations and within Europe itself.
To some extent the disintegration of Western European nationalism started 
to provide a potentially liberating effect – in terms of culture, tradition, econ-
omy and political rights – for those regions or ethnic, linguistic or religious 
minorities that have had to yield to the assimilatory policies of nationalism 
and nation-states (Smith 1990: 175). The aspirations for a ‘Europe of the 
Regions’, an idea that Europe should be constituted on the basis of regions, 
cities and other economic and administrative units smaller than the state, 
emerged to carry rather similar denationalizing overtones (see e.g. Gidlund 
& Sörlin 1993; Harvie 1994; Cronberg 2000).
Regionalism may, however, also encourage nationalism, and at the same 
time as many in the name of economic, political and cultural integration 
have called for the death of nationalism, for many others the dimension of 
the national has only become stronger and politically more powerful as the 
integration proceeds – and especially as the intentions to develop the European 
Union towards a federation have become clearer. At least two interrelated 
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phenomena may be discerned here: one concerns the popular opposition to 
giving up established or newly deﬁned national symbols, and the other, the 
increased consumption value of the national and its territorial foundation.
Functions and symbols of sovereign nation-states, such as the national 
parliament, started to attain new meanings and an increase of value in the 
context of opposing the plans to centralize more and more political power 
in the headquarters of the Union in Brussels. Many came to fear that the 
strengthening of the Union’s power would cause the Member States to lose 
not only much of their independent legislative force but also their independ-
ence as sovereign states. This would then undermine the traditional political 
congruence between the state and the nation. It would threaten the founda-
tion of the national as a cultural unit, as some of the most central national 
symbols of the state would disappear.
The federalist process in which the Union pushed for the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) caused similar reactions. Part of the common 
monetary policy, national money (or more precisely, state-based currency) 
in each Member State was, and still is, to retreat and make way for the euro, 
the common European currency. Although a national currency has not al-
ways been listed in the cultural inventories of national symbols, it certainly 
became one when it was time to make the dramatic change. A country’s own 
currency came to carry value as a symbol of national independence regard-
less of whether the country’s national economy was independent in reality 
or not. In order to calm down popular opposition to the federal currency, the 
European Union had to make a compromise between the federalists and the 
nationalists by allowing the Member States print their respective national 
symbols on the ﬂip side of the euro coin.
Second, although the idea of economic and political integration across 
nation-states and national economies is gaining more and more ground and 
spreading, for example, from Europe to South America, South-East Asia 
and elsewhere, there are many global institutions which foreground and cel-
ebrate nation-states as political-symbolic constructions instead of obscuring 
or dissolving them. Indeed, the breakdown of the primariness of the national 
economy and the relativization of its boundaries has not shown to be as fatal 
to the ideology of nationalism as has been thought. In fact, even though – or 
probably just because – the media are becoming more and more delocalized 
and postnational – that is, independent of national loyalties – some of their 
most popular products, especially international sport competitions, explic-
itly foreground and encourage national frames of reference and national 
identiﬁcation and that way discourage the fragmentation – or rather, the 
de-nationalization – of identities. Rather paradoxically, the deterritorialized 
media help create communities with a sense of place.
One reason for this tendency must be economic, as national identiﬁcation 
has to a great extent become a form of collective, media-mediated consump-
tion with a large market for products appealing to national feelings. Another, 
interrelated reason is social. Despite the internationalization, postnationaliza-
tion and pluralization of identities, the social expectation to anchor oneself to 
a place, a particular locale and a social world, has not signiﬁcantly decreased. 
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This can be regarded as one of the foundations for the continuing value of 
national identiﬁcation – especially of the identiﬁcation with the national ter-
ritory – as one of the major dimensions of social identiﬁcation. As observed 
by Ulf Hannerz, transnational personal ties and other linkages “tend not to 
coalesce into any single conspicuous alternative to the nation” (Hannerz 
1993: 386).
Indeed, national symbols are today in greater demand than ever before, 
just as much in the West as in the East, as nation-states compete against 
each other in an ever-growing number of internationally integrated and 
standardized arenas. National distinctions continue to be created on the 
basis of uniqueness in character and mentality, but to an increasing extent 
nations are also imagined by raising individuals and teams – especially in 
sports but also in business – to the status of national heroes as they win in 
arenas of internationally integrated activities. Both the international arenas 
and nationally adopted international currents, instead of replacing national 
identiﬁcations, tend to foreground nations, nationalism and national frames 
of references (see e.g. Blain et al. 1993).
Related to these processes is the growing impact of tribalism in global 
economic networks (see e.g. Kotkin 1993) or social networks (Maffesoli 
1996), and the resurgence of religious nationalism in state politics (see e.g. 
Westerlund 1996). Of great importance here is also the wide-spread popular 
movement of nationalistic violence, which, on the one hand, is indicative 
of the ideological, psychological and emotional opposition to mixing – that 
is, sharing identity space with – those who ‘belong’ and those who ‘do not 
belong’ in the nationalist congruence of culture, history, religion, economy, 
and political structure. Although channeled in modernity into the ideology 
of nationalism, such opposition has a long history in territorial protection-
ism, patriotism, xenophobia, racism and other community-making ideologies. 
On the other hand, the publicly and privately conducted acts of nationalist 
discrimination are indicative of the reluctance to share state-based economic, 
social and territorial beneﬁts and resources with the growing number of in-
coming ‘non-members’ of the state, non-Western immigrants and refugees.
 Towards a European Consciousness and a European Identity
In addition to creating many new common European policies, practices and 
arenas of interaction, European integration has encouraged the Europeiﬁca-
tion of domestic policies and administration and has greatly Europeanized 
the popular consciousness. The many changes in boundaries have reshaped 
the sense of place and belonging and helped to build a new type of European 
consciousness. This is evident in, for example, the way in which Europe be-
came a popular frame of reference, making the idea and concept of Europe 
a topic of constant discussion and deﬁnition. Probably more than in actual 
economic or political terms, Europe has ‘come together’ in talk and narra-
tion about Europe.6
When concerned with identiﬁcations, such interest is both politically mo-
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tivated and has political ramiﬁcations. Instead of being purely a geographical 
unit, Europe is deﬁned both qualitatively and politically, and this is mani-
fested, among other things, in the way in which Europe and the European 
Union are used as synonyms. This contains, on the one hand, the expansion-
ist idea that the European Union is ‘truly’ European only when the Eastern 
European countries have become members – which places Germany and 
its re-established capital of Berlin right in the center. On the other hand, in 
countries applying for membership in the Union, people have tended to talk 
about ‘going to Europe’ or ‘taking the Europe train’, which implies that they 
would be in Europe – politically, that is – only as members of the European 
Union. A related issue here is the fact that as a consequence of the gradual 
expansion of the Union, new boundaries have been erected to areas where 
there used to be almost none. This especially concerns the former Eastern 
European countries and their gradual ‘Europeanization’.
European consciousness is not the same thing as European identity. In fact, 
it has repeatedly been commented on how the problem with the centrally 
governed European Union is, as well as with the European integration, that 
there is no such thing as a collective European identity. The European Union 
may wish to present itself as a federation, a united states of Europe, and as 
such a conglomeration comparable to a nation, but it lacks the means to cre-
ate ‘national European’ identiﬁcation among the various state populations. In 
terms of identiﬁcation, there is hardly anything more than the shared value 
of economic, political and cultural cooperation between the Member States. 
This creates a European consciousness but not a European identity. Applying 
the concept used by Eric Hobsbawm (1972: 392, 404), Ninian Smart (1983) 
and others, the EU lacks the civic religion of nationalism, a set of motivations 
developed in the national citizens that gives them “a primary and overriding 
sense of obligation” towards the territorial state “and eliminates the vari-
ous other obligations that they feel towards other groups and centres within 
or without the territory” (Alapuro 1982: 114). Europe, and especially the 
European Union, lacks a cultural and political identity that would produce 
loyalty and allegiance (see also Shore 2001).
One of the reasons for this, and indeed, one of the major problems of the 
Union and causes of skepticism towards it, is that it is viewed as being led 
bureaucratically by an elitist group of politicians. The rationale of economic 
integration does not seem to convince people of the importance of political 
integration, if the citizens of the Member States feel that they lack adequate 
political weight in the system. According to one EU critic, it is a historical 
paradox that the undemocratic EU would not be accepted as member in the 
EU (Wallgren 1997).
To replace national identiﬁcation with European identiﬁcation, both the 
European Union as a top-down organization and many ideologically and po-
litically oriented bottom-up discourses offer European-ness or Europeanism 
as an alternative collective identiﬁcation. Instead of concerning European 
consciousness only, European-ness or Europeanism is meant to be an identity 
in the sense that it is constituted in relation to cultural and political other-
ness. In other words, it is expected to comment on being European through 
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an argumentative distinction made in relation to people and sociopolitical 
systems elsewhere, and create loyalty and allegiance that way.
Indeed, Europe is not deﬁned only on the basis of its ‘intrinsic ingredients’, 
as such ‘intrinsic-ness’ is always an ideological construction that natural-
izes certain elements and categorizes certain others as foreign or marginal. 
Especially since the Age of Discovery, Europe and European-ness have 
been deﬁned and conceptualized against, for example, the other continents 
as well as such symbolic systems and constructions as Islam and the Ori-
ent. Today Europe may be constructed, for example, as a political-economic 
unit that draws its identity from competition in global business, trade and 
policy-making force against the two other economic super-powers of the 
world, the USA and Japan.
The idea of Europe may also be a cultural landscape constituted by an 
image of the ‘European past’ and based on the myth that the core of Europe 
lies in its Hellenic heritage. As discussed by Michael Herzfeld, Jonathan 
Friedman and others, throughout European development after the Renais-
sance, Greece was incorporated into an emergent European identity as a 
legitimate ancestor and the Greeks were considered primordial Europeans. 
Greece stood for Science, Progress, Democracy and Commerce, that is, the 
signs of modernity, which at the same time signaled the opposite of every-
thing Oriental (see Friedman 1994b: 120; Herzfeld 1982).
In addition to the origins, the heritage of Antiquity has also been inter-
preted as providing Europe with a ‘spiritual’ instead of an ‘economic’ identity 
space. Making Europe a landscape of literary civilization and sophistication 
can provide an alternative to the equation of European-ness and the Euro-
pean Union, or it can be directed, for example, to oppose the expansion of 
American popular and media culture. In a somewhat similar manner, being 
European might also be argued to mean being Christian – whether Catholic, 
Protestant or Orthodox – which then may be used to construct a landscape 
of Europe based on a fear of the expansion of Islam, especially Islamic fun-
damentalism. These issues have recently been heavily debated in conjunc-
tion with the global threat of terrorism, the EU Constitution and Turkey’s 
possible EU membership.
Indeed, fear is one of the driving forces in the development of the Euro-
pean integration, as the more or less independent nation-states choose not 
to depend only on national defense but look for security guarantees from 
each other. This applies to most of Europe but is most conspicuous in the 
Eastern European countries, which have been eager to become members in 
the European Union and/or NATO. Moreover, it is no longer a secret that 
even though Finland’s application for membership in the European Union 
was ofﬁcially defended with economic arguments only, the wish for security 
guarantees was the main political motive. Security is also the major issue 
today as the Finns debate on the possibility of applying for membership in 
NATO. The issue of security brings geopolitics to the fore and makes the 
extent to which identities – political and cultural – are constituted on the 
basis of geopolitical interests and evaluations a core issue.
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Cultural Identity as Political Identity
In addition to much talk on the economic, political and legal aspects of the 
European integration, as well as on European consciousness and common 
European identity, the recent changes in Europe have given new stimulus 
to academic studies and discussions concerning such ‘cultural’ issues as 
cultural identity, ethnicity and ethnic identity, nationalism, national identity 
and national mentality, local identity, regional identity, multiculturalism, 
ethnic pluralism, immigrant identity, gender identity, etc. In fact, cultural 
identity has in recent years become a key interest in many social scientiﬁc 
and humanistic ﬁelds, including sociology, history, anthropology, linguistics, 
ethnology and folkloristics. Such interest is not only coeval with the proc-
esses of integration and disintegration in Europe, but constitutes intertextual 
links with these on both academic and practical levels.
The drastic changes in the European geographical and economic land-
scape have also brought the concept of boundary to the front line of scholarly 
discussion. The decades of frozen stand-still in Europe after World War II 
made boundaries look ﬁxed and objective, and played at least a partial role 
in inviting scholars to hold on to the study of social phenomena as subjects 
of diffusion and objects of cartographic mapping on the one hand, and to the 
study of isolated ethnic groups and the perseverance of their oral and material 
traditions on the other. Gradually, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, new 
epistemological perspectives started to emerge in both the social sciences 
and the humanities which, at least to some extent, directed methodological, 
theoretical and philosophical interests both to boundaries and to the cognitive 
processes of category formation. These emphasized the spatiality, territorial-
ity and temporality of social processes, and questioned the idea of cultures 
and ethnicities as holistic and objectivist systems. The purity of forms – both 
academic ones and those constructed by academics in their research – gave 
way to disciplinary, cultural and cognitive hybridity (see García Canclini 
1995; Kapchan & Strong 1999).
Although the beginning of the re-evaluation of cultural boundaries as not 
ﬁxed but ﬂexible, blurred and hybrid, temporally precedes the reshufﬂing of 
territorial and cultural boundaries in Europe, the dramatic political changes 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s no doubt increased the impelling force of 
these academic perspectives. They bore witness to the notion that spatial 
structures and territorial identiﬁcations are, indeed, relative and socially 
constructed.
Since spatial structures, such as political and geographical boundaries, are 
temporally and socially constructed phenomena, it is not far-fetched to make 
the same conclusion for cultural boundaries and cultural identities. These are, 
too, temporally and spatially speciﬁc and in that sense context-dependent. 
As pointed out by Jonas Frykman, cultural identity is not something that is, 
but instead, an issue of when, where and how (Frykman 1995: 6).
Indeed, researchers have become reluctant to see identities as objectivist 
lists of cultural traits and to view the study of identity as an exercise in the 
‘discovery’ of such allegedly objective factors. Yet, the fact that identities are 
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constructed in dialogues, interrelations or oppositions to each other does not 
simply mean that “If one is young, then one is not old; to talk about female 
qualities has meaning only because men exist” (Brück 1988: 79). Instead 
of being merely relational, identities are socially constructed categories and 
as such, constitutive of each other and negotiated in the discursive context 
of one another. For this reason, in addition to being an issue of when, where 
and how, the context dependence of the production and articulation of cul-
tural identity is also – and emphatically so – an issue of why. In addition to 
the aspects of spatiality, temporality and modality, cultural identity, in order 
to exist, requires a motivation, a purpose, and an argumentative goal. When 
producing and reproducing categories of people on the basis of such iden-
tity factors as nationality, ethnicity, lifestyle, looks, language, dialect, party 
political or religious standing, territorial residence, etc., we do not merely 
make distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, but we also make choices as to 
why such distinctions are made and maintained. In other words, the making 
of distinctions is argumentative by nature, as we have reasons for why dif-
ference makes a difference when it makes a difference, and why similarity 
does not always carry enough symbolic meaning to unite or integrate those 
that are similar.
The production and articulation of cultural identity takes place in rhetori-
cal and argumentative processes of identiﬁcation, which are in fundamental 
ways linked to questions concerning political and territorial loyalties and al-
legiances, social power, control of land, discursive ways of making historical 
continuity, and on geopolitics and geopolitical strategies. To put it simply, 
cultural identity is political identity.
As regards the role of loyalties and allegiances in the making of a cultural 
identity, some key factors here are the ways in which our various socially 
constituted loyalties suggest or determine when difference does or does 
not make a difference. Accordingly, the philosophical axiom of reality be-
ing socially constructed can be rephrased pragmatically to suggest that the 
interpretative frames of reality are to a signiﬁcant extent constituted by and 
through various personal and intra-group, including national, loyalties. This 
makes both personal identity and group identity political in nature, as the 
question of who we are depends to a large extent on to whom we are loyal, 
and why.
Both on a personal and group level, including ethnic and national levels, 
such loyalties are morally founded. Loyalties are moral even when they rep-
resent the morality of an ideological minority whose morals are questioned 
by the majority as being, for example, xenophobic or racist. We express and 
construct moral loyalties, for example, when we argue that such differences 
as the ethnic origin should not make a difference, or that people who represent 
different genders, religious creeds, age groups, social classes or castes, sexual 
orientations, or economic and political values and interests, are all equal.
Then again, we also express and construct moral loyalties when we em-
phasize distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and celebrate ‘our community’ 
and ‘our kind of people’ against those who are foreigners or whom we regard 
in some other ways as outsiders. Consequently, we are moral whenever we 
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express the universal social value and expectation of building a human com-
munity, regardless of what practical ideology of categorization it is based on. 
For this reason each and every human community can claim to be morally 
based, even though this must not lead to the cultural relativistic conclusion 
that all moral conceptions should be acceptable. While morality transcends 
politics, this transcendence is politically constituted. Collective symbols and 
traditions become valuable representations of cultural continuity because of 
their moral reference – even when they may contradict historical accuracy.
Folklore, Identity, Politics
The concept of identity has become one of the most constitutive elements 
of both folkloristic and ethnological discourse. Jonas Frykman notes that 
the study of cultural identity came to dominate ethnology in the 1990s 
(Frykman 1995: 5). As for folkloristics, Elliott Oring claims that despite 
the recent origin of the term and its use, “identity has always been a central 
concern – in fact, the central concern – of the ﬁeld” (Oring 1994: 223). Yet, 
in his quest to prove the presence of the ‘project of identity’ throughout the 
disciplinary history, as well as in his quest for thus constructing an identity 
for the discipline, Oring fails to distinguish between actual identity research 
and the politically motivated expectations that scholars and society at large 
have set for folkloric and folkloristic scholarship in order to have it provide 
evidence for collective identities. Rather typically in folklore studies, and 
echoing perspectives deriving from J. G. Herder, the identity that according 
to Oring is manifested in folklore materials is constituted by a collectively, 
mainly nationally, imagined set of characteristics, and by a shared mentality 
and ethos. There is no discussion in his article on how identities might be 
constituted by collective values and meanings deriving from and comment-
ing on historically speciﬁc and politically motivated incidents of social action 
– whether by scholars themselves or the people they study.
Indeed, traditionally, studies on cultural identity have tended to ignore the 
politics of identity and the political dynamics in which, for example, local 
and group identities are constituted. Especially in the study of folklore, the 
study of cultural identity has generally meant the observation and analysis of 
those (decontextualized and depoliticized) texts, cultural traits, symbols, and 
performances of identity which appear to descend from previous generations 
and which are said – especially by the scholar of such traditions – to denote 
and strengthen the inner cohesion and thereby the identity of the social group 
or the cultural entity in question. Focusing on preconceived collectivities 
such as nations, ethnic groups, local communities and occupational groups, 
scholars have followed the discipline’s modern sociological paradigm and 
placed much rhetorical emphasis on intra-group folklore as the foundation of 
positive and healthy collective identities – as well as employing this notion to 
legitimate their own scholarly practices in the representation of such groups. 
In addition to mostly ignoring the political implications of elevating particu-
lar identities and backgrounding others, folklorists have been bold enough 
105
Tradition and Political Identity
to claim that studying collective identiﬁcations and providing material for 
them gives their ﬁeld ‘an identity bonus’ in relation to other disciplines (see 
also Knuuttila 1994: 32–33).
However, folklore is not necessarily a collectively deﬁned representation 
of a group identity, a manifestation of a coherent self-image of a precon-
ceived group. Instead, folklore is a name for a type or act of communica-
tion produced in a situation or a process in which groups and collectivities 
are made through interaction between people belonging to different social 
categories and through the exercise of social power (Bauman 1972; Briggs 
& Bauman 1992). Instead of arguing how united a group may be because 
of its folklore, as this is often based on circular reasoning (see Abrahams 
1981: 309), an alternative approach challenges the folklorist to discuss how 
folklore is employed in the making of groups, in the processes of categoriz-
ing people, in building boundaries in certain places and crossing them in 
others, and in deﬁning relations between the categories thus created. Such 
category-making processes are both argumentative and political in character, 
and accordingly, the identities and identiﬁcations emerging from these cat-
egories are also argumentative and political. The same applies to the extent 
to which collective representations are collective. Folklorists may construct 
the discipline’s identity on the premise that they provide material for ‘posi-
tively evaluated’ historical identiﬁcations, but they may also choose to come 
to grips with the political dynamics of identity processes and the conﬂict 
potentials of their representations.
To be sure, recent years have witnessed more and more reﬂection upon 
the political nature of the concepts of cultural identity and tradition as well 
as upon the politics of folklore research (see e.g. articles in Briggs & Shu-
man 1993; Bendix 1997; Naithani 1997; Bauman & Briggs 2003). This 
development represents a politically oriented continuation of the research 
trend generally labeled performance studies, which has accorded key roles 
to human agency and individual action for the understanding and analysis 
of folkloric communication. Sharing here some insights with Marxist and 
Gramscian perspectives (see e.g. Lombardi-Satriani 1974), performance ap-
proaches – or at least some practitioners – have been sensitive to the ways 
in which folklore is produced as an expression of social conﬂict and a form 
of social and political resistance (see e.g. Limón 1983a).
Political awareness in the discipline has also increased as scholars have 
reﬂected upon their own – or their colleagues’ – metadiscursive textual prac-
tices (e.g. Briggs 1993). The questions of power and representation have been 
discussed especially in relation to gender (e.g. Mills 1990 and 1993). In ad-
dition to some folklorists participating in political activism and advocating 
for social change (see e.g. Kodish 1993), scholars in applied folklore have, 
as characterized by Abrahams, offered practical services in developing social 
welfare, alternative health care or legal assistance programs, and in public 
sector folklore displayed their ﬁeldwork results in such public contexts as 
festivals, shows and exhibitions (Abrahams 1993b: 394; see also Baron & 
Spitzer 1992; Zeitlin 2000). Yet, to a large extent, the debates on politics 
and poetics in folklore scholarship have rather self-critically concerned the 
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folklorists themselves and the political implications of their scholarly prac-
tices, instead of directing scholars to develop methodologies in the study of 
the production of identity in the context of situated political processes and 
political economy.
Undeniably, increased attention has been given to the politics of time and 
tradition, that is, the political and argumentative processes in which the mean-
ing of the past and cultural descent is – instead of being ‘handed down’ by 
previous generations – constituted in the present. One of the starting points 
for this perspective in folklore studies was Dell Hymes’s observation that in 
a process which he calls the active, dynamic and universal process of tradi-
tionalization (Hymes 1975: 353–354; see also Handler & Linnekin 1984), 
people make goal-directed historical links as well as breaks, foreground 
particular aspects of the past and background others in order to appropri-
ate a given content of tradition for given argumentative purposes. Instead 
of being merely received, the past is thus actively – and often narratively 
– produced. Such a perspective on the active and interpretive production of 
tradition is emphatically different from the theoretical model formulated by 
Lauri Honko, according to whom tradition is “the stuff out of which cultures 
are made”. By this Honko means that traditions exist in an inchoate state as 
material stored in museums, archives and the “library of the human mind”, 
waiting to be selected, activated and thus transformed into culture (see e.g. 
Honko 1995: 132–136).
The perspective on the construction of the past in the present must also 
be distinguished from such categorizations as ‘fakelore’ or ‘folklorism’, as 
well as from the dichotomization of ‘natural’ and ‘constructed identities’ 
(see Honko 1988: 21–22), which all imply that authenticity awaits discovery 
somewhere outside and independently of the processes of traditionalization. 
Yet, it must also be emphasized that the purpose of research on the processes 
of traditionalization is not to ‘reveal’ that the phenomena that we call tradi-
tions are ‘in reality’ quite recent in origin and sometimes invented, that is, 
made up or fabricated (cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). Instead of classify-
ing traditions into ‘invented’ or ‘authentic’ ones, we must be alerted to the 
selective and politically and morally argumentative nature of all traditions, 
both old and new ones, as well as to the fact that as social practices all tra-
ditions have a historical foundation and a point of origin. For these reasons, 
instead of regarding some traditions as inventions and others not, we should 
consider all traditions both inventions and human interventions in the sense 
that they are socially constructed categories with which people structure their 
experience and reproduce the social world.
The perspective on the politics of time and tradition exposes, among other 
things, the rhetoric embedded in the commonly employed biological metaphor 
of ‘roots’ and in the often expressed claim that our cultural identity is based 
and dependent on our ‘roots’ and on our ‘awareness’ of them. Although a 
source for some signiﬁcant historical and political processes in the reorgani-
zation of global relations today, the general talk on ‘cultural roots’ has also 
created a great deal of unreﬂexive history, as it tends to naturalize – in the 
many senses of the word – a particular construction of history. On the one 
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hand, the metaphor nulliﬁes the possibility of alternative constructions and, 
on the other hand, it creates an illusion of particular modes of life and com-
munities belonging, as it were, to the domain of natural history.
Then again, our focus on the processes of traditionalization should not lead 
us into thinking that all traditions are fake and inauthentic. We should avoid 
synonymizing or equating the social construction or the invention of culture 
and tradition with ﬁction and ontological ﬁctionality. Instead, the perspective 
on the politics of time and tradition should help us observe the many ways 
in which people as social beings establish continuities and discontinuities, 
authenticate the past, and authorize its particular representations in images 
and actions. Yet, at the same time it must also be stated that this perspective 
does not grant the present autonomy in the deﬁnition of its past, because 
present deﬁnitions of the past are always inﬂuenced by past deﬁnitions of 
the past, and the present deﬁnitions of the past, by their very existence, are 
comments on these.
Today’s folklorists, ethnologists, historians, anthropologists and others who 
study, for example, contemporary conﬂicts are well aware of the politics in-
volved in the deﬁnition and appropriation of history and tradition in the service 
of present-day strategies and objectives. This does not merely concern those 
political movements that can be labeled ‘traditionalist’, ‘neo-traditionalist’, 
‘revivalist’ or ‘primitivist’. Perhaps more explicitly than ever before, battles 
are fought not only over territories and ideologies but also over cultural lega-
cies and cultural identities, and here the very notion of ‘tradition’ has become 
a key issue. Indeed, tradition is today a highly contested identity space. In 
some places more explicitly than in others, much tension – even war – is 
created through the denials or claims over ‘traditional’ values, ‘traditional’ 
usufruct rights, ‘traditional’ customs, ‘traditional’ language, ‘traditional’ 
marching and parading routes, etc., which bear direct witness to the politi-
cal and moral charge of the concept of tradition and its argumentative and 
rhetorical use in the making of particular policies. There is much controversy 
all over the world over the issue of what tradition is and how its contents are 
not only selected for political purposes but have direct political implications 
and consequences.
For example, in Northern Ireland today, a section of Protestant Unionists 
known as the Orange Order appeals publicly to the concept and idea of tradi-
tion in order to seek legitimation for its wish to continue – despite Catholic 
opposition – the 200-year-old practice of parading on July 12th through Catho-
lic neighborhoods and celebrate the victory that their ‘national’ hero, King 
William III – also known as William of Orange – took over King James II 
and his Catholic troops in the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. As commented by 
Dominic Bryan, the parades give the appearance of timeless and unchanging 
commemorative events, while they have undergone many stylistic changes 
and their political status vis-à-vis the state has changed on a number of oc-
casions (Bryan n.d.; Bryan 2000: 26, 155, 172; see also Tonkin and Bryan 
1996). Bryan also points out that discourse on tradition is utilized by senior 
Orangemen, the community leaders, in situations in which they appear to be 
losing inﬂuence over the ritual events. The idea of historical lineage is thus 
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employed to reassert not only cultural and political continuity for the group 
but personal control for its leaders (Bryan 2000: 177–178).
Northern Ireland is only one of the many places where current events show 
how, as put by Amy Shuman and Charles Briggs, “The process of traditional-
izing culture (...) emerges as a locus of strategies for empowering particular 
groups, rhetorics, and interests” (Shuman and Briggs 1993: 116). Not only 
in conﬂict-ridden places but also in more peaceful environments traditions 
are selected and placed on display by groups of people in order to create 
and consolidate territorial identiﬁcations and use these representations as a 
means for political commentary. Whenever people make public presentations 
of their identity and show allegiance through cultural representations, they 
foreground some particular aspects and background others, which makes the 
presentation of self always argumentative in nature. Having a cultural identity 
does not, therefore, mean only an active production of context-dependent 
images of contemporary and inherited cultural styles. It means the produc-
tion of images and representations through actions that have argumentative 
goals in the transformation of relations. As such argumentative production 
of relations, cultural identity is fundamentally political in nature, an issue of 
establishing, controlling and ﬁghting over the meaning of symbols, exercis-
ing power, creating hierarchies and contesting them.
The Nation and the State
Cultural identity is political not only because we employ various rhetorical 
means in the deﬁnition of the past and in the selection of cultural traits and 
symbols to denote a particular relationship between the past and the present. 
In other words, cultural identity is not a political issue only because of the 
argumentative nature of the process of traditionalization. Nor is it political 
only because the concepts of tradition and history are politically charged or 
because identities both manifest and constitute relations and hierarchies be-
tween individuals and groups. Cultural identities are political also because 
their constitution takes place within and in direct relationship with political 
events and actions, political processes, legislation, minority and majority 
policies, local, regional and national politics, the realm of civil society, and 
with state policies and politics.
Indeed, when we express our identity and indicate where we belong and 
with whom, we do not merely make distinctions and celebrate and perform 
difference on a ‘cultural’ level. Similarly, the places where we belong – or 
which belong to us – are not merely ‘cultural units’ solely deﬁned by linguistic, 
religious or other ‘cultural’ factors. They are politically deﬁned and marked 
areas and locales, and as such, always connected to issues of power, admin-
istration, social organization and control of territory. Individual identiﬁca-
tions with these places – including personal narratives and life-stories about 
what has happened to whom and where, and how that which has happened 
has constituted or inﬂuenced social identities – are always part of larger and 
wider political fates and histories.
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In disciplines such as folkloristics and ethnology, cultural identity has for a 
long time tended to be discussed in relation to such ‘cultural issues’ as nations, 
ethnicities and ethnic groups, and not in relation to such ‘political issues’ as 
the state and its hierarchical organization and administrative policies. This 
has rested on the traditional (but still modern) framework in which folklore 
is seen as coming in ‘national packages’, with the nation conceptualized as 
the organizing unit for folklore. Even when cultural identity has been dis-
cussed as an issue concerning nation-states, the emphasis has been on the 
nation as a cultural and symbolic unit instead of a political unit. Similarly, 
scholars have tended to classify territorial identiﬁcations into three levels, 
the local, the regional and the national levels, while ignoring the level of the 
state. Even though cultural entities and boundaries do not necessarily match 
with state entities and their borders, all people in the world live within the 
conﬁnes of some state, willingly or unwillingly, and in most people’s lives the 
state plays an active role not only because of the law, the police, schooling, 
army, taxation, social beneﬁts and bureaucracy, but also as an important unit 
of political and territorial identiﬁcation. Therefore it is justiﬁed to say that the 
state as the context for both the constitution and understanding of traditions 
and traditional identities has not received the attention it deserves.
One of the main reasons for this lack of attention must be that folklore 
studies have conventionally conceptualized and constructed traditions as 
the cultural stuff that lies beyond the modern state or emerges from oppo-
sition to its presence, including industrialization, enlightenment and other 
effects and elements of modernization. The bias can also be witnessed in 
the centralization of those research approaches that conventionally belong 
to the ‘humanities’ and in the marginalization of ‘state oriented’ and ‘state 
conscious’ social scientiﬁc methods and approaches. A variant of this idea 
is present in the Western Marxist notion that the fundamental character of 
folklore is inherently opposed to state capitalism, its development and its 
social order (see Limón 1983b). The both implicit and explicit antimodernism 
of folklore study has been directed against the modern state but not against 
the modern nation. Folklore, as if by deﬁnition, concerns and celebrates the 
nation but not the state. The state is seen to be only interested in eradicating 
and changing, in accordance with the enlightenment ideology, those cultural 
expressions that ethnologists and folklorists have studied as traditions (see 
e.g. Ó Giolláin 1990). Such a perspective predicates power with negativity 
and places it outside the domain of folklore and the folkloric collectivity 
(see Linke 1995: 417, 437).
To be sure, folkloristic and ethnological research has been tangential to 
issues concerning the state. Cultural identity has been studied in the context 
of ‘popular ethnic nationalism’, which, as put by David Gaunt, “politically 
mobilizes an ethnic group in order to agitate for that group’s own language and 
culture and eventual territorial sovereignty” (Gaunt 1992: 146). Accordingly, 
many of the nation-states that have the nationalistically oriented disciplines 
of folklore and ethnology in their academic curriculum, have emerged – or 
present themselves as having emerged – out of such popular ethnic nation-
alism. The societal relevance of these disciplines continues to be evaluated 
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on the basis of how they consolidate the state with national symbolism and 
with research information concerning nationally contextualized culture and 
history. This means that the relationship between the state and the culture of 
its citizens is perceived through the state-legitimating ideology of nationalism 
and related questions of national identiﬁcation and historical mythologiza-
tion. Culture appears in the context of the nation, not the state.
As argued by, for example, Ulf Hannerz, the state is one of the most es-
sential frameworks of the cultural process, “not as a bounded physical area 
but as organizational form” (Hannerz 1991: 112). The signiﬁcance of the 
state as a factor in the constitution of cultural identities can be seen in, for 
example, the fact that the state as a social organization has customs, ritu-
als, ceremonies and other collective traditions, symbols and values, which 
it may put on display for public and private celebration and reproduction. 
Such performances of identity and power are of great interest especially to 
historians, folklorists and ethnologists but also to political scientists and 
political historians (see e.g. Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). Traditions and cul-
tural identities, including ethnic identities, are both marked and constituted 
by political events and processes concerning states and their domestic and 
foreign policies, economy, legislation, the execution of laws and statutes, and 
other institutional elements of society making. It also worthy of note that 
many of the ways in which folklorists and ethnologists display the nationally 
signiﬁcant traditions that they collect and study are established as symbolic 
traditions of the state and become part of its political mythology.
The signiﬁcance of the state as a factor in the constitution of cultural identi-
ties can also be seen in the ways in which expressions of particular identities 
are supported by the state organization and its representatives. Indeed, in 
addition to creating common identiﬁcation through ‘state traditions’, ‘state 
folklore’ or ‘state mythology’, state, local and regional governments encour-
age and fund cultural activities and the making of cultural identities – or rather, 
a particular type of discourse on cultural identity – when locally, regionally 
and nationally constituted cultural identities support and legitimate the po-
litical and administrative authority of the state organization.
The state thus employs cultural identity as a means to exercise state power, 
and this may be said to have its origin in the tendency by the post-medieval 
kingdoms and empires of Europe to collect ‘antiquities’ from among their 
subordinated peoples and employ these to legitimate the sovereign’s control 
of the land. Indeed, as discussed by Roger Abrahams (1993a and 1996), one 
of the historical origins for the collecting of folklore was the use and advan-
tage that medieval European states saw in folkloric products and objects as 
means for legitimating their territories with the emergent value of oral history. 
Similarly, Tine Damsholt places the political origins of Danish ethnology 
in the Enlightenment interest in the organization of the Danish state, albeit 
in the 19th century the political discourse was directed at the legitimation of 
the state with nationalism, and this came to be commonly regarded as the 
origin of ethnology (see Damsholt 1995).
On the other hand, the cultural – including linguistic and/or religious 
– identity of a local group or a minority may be constituted on the basis of 
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their questioning the political and administrative authority of the state. In 
such situations, elements such as geographical features and location, tradi-
tional industries, local customs, historical background, language, and other 
cultural characteristics of a region can come to convey meanings that are 
politically charged because of this opposition. Indeed, the question of local 
and regional identity is more often than not linked to the politically charged 
question concerning the extent to which people are able to continue their 
‘traditional’ or customary economic practices, hold usufruct rights over a given 
piece of land and other natural resources, speak a given language or dialect, 
adhere to their ‘cultural and political heritage’, or even maintain their basic 
human rights or rights of citizenship. Cultural identity, therefore, concerns 
discourse on political rights, and the refusal of a state to give certain groups 
or populations a right to ‘express their culture’, or live according to it, derives 
from the awareness of how political culture is.
A Bias for the Local
In the present-day European context the perspective on the dialectic and dia-
logical relationship between the state on the one hand and the construction 
of tradition and identity on the other is utterly relevant and topical. Yet, this 
does not merely concern the processes of continuous state-formation within 
the European nation-states and the directly related issue of the nationaliza-
tion of traditional culture in them. The present situation also challenges us 
to look into the ways in which the making of the European Union, along 
with its federalist overtones, relates to the continuous making of the national 
and the local.
Although European integration primarily appears to concern trade relations 
and the interconnectedness of state economies, some of its major challenges 
economically, politically, culturally and intellectually concern individual and 
collective territorial identiﬁcations, their interrelations and representations, 
and especially the status of the local and its representations. Indeed, the situ-
ation calls for research on the ways in which changes in the constitution of 
geographic and administrative regions, transnational networks in the produc-
tion of goods and entertainment, and multi-state political organizations affect 
locally and translocally grounded collective identities and the constitution, 
selection and display of their cultural symbols.
A key word here is the local as a site of cultural production. In addition to 
the role of policies, politics and economic relations in the making of tradi-
tional cultures – or modern traditional cultures – an important aspect in the 
reorientation that the recent dramatic changes in Europe have demanded of 
us is the reconceptualization of the category of the local. Instead of viewing 
the local as an isomorphic, monolithic and traditional unit in the peripheries, 
or an endangered species on the verge of extinction because of homogenizing 
globalization and postlocalization, recent world-system theories and other 
globally sensitive ethnographic approaches have foregrounded a perspective 
which sees the local and its constitution in a direct relationship with issues 
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larger than the local. On the one hand, the making of the local takes place in 
the dialectics of continuous globalization and localization, as well as continu-
ous homogenization and heterogenization. On the other hand, the deﬁnition 
of the local, as well as the selection of its symbols, is a translocal process in 
which each locality creates its identity in the context of more or less similar 
identity processes elsewhere, both within nations and states and across them. 
In these processes, localities employ localized competitive strategies and a 
heightened sense of awareness of what makes a place special and gives it a 
competitive advantage (see e.g. Löfgren 1989, 1993a; Hannerz & Löfgren 
1992; Friedman 1994b).
Recent perspectives in folklore scholarship have also questioned the tra-
ditional view of the local as a phenomenon of isomorphism and emphasized 
that such a view has been an obstacle to the study of the politics of culture of 
which the constitution of the local is part (see e.g. Shuman 1993). Accord-
ingly, folklorists have looked for ways to incorporate into their methodology 
the fact that the local is always made up of constituents larger than the local. 
Here the insights provided by the study of ‘public culture’, the invention of 
cultural identity space in the context of global cultural ﬂows and deterritori-
alized, hybrid, creolized, heterogenic and cosmopolitan cultural production 
and consumption (e.g. Appadurai 1990, 1996; Hannerz 1991; Hanson 1993; 
Kapchan 1993, 1996; Löfgren 2003), have increasingly attracted scholarly 
attention.
The deterritorialization of culture means that cultures are to a lesser degree 
than before territorially, nationally, regionally or locally speciﬁc, and instead, 
more and more interconnected. Yet, the important role of transnational linkages 
and networks in the production of culture – including cultural traditions and 
identities – does not mean that people will not also continue to ascribe to ter-
ritorially based state-related, national, regional and local identiﬁcations. The 
signiﬁcance of cultural interconnectedness lies in its challenge for us to look 
at the ways in which the local as a site of cultural production is constituted 
by and stands in relation to larger social and historical processes.
Indeed, cultural identities, whether local, regional, national or state-related, 
are constructed on the basis of various loyalties and allegiances, economic 
and political interests and historically speciﬁc circumstances and relations, 
which are always locally experienced, albeit at the same time in many ways 
translocally, even globally, constituted. This also includes the invention and 
display of traditions, which operate within communities – as communities 
operate within traditions – not only in the context of the larger society, the 
nation and the state, but as ways of producing meaning and identity within 
transnational economic and political structures, center–periphery negotia-
tions and global political economy.7
For this reason, in order to understand the locality and the sense of place 
of the people we study – and conduct ﬁeldwork with – we must contextualize 
the constitution and production of their respective identities with those world 
historical processes of which they are a part. To show the relevant relations 
and contexts of meaning, we must be sensitive to both local and multi-local 
dynamics and observe the ways in which people create their sense of place 
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and geopolitical identity in the contexts of nationalism, localism, global 
tribalism, modernism and traditionalism, postmodernism and postcolonial-
ism, local and state policies and politics, local organization of industries, 
transnational and trans-state conjunctions and disjunctures, world politics, 
economic world-systems and global cultural ﬂows. It is in the context of a 
variety of competing ideologies, political processes, social and commercial 
networks, that vernacular cultural production, the constitution of local cul-
tural and territorial identity as well as the construction of local history and 
historical imaginations take place.
114
Globalization and Nationalism
7. Globalization and Nationalism
The term globalization has many meanings, and as one author comment-ed, “The more we read about globalization from the mounting volume 
of literature on the topic, the less clear we seem to be about what it means 
and what it implies” (Amin 1997: 123). Generally, globalization can be 
said to contain the denotations of internationalization, universalization and 
transnationalization. Yet, it is much more than their total sum of meaning. 
Both ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ refer to things that reach beyond 
national boundaries or concern relations between different nations or states. 
While internationalization is generally understood as an increase in cultural, 
economic, and political contacts between different countries or their repre-
sentatives, transnationalization suggests a comparative perspective on that 
which transcends national boundaries and emphasizes the constitutive roles 
that similar elements have upon each other within different national cultures 
(see e.g. Hannerz 1990).8
‘Universal’, on the other hand, refers to that which extends over the whole 
world or exists and occurs in all things. Universalization thus denotes the 
process by which things that are ﬁrst individual, particular, or local become 
general and collective and diffuse across lands and countries. When globali-
zation is understood as a universalizing process, it stands for the expansion 
and diffusion of things and ideas (and people) on a global scale. In this sense, 
globalization can be taken to mean, for example, the spread of modern West-
ern institutions or marketed products to the rest of the world. But instead of 
merely denoting diffusion on a global scale, the concept also contains the 
idea that due to such diffusion, as well as due to the technological develop-
ment of transport and media communications and the acceleration of global 
trade, the world is compressed, made small and village-like. As deﬁned by 
Roland Robertson, globalization is “the crystallization of the entire world 
as a single place” (Robertson 1987: 38).
However, instead of considering the concept from only the apparently obvi-
ous Western perspective, many scholars have emphasized that globalization 
is an age-old phenomenon which includes, among other things, the spread 
of Asian and Islamic civilizations to other parts of the globe, and the consti-
tution of large cultural areas such as the Chinese cultural block, the Islamic 
cultural block, and so on. In this meaning, universalization is not merely an 
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issue of dissemination but may also be used to refer to the discursive practice 
in which certain cultural processes and values are ‘deprovincialized’. This 
term suggests a process by which particular social forms and practices are 
metadiscursively rendered powerful, naturalized, “projected as the universal 
bases of knowledge, truth, culture, nation, rationality, science, politics, and 
modernity – as unmarked, historically transcendent, and natural foundations 
of social life” (Bauman & Briggs 2003: 313). A postcolonial act in this regard 
would be to ‘reprovincialize’ that which has been deprovincialized; accord-
ingly, the dominant Eurocentrism in the universalization of modernity would 
require the reprovincialization of Europe (see Chakrabarty 2000).
Global Context
Since people experience the world as more compressed, there is increasing 
awareness and consciousness about global connections: global has come to 
us as an arena to be aware of. Environmental changes, for example, have 
increased global awareness as well as global concerns and responsibilities. 
Then again, being aware of the global connections of local strategies in the 
use and appropriation of natural resources is closely related to the increase 
in awareness of global connections in social practices and their political 
and economic aspects, as well as global connections in cultural production 
and exchange. One of the consequences of such globalization has been the 
challenge to modern sociology’s conventionally set national framework (e.g. 
Turner 1990).
The same applies to many other disciplines, as scholars have learned to 
put and see things in their ‘global context’ and view them from a ‘global 
perspective’. In academic conferences on the study of culture, a great number 
of issues are now being discussed from the fashionable viewpoint that binds 
together local and global. For example, in the American Folklore Society 
1998 meeting there were panels and forums with the following titles: ‘Local 
and Global Processes’, ‘Local Culture/Global Issues: Cultural Representa-
tion Through a Thematic Lens’, ‘Local Cultures, A Global Discourse: Native 
Strategies for Telling Northwest Indian Stories in English’, ‘Responses to 
Globalization: Local Traditions in the Global Ecumene’, ‘Global Materials, 
Local Adaptations in Material Culture’, ‘Witchcraft in Local and Global Per-
spective’, ‘Local and Global Connections for Northwest Teachers’, ‘Jokes 
in the Global Media’, ‘Music Local and Global’, ‘Africa Local and Global’, 
‘Geographies of Eating: Tastes of Dispersal Local and Global’, and ‘Local 
vs. Global Perspectives on ‘Lesbian’ Presentations of Self’.
One manifestation of global awareness is the interest in so-called global 
ethics. Some years ago, when I was new to the modern world of the Inter-
net, the search word ‘global ethics’ brought me to the Institute for Global 
Ethics, which presents itself with a mission to discuss ethics in ‘a global 
perspective’. This is to discover and articulate the globally common ground 
of ethical values, and to analyze ethical trends and shifts in values as they 
occur worldwide. The Institute offers a four-step Ethical Fitness Seminar, 
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which “helps you become ethically aware, deﬁne values, analyze ethics, and 
resolve dilemmas” (Global Ethics n.d.). A somewhat different enterprise was 
the theologically and ecumenically oriented Center for Global Ethics, which 
“coordinates the work of thinkers, scholars and activists from around the world, 
who are working to deﬁne, implement and promote policies of responsible 
global citizenship” (loc. cit). One of the cornerstones for their activity is the 
Declaration of a Global Ethic, written by Dr. Hans Küng (1993).
The rhetoric of global ethics resonates with the rhetorical construction of 
the ‘global community’ and ‘world community’, which are rather commonly 
used terms in world politics today. The Harvard University Professor Samuel 
P. Huntington, discussing the role of the West in what he terms as the clash of 
civilizations and cultures, has pointed to the ways in which decisions made in 
the United Nations Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund 
reﬂect the interests of the Western powers but are presented to the world as 
reﬂecting the desires of ‘the world community’. Says Huntington: “The very 
phrase ‘the world community’ has become the euphemistic collective noun 
(replacing ‘the Free World’) to give global legitimacy to actions reﬂecting the 
interests of the United States and other Western powers.” (Huntington 1996a: 
16.) According to Huntington, the West, acting in the name of ‘the world 
community’, uses “international institutions, military power and economic 
resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, 
protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values” 
(op. cit.: 17). Instead of representing globally shared views, such Western 
dominance, according to Huntington, is an emergent source of conﬂict be-
tween ‘the West and the rest’, which Huntington conceptualizes as a conﬂict 
between different units in cultures and civilizations.
Global Economy and Politics
While many scholars have wished to relativize the present discussion on 
globalization and its alleged newness by seeking corresponding phenomena 
in ancient civilizations and cultural imperialisms (ancient Mesopotamia, hel-
lenization, pax Romana, etc.; see e.g. Friedman 1994a), some others have 
regarded globalization as a new period and stage in modernity. For many 
postmodern theorists, ‘postmodern’ did not merely represent a critical ap-
proach to modernity and modernism but indicated a transition to a particular 
civilizational or cultural state, a postmodern condition in the modern world. 
In a similar manner, globalization has been understood by some scholars as 
a new stage or phase after postmodernity, a global modernity constituted by 
globally organized space, global economy and global frameworks of social 
relations and cultural ﬂows (see e.g. Featherstone, Lash & Robertson 1995). 
Accordingly, one can view the present-day academic interest in globalization 
as a new trend coming after postmodernism in social sciences and the study 
of culture. The change that has taken place within the last few years is quite 
drastic. For example, no panel or forum in the afore-mentioned American 
Folklore Society 1998 meeting carried the term ‘postmodern’ in its title.
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One of the basic ways in which globalization is understood today con-
cerns current cultural, economic, and political changes and transformations, 
which are generated by the latest technological advances in mass commu-
nications, and by increased mobility and transfer of both people and goods 
across cultural and economic units and state borders. These changes are re-
garded as being unprecedented in both speed and volume, touching almost 
every country, province, city, neighborhood, and person on the globe. Yet, 
instead of merely indicating a global – that is ‘worldwide’ – impact of the 
latest developments, globalization is understood to signify the formulation 
of a world system of production and consumption, the emergence of global 
capitalism organized into networks and arenas that transcend the territories 
of the nation-states and national economies, connecting the local production 
of goods and culture into worldwide systems of relations.
Such a system of global economy is, however, hardly founded upon any 
global consensus. In addition, it mainly concerns global investments in cur-
rency speculations instead of investments in local production in other national 
units. A large portion of currency speculations has no relation to the sphere of 
actual production. This, according to such critics as David C. Korten (1997), 
means that global capitalism has replaced the market economy.
In essential ways, globalization stands for the increased speed and vol-
ume in investments on stocks and capital on a global scale and the creation 
of worldwide markets. One of the symbols of such globalization – and a 
highly controversial issue within the discourse of economic globalization 
– is the planned Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), which would 
guarantee unrestricted ﬂow of capital across national borders, so that there 
would not be any difference or discrimination between domestic and for-
eign investments. Consequently, this would also reinforce the separation of 
economy from the state.
This shows that we are witnessing a large-scale restructuring of economic 
and political power in which nation-state governments yield much of their 
control of economy and economic policy to multinational corporations – of 
which many are larger than many nation-states and their national economies 
– in order to gain some of the beneﬁts that the multinational corporations may 
provide for national economies in the form of paid taxes and employment 
(see e.g. Hirst 1997). The multinational corporations may have a ‘home base’ 
in their national origin. In the national Öffentlichkeit (public sphere) of such 
a country, this can be appropriated as cultural capital and made into a source 
for national identiﬁcation and symbol making. For example in Finland, the 
international success of the Nokia Corporation, the renowned manufacturer 
of cellular phones, receives many of its meanings through the discourse on 
Finnish national heroes. In this discourse, heroic ﬁgures are successful in 
international arenas. Such a discourse must obviously play down the fact the 
Nokia is 90% foreign-owned (e.g. Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition, 
June 10, 2002) and thus a ‘global company’.
Although globalization diminishes the meaning of the state, government 
politicians choose to present such globalization as a process that is both 
inevitable and prosperous – a ‘new global deal’ that will bring wealth and 
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prosperity to all. In Finland, Mr. Ole Norrback, Minister of European Af-
fairs in the late 1990s, stated that a global economic system based on mutual 
interdependency would promote international peace and stability (Norrback 
1998). A similar assertion was made by Mr. Alpo Rusi, the political advisor 
of President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, who wrote that the stock market 
crash of the late 1920s gave an impulse to build obstacles to world trade, 
which then caused the emergence of Nazism in Germany, the Stalinization 
of Soviet Communism, and the strengthening of militarism in Japan (Rusi 
1998). According to Rusi, this indicates the threat that national processes 
of identity production and economy pose to humankind. Therefore, it also 
demonstrates the beneﬁts of free world trade and globalization. The logic of 
such a view (and the construction of historical narratives in accordance to 
it) is that by being global and trading globally, new totalitarian governments 
are prevented from emerging.
It must be acknowledged, however, that economic globalization, together 
with global investments based on stock market speculations and quick trans-
fers of capital from one country to another, may also threaten the political 
balance of national economies, and shake political stability. For this reason, 
globalization can easily come to mean the loss of local and/or democratic 
means in economic policy making. As a global-scale political operation 
controlled by mostly Western industrial and post-industrial countries, it may 
represent a new form of colonialism. But on the other hand, a rearrange-
ment in the global political and economic relations may enhance the decline 
of Western hegemony. The growing inﬂuence of non-Western countries in 
global economics and global politics through industrialization, tourism, and 
the control of natural resources may at least to some extent challenge the 
old center–periphery structures that the colonizing West established in its 
modernization and industrialization process.
It is obvious for these reasons that globalization cannot create a uniﬁed 
worldwide economy, but instead, promotes increased competition between 
large market areas, such as the European Union, the United States, and Japan. 
Accordingly, it has been predicted that the future competitors in the global 
economy will be entire continents. Such constellations are not without mean-
ing for world politics or for collective or individual political and cultural 
identiﬁcations. According to Samuel P. Huntington, the world is divided by 
civilizations and cultural differences, and Western-based globalization is not 
going to undo these differences, but on the contrary, act upon them. Hunting-
ton’s main argument is that alignments deﬁned by ideology and superpower 
relations are giving way to alignments deﬁned by culture and civilization, 
and that political boundaries are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: 
ethnic, religious, and civilizational (see Huntington 1996c). Moreover, after 
the Cold War, “the principal conﬂicts of global politics will occur between 
nations and groups of different civilizations” (Huntington 1996a: 1).
By this Huntington means that despite the increase in global relations in 
economy, nation-states will continue to be important political entities and 
they will increase their political alignments on the basis of ‘cultural’ factors. 
Such factors are made of “history, language, culture, tradition, and most 
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importantly, religion” (Huntington 1996a: 4). According to Huntington, 
increased interaction, greater communication and transportation, will not 
produce homogeneity, but instead, “interaction frequently reinforces existing 
identities and produces resistance, reaction and confrontation” (Huntington 
1996b: 63).
The civilizational paradigm, according to Huntington, accounts for “many 
important developments in international affairs in recent years, including the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the wars going on in their former 
territories, the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout the world, the 
struggles within Russia, Turkey and Mexico over their identity, the intensity 
of the trade conﬂicts between the United States and Japan, the resistance of 
Islamic states to Western pressure on Iraq and Libya, the efforts of Islamic 
and Confucian states to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver 
them, China’s continuing role as an ‘outsider’ great power, the consolida-
tion of new democratic regimes in some countries and not in others, and the 
escalating arms race in East Asia.” (Huntington 1996b: 58.)
Following Huntington, Marju Lauristin, formerly an Estonian political 
activist and now Professor of Political Communication at Tartu University, 
claims that the East-European revolution of 1989 and the collapse of the So-
viet Union was to a signiﬁcant degree an outcome of a ‘civilizational conﬂict’ 
between the Soviet Empire and the East European nations: the Russian-Soviet 
Empire represents a “New Byzantium of the 20th century”, while the Baltic 
states and other East European nations represent “the Western traditions of 
individual autonomy and civil society” (Lauristin 1997: 28–31). Such a ‘cul-
tural’ explanation makes the regaining of political power and independence 
for the linguistically and ethnically deﬁned communities in the respective 
Baltic states a ‘natural’ phenomenon. In addition, it continues the pre-World 
War II thinking about the Baltic states (as well as Finland) as being the last 
resort of Europe against ‘the evil forces of the East’. Therefore, for the Baltics, 
their regained independence appears as a return to ‘Europe’ and ‘European 
civilization’, while Russia is excluded from it by making it represent the 
Byzantine and therefore a ‘non-European’ heritage.
The Global and the National
Because of the drastic and dramatic changes in world economics and politics, 
globalization has generated much discussion on identity and identiﬁcation: 
individual, local, national, translocal, transnational, cosmopolitan, etc. The 
discussion on globalization and identity has especially concerned the rela-
tionship between identity and territory. There are two basic approaches in 
this discussion. The ﬁrst is the notion that globalization leads to the end of 
cultural differences and to the beginning of global similarity. Globalization 
can thus stand for worldwide homogenization of culture (see Hannerz 1991), 
which may be conceptualized as ‘the end of traditions’ or ‘the end of local 
cultures’ or as ‘McDonaldization’. Although the discussion on ‘McDonaldi-
zation’ in cultural studies may be sensitive to the worldwide changes in 
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economic structures (see e.g. Ritzer 1996), the discussion on the worldwide 
homogenization of culture tends to be based on the observation that given 
items of merchandise are now available even in the most ‘peripheral’ places. 
This is a diffusionistic approach to globalization based on the polarization of 
change and continuity. While novelties, seen as the elements of change, are 
observed to spread and diffuse more and more rapidly, and appear in places 
where they didn’t use to be, the elements that are conventionally regarded 
as signs of continuity – such as local traditions and traditional cultural herit-
age – are felt to be more and more threatened. Globalization is here seen as 
an issue of consumption, but the term ‘consumption’ directs the observer’s 
gaze only to the imported goods, not to the local construction of tradition 
and heritage in their political contexts. Indeed, we are accustomed to seeing 
the merchandise on shop shelves as commodities, while we tend to disregard 
the construction of collective traditions and symbolic heritage as a form of 
commodiﬁcation.
For this reason, we may think that globalization and the preservation of 
traditional culture are in opposition to one another. But instead of constituting 
an opposition, they can also be seen as presenting two aspects of the same 
development. For example, establishing world heritage sites is a means to 
bring local culture into global processes of producing value and meaning. 
On the other hand, the continuation of a local identity within global integra-
tion does not automatically mean that the elements of local identity are or 
even should be ‘traditional’. On the contrary, the category of the ‘traditional’ 
has itself become a global construction – especially on the global markets 
of tourism, trade and symbol production concerning traditional music and 
traditional arts and crafts. Indeed, there is another approach to globalization 
that emphasizes the deterritorialization of the production of identity and 
culture and of consumption. Accordingly, much emphasis has been placed 
on such processes as interstitial identities (Bhabha 1994), reﬂexive moderni-
zation (Giddens 1994), detraditionalization (Heelas, Lash & Morris 1996) 
and reﬂexive traditionalization (Welz 2001). Along the same lines, Néstor 
García Canclini suggests that globalization stands for a passage from mod-
ern territorial and monolinguistic identies to postmodern transterritorial and 
multilinguistic identities (García Canclini 2001: 28–29). The former are 
imposed by nations and states, while the latter are structured by the logic 
of the markets.
One of the most heated topics generated by the processes of globalization 
concerns the future of the nation-state and nationalism, as well as the possi-
bilities of global citizenship and global democracy. Globalization has meant 
a drastic decline in the importance of many institutions and strongholds in 
national economies and administrations, including institutions of democracy. 
Yet, the question that is in this context particularly interesting and challenging 
is the factual simultaneousness of both deterritorialized and highly territorial 
identities. Is one of them increasing at the expense of the other?
For many present-day researchers, the deterritorialization of culture and 
identity indicates a decrease in the signiﬁcance of the national as a frame-
work in the constitution of identity. For Arjun Appadurai, for example, it is 
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an indication of postnationalism and the movement towards nonterritorial 
principles of solidarity (Appadurai 1996: 165). For Scott Lash and John 
Urry, the global present appears as marked by various kinds of ﬂows: ﬂows 
of information, ﬂows of migrants and refugees, ﬂows of capital, ﬂows of com-
modities, and ﬂows of culture. From this perspective, the recent developments 
denote a change from space to ﬂow, from spaces to streams, from organized 
hierarchies to disorganization (see Lash & Urry 1996).
For Appadurai, electronic mediation and mass migration, in their present-
day forms and meanings, represent a fundamental rupture between past and 
present, and one of their most essential aspects is that “Neither images nor 
viewers ﬁt into circuits or audiences that are easily bound within local, na-
tional, or regional spaces” (Appadurai 1996: 4). To replace these, Appadurai 
presents ﬁve dimensions of global cultural ﬂow that he has termed ‘ethno-
scape’, ‘technoscape’, ‘ﬁnanscape’, ‘mediascape’ and ‘ideoscape’. ‘Ethno-
scape’ refers to the variety of people on the move across cultural boundaries; 
‘technoscape’ to the positioning of multinational enterprises, factories, power 
plants, etc. and their work force across national and cultural borders and wage 
systems; ‘ﬁnanscape’ to the ﬂow and disposition of capital across currency 
markets and stock exchanges; ‘mediascape’ to the distribution of electronic 
capabilities to produce and disseminate information through newspapers, 
television stations, ﬁlm production studios, etc. as well as the narrative-like 
images of the world created by these media; and ‘ideoscape’ to the diaspora 
of political images composed of such narratively constructed Enlightenment-
related ideas and terms as ‘freedom’, ‘welfare’, ‘rights’, ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘democracy’ (Appadurai 1990; see also Appadurai 1996).
Discussing deterritorialization, Appadurai describes Turkish guestwork-
ers in Germany watching Turkish ﬁlms in their German ﬂats, Koreans in 
Philadelphia watching the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul through satellite 
feeds from Korea, or Pakistani cabdrivers in Chicago listening to cassettes of 
sermons recorded in mosques in Pakistan or Iran. It is in such situations that, 
according to Appadurai, “moving images meet deterritorialized viewers”. In 
other words, immigrants who consume objects made at ‘home’ or objects that 
convey important symbolic references to the home country, are, according 
to Appadurai, deterritorialized, and as such, not easily bound within local, 
national, or regional spaces. This, according to Appadurai, speaks against 
the importance of the nation-state and its role in the production of social 
changes (Appadurai 1996: 4).
For Appadurai, territorial nationalism has no essential role in many of the 
present-day ethnic or national movements or conﬂicts. For example, “Serbian 
nationalism seems to operate on the fear and hatred of its ethnic Others far 
more than on the sense of a sacred territorial patrimony” (Appadurai 1996: 
165). Similarly, according to Appadurai, “Palestinians are more worried about 
getting Israel off their backs than about the special geographical magic of the 
West Bank” (loc. cit.). Thus, territoriality for Appadurai appears to refer to a 
rather irrational religiosity, which can therefore be dismissed as a foundation 
and motivation for rational political action. Yet, we may wish to ask why the 
occupation of particular territories would not be important to these or other 
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groups, since, in the case of population settlements, getting somebody off 
your back means, more often than not, to be left alone in spatial and geo-
graphical terms. As far as the motives for Serbian aggression are concerned, 
many others have pointed to territorial aggrandizement as their explicit goal 
(see e.g. Kirkpatrick 1996: 52).
A related issue concerns territorial control, as someone always controls 
territories – also those territories occupied or inhabited by diasporic popula-
tions. In fact, there can be powerful reterritorialization processes taking place 
in diasporic situations. While migration has received an almost metaphori-
cal and metonymical status for deterritorialized global modernity, migrated 
populations may wish to put up monuments or symbols to commemorate 
their migration and settlement in order to become rooted in their new envi-
ronments and receive support for their demands for political rights in their 
new neighborhoods.
As far as today’s economic development is concerned, its global dimen-
sions can certainly be described as economic pragmatism stripped of national 
loyalties. In many arenas, and perhaps we can say that in an increasing number 
of arenas, economic and commercial interests surpass instead of foreground 
national frames of reference. Yet, we may still wish to ask, how encompass-
ing are these arenas, or do those speaking in favor of the loss of meaning for 
territorial identiﬁcation represent only various sorts of elites? This is in fact 
suggested by Orvar Löfgren, according to whom there are new transnational 
and intellectual elites, “cosmopolitans who are at home in the world and have 
fewer loyalties to their old nation or home ground. They travel business class 
through life and across the world. Against this new elite we ﬁnd an increasingly 
marginalized working class, trying to defend themselves against globalization 
by becoming more national, regional, or home-loving. They opt for the seem-
ing safeness of place and ritual belonging, and in this nostalgia they become 
both more inward looking and more xenophobic.” (Löfgren 2001: 3–4.)
There is reason to believe that despite internationalization, postnationaliza-
tion and the pluralization of identities, identiﬁcation with the national territory 
and the national community continues to be one of the major dimensions of 
social identiﬁcation. In the previous chapter I wrote that even though – or 
probably just because – the media are becoming more and more delocalized 
and postnational, that is, independent of national loyalties – some of their 
most popular products, especially the international sport competitions, ex-
plicitly foreground and encourage national frames of reference and national 
identiﬁcation and in that way discourage what is called the fragmentation of 
identities. Another reason for the continuation of the nation as the preferred 
imagined community is the strength of particular systems of thought inherited 
from the philologically inﬂuenced philosophy of nationalism developed in 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries. These concern the politically charged 
connections constructed between language and culture, on the one hand, 
and language and culture and the state, on the other. They may constitute 
a much stronger factor in the continuation of the national framework than 
expected, even if they seem modernist and therefore passé to the critics of 
nationalized modernity.
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On one level, the continuation of such systems of cultural and political 
thought may mean the strengthening of the ‘civilizational framework’ in the 
construction of nationally constituted political and cultural entities. At least 
Samuel P. Huntington believes that “Faith and family, blood and belief, are 
what people identity with and what they will ﬁght and die for” (Huntington 
1996b: 67). Yet, as commented by Fouad Ajami (1996: 34), “States avert their 
gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and 
kin when it is in their interest to do so.” Still, it is one thing what the repre-
sentatives of a state might argue and another, what mobilizes the masses. As 
noted by Unto Vesa, Huntington’s arguments reproduce the images of threat 
built upon the mythology of the crusades (Vesa 2000: 490–493).
In this highly politicized context of making culture, the signiﬁcance of 
cultural interconnectedness lies in its challenge for us, ﬁrst, to look at the 
ways in which the local and the national as sites of cultural production are 
constituted by and in relation to larger historical and political processes and 
global political economy. Cultural identities, whether local, regional, national 
or state-related, are construed on the basis of various loyalties and allegiances, 
economic and political interests and historically speciﬁc relations, which are 
always locally experienced, albeit at the same time in many ways translocally, 
even globally, constituted. Another challenge lies in the ideological consti-
tution of such loyalties, for which reason we must look, for example, at the 
roles that kinship, ‘genetic belonging’, and the metaphors of family continue 
to play in the construction of cultural and political units. Accordingly, the 
many arenas in which globalization is both encouraged as well as used for 
ideological purposes, alert us to acknowledge that despite the fact that there 
is only one globe, the global is a highly contested category.
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8. Cultural Homogeneity and the National 
Uniﬁcation of a Political Community
When discussing globalization, present-day Nordic policies vis-à-vis ethnic diversity, European integration, and the inﬂux of refugees, asy-
lum seekers and immigrants, we can hardly ignore the ideological founda-
tions laid down by the 19th century national movements and state-making 
processes in the respective Nordic countries. Such discussions call for the 
examination of the role and continuing impact of the ideas of ‘romantic’ or 
ethnic nationalism – as especially expressed and promoted by the German 
philosophers Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) and Georg Wilhelm He-
gel (1770–1831). These ideas seem to have a lasting inﬂuence not only on 
the conceptualization of national identities and the discourses on national 
characters and history, but also on the legislation concerning citizenship and 
immigration, democratic principles, and popular attitudes regarding ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities and foreigners.
From both a Nordic and a global perspective, Finland provides an interest-
ing example for discussing the historical foundations for the inter-relationship 
between what have been termed ‘ethnic-genealogical’ and ‘civic-territorial’ 
conceptions of the nation (Smith 1991). The former refers to the Herderian 
ideas of shared ethnicity and common genealogy, that is, common language, 
religion, history, customs and race, as the prerequisites for membership in a 
national community. The latter refers to the principle of legitimate participa-
tion in the political community of the territorial state (and the nation), with 
rights and duties determined regardless of ethnicity, race or ancestry. These 
distinctions have sometimes – but rather arbitrarily – been called ‘eastern’ 
and ‘western’ types of nationalism; East Europe being the location for ethnic 
nationalism and West Europe, for political nationalism or state nationalism. 
The recent developments both east and west have indicated that such a cat-
egorical distinction is not quite valid.
What is present-day Finland was part of the Kingdom of Sweden since the 
12th or 13th century, until in 1809 the area was annexed to the Russian Empire 
and made an autonomous Grand Duchy, which gained political independence 
as the Republic of Finland in 1917. Developed from a disputed border area 
between Sweden and Russia (or ﬁrst Novgorod) into a nation-state of its own, 
Finland exempliﬁes a country in which the idea of ethnic homogeneity and 
125
Cultural Homogeneity and the National Uniﬁcation of a Political Community
the sense of ethnic solidarity continue to play a signiﬁcant role in the con-
struction of the national and the selection of its representations and symbols. 
Instead of diminishing in its signiﬁcance in the present age of globalization 
and globalism, the on-going European integration and the consequent de-
crease in the role of the state have given new impetus to cultural and ethnic 
nationalism.
In this situation, a variety of related topics have emerged for both academic 
research and general debate. Within research into immigration, refugees and 
ethnic diversity, a great deal of attention has been directed at intercultural 
encounters and especially at the adaptation of the immigrated or displaced 
people in the receiving country as a minority population. In addition to so-
ciopolitical and legal issues, questions concerning cultural identity, especially 
its preservation and modiﬁcation in the new social and cultural environment, 
have prevailed.
Much attention has also been paid to the attitudes that people in the re-
ceiving country express towards incomers. Here especially the apparent ex-
clusivist and even racist sentiments against immigrants, asylum seekers and 
refugees have been a much-debated issue. In most surveys, research reports 
and scholarly essays, tolerance is called for and the multiculturalization of 
the nation-state is suggested as the political solution. These stand in open 
opposition to the demands of anti-immigration activists and their supporters 
to delimit immigration and the reception of asylum seekers and refugees and 
to deport those ‘outsiders’ who have already entered the national space.
According to statistics and polls, a large portion of the population in Finland 
has a somewhat negative attitude towards the recent growth of immigration 
and the reception of both refugees and asylum seekers. Often these attitudes 
bespeak a fear for increasing competition in the labor and marriage market, 
but there is also an explicit fear – even media-bred hysteria – for an unjust 
distribution of social beneﬁts between the nationals and the newcomers. 
Foreigners in general tend to be regarded as posing a threat to the country 
by, allegedly, increasing criminality, trafﬁcking drugs and spreading AIDS. 
In Magdalena Jaakkola’s much publicized survey from 1998, approximately 
20% of the 1,000 persons interviewed favored the principle that people 
from different cultures should not mix, and 42% believed that “people of 
particular races are unﬁt to live in modern society” (Jaakkola 1999: 183). 
In the comparative surveys of Finnish attitudes sponsored by the Centre 
for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA), published in 2003, 43% in 
1992 and 34% in 2000 were found to agree with the proposed statement that 
increasing immigration will lead to a disadvantageous mixture of races and 
weaken the vigor of the nation (Haikonen & Kiljunen 2003: 239, ﬁgure 6–9 
C; see also p. 217).
How do we explain the popular negative attitudes and fears regarding 
the recent increase in the number of foreigners? In Finland, one of the most 
commonly suggested explanations is selﬁshness caused by the economic 
recession and high unemployment of the early 1990s. Other publicly aired 
suggestions include the idea of a national identity complex based on low 
self-esteem, a lack of multicultural policies in society, as well as a lack of 
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satisfactory models of adulthood and ego for the youth. Ethnocentrism, in-
tolerance of differences in cultural behavior and physical appearance, and 
prejudice against foreigners and foreign cultures in general have also been 
seen as manifestations of a particular ‘Finnish mentality’, which would make 
these attitudes and fears intrinsically Finnish.
I would suggest that in addition to being manifestations of historically 
speciﬁc international currents of exclusionist ideas (see Stolcke 1995), the 
attitudes and fears concerning immigrants and refugees, and foreigners in 
general, have to do with the way in which ‘the national’ is discursively con-
structed in a particular nation-state context. The explanations for the popular 
negative attitudes, therefore, call for research into the history of nation mak-
ing and the policies and discourses regarding the ethnic, religious, cultural 
and political constitution of the national population.
As part of such an ‘ethnopolitical’ research agenda, the present chapter 
takes up for scrutiny the generally held conception that Finland is a nation-
state of small cultural differences, and therefore, homogeneous – even “ex-
tremely homogeneous” (e.g. Kajanoja 1993: 21; Peltonen n.d.). In present-day 
academic discussions of Finnishness, which has gained momentum especially 
due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Finland’s new member-
ship in the European Union since 1995, the idea of Finland’s homogeneity 
is both denied and conﬁrmed (see e.g. articles in Laaksonen & Mettomäki 
1996 and Alasuutari & Ruuska 1998; cf. Saukkonen 1999: 235–239). Yet, the 
conception of Finland’s relative homogeneity may be supported by ‘simple’ 
population statistics:
Population statistics (source: Statistics Finland, www.stat.ﬁ)
 
  1998 2002
 
Total population   5,16 million 5,2 million
Population by language:
 1900 1998 2002
Finnish 86,75% 92,61% 92,14%
Swedish 12,89%   5,68% 5,58%
Sámi   0,06%   0,03% (1,688 persons)  0,03%
Russian   0,29%   0,45% (23,220 persons) 0,64%
Other   0,01%   1,22% (62,865 persons) 1,61%
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Population by religion:
  
 1900 1998 2002
Lutheran Protestants 98,1% 85,4% 84,6%
Orthodox   1,7%   1,1%   1,1%
Other   0,2%   1,1%   1,1%
No religious afﬁliation     – 12,4% 13,1%
Foreign residents:
 1990 1998 2002 
 26,255 85,060 103,682
The statistics clearly show, that in relation to the great majority of Lutheran 
Finnish speakers, the others represent only small minorities. In this sense it 
may be accurate to characterize Finland as a homogeneous country – ‘ho-
mogeneity’ being here a biological metaphor indicating lack of ‘major’ or 
‘signiﬁcant’ cultural variation or diversity. Yet, the statistics do not explain 
why Finland is a homogeneous country or why there is no ‘major’ cultural 
variation. Neither do they explain why the existing minorities are only mi-
norities or why their minority positions have been deemed so ‘insigniﬁcant’ 
that they have yielded to a dominant image of homogeneity.9
If Finland is homogeneous, we may ask whether its homogeneity is a 
primordial state, dating from prehistoric times, or a historical consequence 
of particular homogenizing policies. In what way has Finland become homo-
genous or at least come to be viewed as such? If it is a narrative construction, 
what kind of rhetorical ways of narrativizing and mythologizing history have 
been employed in the production of homogeneity? Have the nationalized 
representations of traditional culture, produced by such academic disciplines 
as ethnology and folklore studies, helped promote ethnic and cultural ho-
mogenization? What role have the philological theories of the relationship 
between language, culture and territory and race played in this? What is the 
connection between such theories and the modern, mainly early 20th-century, 
‘race hygienic’ measures taken, for example in eugenics, to secure ‘purity’ 
in the ‘genetic heritage’ of the national population? What kind of legislative 
actions have been taken to tone down ethnic and/or religious differences 
and make them less visible? How has the government’s policy in granting 
citizenship affected the ethnic, linguistic and/or religious composition of the 
national population? Has the ideology and practice of modern democracy 
increased or decreased the cultural homogenization of the national popula-
tion? Have ‘geopolitical realities’ and images of threat from across the na-
tional borders been used to legitimate ethnic and cultural homogenization? 
What sort of unifying campaigns have been launched in society by the state 
and its leaders – by those attempting to increase their own political power 
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and inﬂuence – to create a sense of cultural homogeneity that transcends the 
differences in language, political objectives, and social class? How do these 
unifying campaigns employ the ideas of heritage and heredity, and extend 
their symbolism over the national population?
The idea of nations being homogeneous, or at least being regarded as 
such, is not a new one, as cultural homogeneity has been considered one of 
the central objectives in and prerequisites for the creation of political unity 
in nation-states. The production of a synonymy between national culture 
and the cultural homogeneity of a nation-state follows what has been called 
‘homogeneism’, a term coined by Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren (1998) 
to refer to the ideological foundation of the discursive production of national 
homogeneity. According to Blommaert and Verschueren, homogeneism is “a 
view of society in which differences are seen as dangerous and centrifuged 
and in which the ‘best’ society is suggested to be one without intergroup 
differences. In other words, the ideal model of society is monolingual, mono-
ethnic, monoreligious, monoideological.” (Blommaert & Verschueren 1998: 
194–195.) In homogeneism, that which is seen to manifest desired homoge-
neity is established as ‘the national tradition’, which can then be used as a 
symbolic means to consolidate national political unity, while diversity and 
its manifestations are seen to threaten this unity.
The historical production of national cultures has been critically exam-
ined in some of the most inﬂuential works in historical and cultural research 
in the late 20th century (e.g. Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm & 
Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). These critical works entail taking up a 
deconstructive perspective that also concerns the historical production of 
cultural homogeneity. The fact that this process has been constantly charged 
with heterogenizing forces, tendencies and preferences makes it a historical 
instead of a natural state of affairs. Since it takes place in contexts where 
there are at least theoretical, if not practical, alternative ways of making so-
cial reality, it is also political.
The present-day academic interest in the problematization of nationness 
and its political and cultural constitution, together with the attention given to 
the politics of identity and multiculturalization, provide a framework in which 
I ﬁnd it relevant to focus on a particular nation-state, Finland, and study how 
homogeneity – or belief and persuasion in its existence – has been produced 
historically and narratively. Since this mainly concerns the ethnic, linguistic 
and religious composition of the national population, it is closely linked to 
the ways in which the national culture has constructed and established cul-
tural Others both within and beyond the territory of the state. Accordingly, 
one of the central issues in the study of ethnic diversity and heritage politics 
within a nation-state is this: How and why are some similarities within the 
heterogeneous or diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious reality employed 
to make nationally signiﬁcant intercultural links, while others are employed 
to make breaks? In other words, what are the politics of difference in the 
cultural variation of the nation-state?
I have to point out, however, that my purpose here is not to take a com-
parative approach to describe how the Finns constitute a group that is either 
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similar to or different from other national groups. In other words, my aim is 
not to examine ‘what the Finns are like’ and come up with a new deﬁnition or 
characterization of Finnishness or ‘Finnish mentality’, on the basis of which 
I could then argue why the Finns are distinct from other people. This is, ac-
cording to my interpretation, the research agenda outlined by some leading 
Finnish folklorists in the book Gender and Folklore: Perspectives on Finnish 
and Karelian Culture. The editors of this book write as follows:
Finland’s entrance into the European Union in 1995 has once again set in 
motion the process of national self-deﬁnition; this may explain the sharp 
increase in the number of university students enrolling in folkloristics. 
Folk poetry and folklore researchers are called upon to answer the same 
sorts of questions that they were a century ago, when the discipline 
emerged around the work of Julius and Kaarle Krohn. In these questions, 
the focus is once again ethno-cultural identity: who are the Finns in 
relation to the Other, what sorts of differences or similarities does our 
culture share with other cultures in Europe and the world? (Apo, Nenola 
& Stark-Arola 1998: 24–25.)
Even though I participate in the same disciplinary framework as these writ-
ers, I disassociate myself from this approach for two reasons. First, the role 
of folklore studies in modern society lies, in my mind, in its potentiality in 
offering insights into the research of identity production rather than consoli-
dating and propagating for particular identiﬁcations and identity constructions. 
Second, the comparative methodology that the statement implies is descriptive 
instead of analytical. It would mean taking the categories of ‘the Finns’ and 
‘the Other’ as given, as predetermined and innately separate ‘ethno-cultural’ 
entities, while my purpose here is to discuss their historical and ideological 
construction – including the very question of why culture and ethnicity are 
linked in a way that appears to produce a separate ‘ethno-cultural identity’. 
Instead of studying the ‘Finnish mentality’, I am interested in scrutinizing 
historically developed mentalities that are employed in the ideological con-
struction of Finnishness. My concern is to study the argumentative processes 
of producing nation-ness, rather than promoting such processes. This includes 
taking distance from the rather common discursive practice, typical also in the 
academic discussion on Finnishness, of constructing national identity space 
with the use of the ﬁrst person plural. The rhetorical ‘we’ tends to cover up 
the politics of its composition.
Obviously, the present work cannot answer all of the questions listed 
above. Yet, I seek to contribute to their examination by paying attention to 
some elements in the discursive production of Finnishness since the creation 
of the Finnish state in 1809. The chapter will discuss how particular deﬁni-
tions of Finnishness – with its inclusions and exclusions – are adopted and 
employed as political means to manipulate or modify society, its population, 
territory and identity space, whether by the state through legislation or by 
civil activity, including academic discourse. Here, one of my major focuses 
is the ideological use of conceptions of race, language, religion and folk tra-
dition in the production of national homogeneity and the related interest in 
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making symbolic links and breaks between both peoples and territories. The 
present analysis of these issues is an attempt to put into practice what I have 
above, in Chapter 6, outlined about the political study of cultural identities 
and their argumentative and hierarchical nature.10
Common Genetic Heritage
Even though my explicit purpose here is not to discuss the cause and effect 
relationship between Finland’s alleged homogeneity and present-day atti-
tudes towards immigration and multiculturalization, it is necessary to point 
out how the recent drastic changes in the number of immigrants and other 
foreign-born inhabitants (although they are far less drastic in Finland than in 
most other European countries) may function as a point of reﬂection against 
which earlier elements of ethnic diversity disappear from sight. Finland (like 
the other Nordic countries) has been traditionally perceived as a country of 
emigration, not immigration. Yet, a number of factors speak for continuous 
migration into the country.
It is an oft-repeated story how the area of present-day Finland was gradu-
ally settled during the last 9, 000 years since the Ice Age. It is a much less 
often told story how the heterogeneous sources of the settled populations 
have over the millenniums and centuries produced a culturally, ethnically 
and even genetically coherent community – or given grounds for a domi-
nant image of such coherence. For example, during the second millennium 
A. D. , after the Viking period and strong Scandinavian inﬂuence, the area 
of present-day Finland has been settled and populated by Roman Catholics, 
Protestants, Muslims, Jews, Greek Orthodox, the Rom (Romanies or Gyp-
sies), the Sámi, Russian speakers, Finnish speakers, Swedish speakers, and 
others. During the Hanseatic period in the Middle Ages, immigrants included 
Germans, Swedes, Danes, Dutch and Scots. The present wave of migration 
from abroad started in the 1980s, increasing rapidly in the early 1990s. The 
sudden diversiﬁcation of the population, in terms of cultural background and 
languages spoken, appears to have created an image of a rapid heterogeniza-
tion after an allegedly original state of homogeneity.
The most recent wave of diversiﬁcation has helped bring some of the coun-
try’s earlier heterogeneity to the surface and provided new forms of publicity 
for discussing the country’s old linguistic and religious minorities. At present, 
the ‘national minorities’ are Swedish speakers (or ‘Finland’s Swedes’), the 
Sámi, the Rom, the Jews, the Old Russians and the Tatars. The Rom came to 
Sweden in the early 16th century, and in the 17th century they were ordered to 
settle in the eastern part of the kingdom, present-day Finland. The so-called 
Old Russians are descendants of the Russian civil servants, military ofﬁcers 
and merchants who settled in Finland during the country’s autonomous pe-
riod (1809–1917), as well as of the emigrants of the Russian Revolution in 
1917. Those who have come after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s are commonly called New Russians.
Jews were ﬁrst allowed to settle in Sweden in 1782, but only in the three 
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cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Norrköping, and a little later to Karls-
krona. These were all located in the western part of the state, which meant 
that that eastern part of the kingdom, today’s Finland, remained off limits 
to Jews (Harviainen 1999: 333). The Jews of Finland came ﬁrst to so-called 
Old Finland, which was part of the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th 
century. During Finland’s autonomous period, more Jews came as tradesmen 
and craftsmen or retired ofﬁcers of the Imperial Army. They were granted 
full citizenship only after Finland became a sovereign state. Until 1930 the 
Jews in Finland registered Swedish as their ﬁrst language. The ﬁrst Tatars 
arrived during the early years of Finland’s autonomous period, when they 
were used as labor force in the construction of fortresses both on the Åland 
islands and in Helsinki. Groups of merchant Tatars migrated from Russia 
between 1870s and 1920s.
There is thus plenty of historical evidence to argue that Finland has always 
been ethnically diverse instead of homogeneous, albeit that the diversity has 
been rather small in numbers. Yet, the idea of Finland being a homogeneous 
country instead of a heterogeneous one is not merely a defensive rhetorical 
image created to oppose present-day immigration. Its roots can be placed in 
the ideological and political foundations of Finnish nationalism and nation-
making, but also further back in history, in the Protestant Reformation of the 
16th and 17th centuries and the consequent consolidation of the Swedish state. 
In addition to these factors, particular theories produced within comparative 
linguistics in the 18th and 19th centuries and in genetics in the 19th and 20th 
centuries have supported ideas according to which the population of Fin-
land – of which ‘the Finns’ is at the same time both a matter-of-fact and an 
ethnopolitically charged denomination – is a uniform linguistic-ethnic-racial 
group distinct from their neighboring ‘Indo-Europeans’. This distinction 
making functions even today as one of the prominent ways – although not 
always the politically dominant way – of conceptualizing, historicizing and 
territorializing Finnishness and Finnish identity. In a recent study on popular 
attitudes in Finland by Pentti Kiljunen of  Yhdyskuntatutkimus Oy, sponsored 
by the Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA), it was found 
that 75% of the 2,133 people who responded to the mailed questionnaire in 
2002 agree (and 14% disagree) with the proposition that Finns should ef-
fectively protect their distinctive culture against globalization. In the same 
survey, 74% regarded it as a privilege to be a Finn, while only 44% felt that 
being a Finn also means being a European (see Kiljunen 2003, Chapter 5.1.; 
ﬁgures 40a, 40b, 40c).
One of the main reasons for emphasizing ethnic and racial homogeneity 
in Finland has been the political call for national unity. This was expressed 
most clearly by one of the pioneers and most inﬂuential experts in modern 
sociology and social policy in Finland, Heikki Waris, who in his 1940s and 
1950s textbook wrote that “when one compares Finnish society to, for ex-
ample, countries in Central and Southern Europe, which have many kinds of 
racial mixtures and consequently, social problems that are difﬁcult to solve, 
one must acknowledge the great strength provided by the racial uniformity 
of our people. The racial uniformity of this people is an indispensable sup-
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port to the unity and solidity of the nation-state.” (Waris 1952: 24, quoted in 
Pentikäinen & Hiltunen 1997: 19, my translation)
After the racialized conﬂicts between Swedish and Finnish speakers 
over linguistic hegemony in the 1920s and 1930s, the debate on race has 
gradually changed into an interest in genetics and the national signiﬁcance 
of genetic heritage. It is not at all uncommon to ﬁnd in printed presenta-
tions of Finland articles or essays on the population’s genetic composition. 
Facts about Finland, a semi-ofﬁcial guidebook to Finland distributed by the 
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is a good example of this (see Sauk-
konen 1999: 158–160). The Internet pages of the Foreign Ministry, called 
Virtual Finland, also contain a long article on the genetic composition of the 
Finns (http://virtual.ﬁnland.ﬁ). The most recent edition of Eino Jutikkala and 
Kauko Pirinen’s book on the history of Finland in English is supplemented 
with ﬁndings from ‘objective’ genetic research (Jutikkala with Pirinen 2003: 
20–22), while the earlier editions’ discussions on the Finns belonging to the 
East Baltic race and partially to the ‘Nordic’ race (Jutikkala with Pirinen 
1962: 7; Jutikkala with Pirinen 1984: 13) have been dropped.
Geneticists have played an important role in the deﬁnition of Finnish na-
tional identity by, for example, emphasizing the distinct nature of the Finns 
vis-à-vis the ‘Indo-Europeans’. Yet, genetics have also yielded the concep-
tion that there is no major difference between ‘the Finnish genotype’ and 
the general traits of other European peoples (e.g. Kajanoja 1993). The latter 
emphasis has emerged to counter the claim that Finns are not members of 
the ‘Europeid’ or ‘White’ race (see Kemiläinen 1998). Here the ideas of race 
and civilization are linked, as the ‘Western genetic heritage’ of the Finnish 
population is used as an argument for Finland’s belonging in West-European 
Civilization. According to one theory, instead of being genetically ‘Uralic’, 
the Finns are Indo-Europeans who have adopted the Finno-Ugric language 
of a previously settled population (Sajantila 1997: 354; Horn n.d.).
The emphasis on the Westernness of the Finns is a recent phenomenon. 
As observed by Pasi Saukkonen (1999: 159), the 1991 edition of Facts 
about Finland linked language and genealogy to create a sense of the Finns’ 
‘originality’ and ‘non-Europeanness’. In the ﬁrst chapter of the 1996 edi-
tion, the section entitled ‘The Origin of the Finns’ (note the singular form 
of the word ‘origin’) begins with a statement that 65–75 % of Finnish genes 
are European and 25–35 % are Asian. Saukkonen concludes that the new 
formulation ‘moves’ the Finns westward in regard to their physical traits. 
Elsewhere Saukkonen has suggested that such a research ﬁnding makes 
Finland’s membership in the European Union appear as a ‘return to Europe’ 
(Saukkonen 1996: 17).
While Finland’s political move to ‘Europe’, joining in the European Union, 
is justiﬁed with an ‘appropriate’ genetic heritage, the homogeneity of ‘the 
Finnish genes’ is emphasized to the extent that the presence of more than 30 
congenital diseases is said to make up a ‘pathological heritage’ (Savontaus 
n.d.). According to Marja-Liisa Savontaus, who has written about Finnish 
genetics in Virtual Finland, the reason for this problem is the small number 
of the original settlers and the isolation caused by such a low population 
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density. In addition, “our geographical location, just as our culture, language 
and faith, have limited the number of immigrants” (Savontaus n.d.).
Although it is now often stressed that language relations and biological 
relations are separate issues and linguistic ties are not necessarily an indica-
tion of genetic kinship (e.g. Savontaus n.d.), the language of genetics oper-
ates with the linguistically constructed categories of the Finno-Ugric and 
the Indo-European. They are also conceptualized as genetic categories. The 
relationship between genes and language is, however, denied when discussing 
the Sámi, whose difference from the Finns is emphasized even though they 
also speak a Finno-Ugric language. ‘The Sámi genotype’ is found to differ 
from all other European peoples as well as other Finno-Ugric peoples. This 
difference is said to be based on the genetic ‘Sámi motif’ (Savontaus n.d.).
This can be taken as an example of the ideological primitivization of the 
Sámi, which is one of the discursive means of producing Finnishness and 
its Others. Another example of such cultural othering is the interpretation 
that the primitive ‘Fenni’ described by Tacitus in his book Germania from 
the year 98, refers to the Sámi, not the Finns. Regardless of whether this is 
a fact or not, it is noteworthy how the Finns are emphasized to have been at 
that time on a much higher level of cultural evolution. (See e.g. Uino n.d.; 
cf. Ruuska 1998; Tuulentie 2001: 84; cf. Mathisen 2000, 2004.) Cultural 
evolution is used as an argument for making ethnic distinctions.
Linguistic and Cultural Afﬁnity
The 19th-century nation building in Finland has sometimes been compared 
with simultaneous developments in Estonia and Latvia, which were also 
part of the Russian Empire and in which the dominant social class spoke a 
different language from that of the majority of the population. Despite the 
many factual similarities, however, Risto Alapuro (1997a, 1999) emphasizes 
the differences. These were, ﬁrst, the existence of Finland as a separate po-
litical unit within the Empire; second, the growth of its economic wealth 
especially towards the end of the 19th century; and third, the class structure 
dominated by extensive peasant land ownership, which was a legacy of the 
Swedish social system.
One of the most characteristic viewpoints on 19th-century Finnish nation 
making has been the attribution of great signiﬁcance to J. G. Herder’s ideas 
of nationalism (see e.g. Wilson 1976). Among folklorists, this is commonly 
understood to mean a close ‘romantic’ link between folklore collecting and 
the use of collected materials for national symbolism and collective identiﬁca-
tion. This follows the Herderian notion according to which national cultures 
are manifested in the oral traditions of the lower classes, the folk, and such 
traditions convey the history of the nation and speak for its innate unity. As 
a political conclusion in scholarship, great value is placed on small cultures 
and ethnic minorities and their struggle for cultural or political independence 
(see e.g. Siikala 1998, 2000).
The nation in Herderian nationalism is seen as a ‘natural’, ‘family-like’, 
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and an ‘organic’ unit of people, and homogeneous in ethnic and genetic terms. 
States are artiﬁcial unless they are founded upon an ethnically homogeneous 
nation, for which reason the ideal state is one in which all citizens are geneti-
cally related (Nisbet 1999: 79–82). As a consequence of this premise, much 
emphasis is put on shared ethnicity, common genealogy, common language, 
religion, history, customs and even race as the prerequisites for membership 
in a national community. In this respect, Herderian nationalism downplays 
both the value and visibility of cultural diversity.
In Finland, these perspectives are manifested, among other things, in the 
exclusive character of the category of the Finn and in the popular tendency 
to think of only Finnish-speakers as ‘real’ Finns. This discursive practice 
deﬁnes Finnishness ‘culturally’ and biologically, on the basis of genetic and 
social kinship, and makes the Finnish speakers the ‘core nation’ within the 
nation-state. Such a perception is discursively reproduced in continuous 
examinations, debates and public lectures on the Finnish language, cultural 
roots, ‘Finnish genes’ and the close interrelation seen between these. There 
is a clear difference when comparing Finland in this regard to many other 
countries. Pasi Saukkonen has contrasted Finnish discourses on nation-state 
identity with those in the Netherlands and concludes as follows:
To be a ‘real’ Finn, one should speak Finnish, have ‘Finnish’ ancestors or 
genes and live according to ‘Finnish’ social rules. (...) In the Dutch case 
(...) [l]anguage and religion do not work as explicit criteria. (...) Ancestry 
and genes, very important issues in the Finnish discussion, are almost 
totally lacking in the Dutch debate. (Saukkonen, n.d.; see also Saukkonen 
1999: 142, 158–160, 252.)
Yet, as emphasized by Risto Alapuro, employing concepts made famous in 
the research on nationalism by Anthony D. Smith (1991), Finland can be 
characterized as a mixture of ethnic-genealogical and civic-territorial con-
ceptions of nationality. This can be seen, for example, in the way in which, 
in the making of the Finnish nation-state in the 19th century, the former func-
tioned as a means to construct symbolically and ideologically the ‘people’, 
who in the latter came to be regarded as the democratic holders of power in 
the modernizing state and the emerging civil society. According to Alapuro, 
the Finnish nationalists perceived citizenship as an issue of “legal equality 
of rights and duties, especially rights to social and political participation” 
(Alapuro 1999: 116), but still, ethnic solidarity conditioned the principle of 
political participation. For this reason, “the idea of citizenship (kansalaisuus) 
became intimately related to that of nationality (kansallisuus)” (Alapuro 
1999: 114). This intimate relationship can also be seen in the close lexical 
similarity of the two terms.
Because of ‘ethnic solidarity’, the conceptualization of Finnish nationality 
continues to contain discursive elements that enhance the preservation and 
perseverance of the category of the Finns as compact and homogeneous; in 
other words, as unaffected by diversifying elements and factors from that 
which is categorized as ‘the outside’. It is my contention that this is one of 
the reasons why and how nation making has made and continues to make 
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diversities almost invisible. The Finns (meaning the Finnish-speaking Finns) 
are regarded as being similar to each other while all others are considered 
essentially different (see also Saukkonen 1999: 239–241). At the same time, 
those people who have come from elsewhere tend to remain non-Finns even 
if they become Finnish citizens – some groups of people even after genera-
tions of original settlement. Because of the sharp distinctions often drawn 
between citizenship and ethnically and ‘culturally’ conceptualized national-
ity, the fact that the state grants citizenship – which for the ‘real’ Finns is a 
hereditary right based on jus sanguinis11 – does not necessarily encompass 
the incomer in the ‘cultural’ category of the Finns. For this reason, despite 
the expectations that immigrants ‘integrate’, integration is in practical terms 
prevented or hindered by the very fact that the new member of the state is 
excluded from the symbolically central ways of conceptualizing nationality, 
Finnishness as a cultural category.
The construction of Finns as an ethnic-genetic-linguistic category, a na-
tional organism analogous to the family, in the Herderian sense, has thus had 
serious repercussions in terms of how ethnic diversity has been conceptual-
ized in Finland. Rendering the ethnic-genetic-linguistic Finns synonymous 
with the national Finns has not only excluded incomers but made all other 
‘ethnic-genetic’ and linguistic groups living in Finland, for example the Sámi 
and the Swedish speakers, appear as foreigners or non-nationals. At the same 
time, there is a politically motivated emphasis on close cultural connections 
with linguistically related populations in Karelia and elsewhere in Russia 
and a consequent argument for ‘family ties’. This is the idea of the ‘Finnish 
tribe’ that is considered to be constituted by all people speaking Finnish and 
related languages.
The linking of the question of citizenship with ethnic-genealogically con-
ceptualized nationality is clearly visible today, for example, in the case of 
Ingrians, a Finnish-speaking population on the southern and eastern shores of 
the Gulf of Finland in Northwest Russia. They are descendants of the people 
who moved there in the 17th century from what is presently Finland or what 
was part of Finland before the end of the Second World War. In April 1990, 
in the middle of the political turbulence in the Soviet Union and the rest of 
Eastern Europe, President Mauno Koivisto (in ofﬁce 1982–1994) told report-
ers in a television interview that Ingrians who wished to move to Finland 
should be regarded as returnees or ethnic remigrants (see also Laari 1997; 
Forsander 1999: 59–61; Lepola 2000: 96–99). This meant in practice that 
that their moving should be ﬁnancially assisted by the Finnish state and the 
necessary bureaucratic procedures should be eased. The Finnish immigra-
tion law was eventually modiﬁed to accommodate the President’s personal 
wish. Accordingly, the immigrating Ingrians were legally categorized as 
returning migrants and as such, expatriate Finns. In other words, they came 
to be regarded as Finnish nationals who had been residing outside Finland 
and were now returning to their home country.
There were a number of reasons for general acceptance of the President’s 
suggestion to view any Finnish-speaking Ingrian as a potential returning mi-
grant (see also Lepola 2000: 98–99). One of these reasons was the anticipated 
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need for a cheap labor force competent in the Finnish language. Another one 
had to do with the idea that the Finnish state had to somehow compensate 
for the deportation of those Ingrians who had resided in the country during 
World War II. Finland had a ‘debt of honor’ to repay. This was the motive 
given in 1999 by President Koivisto himself in an interview published by 
Helsingin Sanomat, the country’s largest newspaper (HS Kuukausiliite Feb-
ruary 6, 1999). The sense of kinship between Finns and Ingrians was also 
involved in this, especially since the legal status of returning migrants was 
not only granted to those families whose members had been deported, but 
was extended collectively to all the descendants of those people who had 
moved to Ingria in the 17th century, including those who had been forcefully 
transported from there to Siberia in the 1930s. The Finnish immigration law 
concerned thus the ‘whole Ingrian people’, who now were adopted by Finn-
ish law as members of the Finnish nation, and were on these grounds eligible 
for immigration and applying for citizenship.
The Finnishness of the returning migrants was, however, soon questioned. 
They were acknowledged as ‘kinfolk’ and ‘relatives’ but regarded as having 
been ‘contaminated’ by Russianness. They were thus Finns and non-Finns at 
the same time. In addition to the lack of need for cheap labor, due especially 
to the economic recession that started in the early 1990s, criticism against 
Ingrian immigration increased in the mid- and late 1990s due to repeated 
reports in the public media that many incoming ‘returnees’ from Ingria and 
elsewhere in Russia, who may have qualiﬁed in terms of biological kinship 
ties, did not speak a word of Finnish (see also Hakamies 2004: 43; Pöysä 
2004: 57–59). As noted in an early July 1999 editorial of Helsingin Sanomat, 
their identity has been found to be ‘completely Russian’. The Finnish consul 
Rauno Pietiläinen in St. Petersburg made a comment to the same effect on 
Finnish television in September 1999 (see Heikkinen 2003: 160–161). Such 
comments revealed that the Finnish-speaking Ingrians – Russian or Soviet 
citizens – were not only assumed to be similar to the Finns of Finland but 
were expected to identify with the Finnish nation and national culture. Their 
ability to speak Finnish was taken as an indication and guarantee of this. 
Their inability was taken as an indication that they were not ‘real’ Ingrians 
or relatives of the Finns. As put by the English-language Internet pages of 
Helsingin Sanomat on February 12, 2002, they lacked “true ties to Finland” 
(Interior Minister 2002). As a result of public demands for putting limits to 
this migration, the Ministry of the Interior decided in summer 1999 that the 
immigration law would be altered to make competence in the Finnish lan-
guage a requirement (see also Lepola 2000: 108).12
The presence of Russianness within the category of the Ingrian represents 
one of the basic dilemmas in the political linking of Finnish-speaking Finns 
in Finland with Finnish speakers across the national borders. According to 
a common conception, if the ‘relatives’ of the Finns are partially Russian, 
they are partially non-Finns. Such a categorical approach has many roots. It 
partially derives from the centuries-old rivalries between Sweden and Russia 
over the control and taxation of the people in Finnish-speaking territories and 
the strong anti-Russian sentiment in Sweden in the 18th century. In the early 
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19th century Finns were generally loyal towards Russia (see Klinge 1997), 
but there was also a strong interest in constructing a Finnishness clearly 
distinct from Russianness (as well as from Swedishness). At that point, one 
of the central political goals was to ward off any attempt at standardizing 
Finland’s social and political institutions with the rest of the Russian Empire. 
Yet, according to most recent research, it was only towards the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century that the Finnish Russophobia 
became ‘ethnicized’, concerning all Russian persons and everything deemed 
Russian (see Tarkiainen 1986; Immonen 1987; Karemaa 1998). For most of 
the 20th century, the political opposition to Communism has conditioned the 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic otherness of Russianness.
The aboriginal Sámi (or Lapps) in Northern Finland provide a somewhat 
different case from the Ingrians. The Sámi have been recognized as being 
linguistically related to Finnish speakers, but both genetic and cultural re-
lationship to the Finns has been denied. In the making of Finnish national 
culture, the symbolic role that has been designated to them has been that of 
the primitive Other (see e.g. Isaksson 1997; Lehtola 1997; Ruuska 1998; Tuu-
lentie 2001: 93–99). There is a presumption that the words ‘saame’, ‘suomi’ 
(Finland) and ‘häme’ (Tavastland) are related (see Koivulehto 1993) and a 
conception that the Sámi and the Finns have at some point in history consti-
tuted common peoplehood, but neither one of these have brought the Sámi 
close to the ‘ethnic-genetic’ Finns in the history of Finnish nation making. 
Vis-à-vis the Sámi, the consolidation of the category of Finnishness has also 
required a clear geographical distinction. The denial of a constructive role for 
the Sámi in the building of the nation has continued the 16th and 17th century 
policy of the Swedish state to push the ‘primitives’ towards the margins, to 
more inhospitable types of land, in which they have only recently started to 
gain political rights (cf. Tuulentie 2001: 81–93).13
Pekka Isaksson locates the exclusion of the Sámi from the nation-state 
project towards the late 19th century (Isaksson 1997). According to him, the 
marginalization of the Sámi can be mainly attributed to the historian and 
journalist Zachris Topelius, who in his highly inﬂuential writings excluded 
the Sámi both from the concept of the people of Finland (in Swedish Finlands 
folk) and that of the Finnish people (det ﬁnska folket). The latter included 
only the Finnish speakers, while the former has comprised of both the Finn-
ish and the Swedish speakers as well as the Russians, Germans, French, etc. 
who have settled in Finland. However, the Jews and the Gypsies as well as 
‘other strangers’ living in the country, which, among others, meant the Sámi, 
were excluded from both categories (Isaksson 1997: 54; see also Saukkonen 
1998b: 33–34; Saukkonen 1999: 202–206). Topelius’s categorizations can 
be regarded as being indicative of the growth of democracy in the late 1800s 
and the consequent desire to specify the membership criteria in the demos, 
the people conceptualized as the democratic subjects of the state.
The basic reason for the Sámi’s exclusion, according to Isaksson, has been 
their nomadism (Isaksson 1997: 60–62). For 19th-century Finnish ethnog-
raphers and historians, who followed common contemporary Western ideas 
about non-Western and ‘primitive’ peoples and cultures, only agriculturalists 
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had history and political organization, both of which were regarded as signs 
of national subjectivity. As a nomadic people the Sámi were regarded as hav-
ing failed to make any progress since the Stone Age, which also meant that 
they lacked history. In addition, they were viewed as belonging to a different 
race than the Finns (Isaksson 1997: 63). This distinction making continues, 
for example in Finnish genetics, despite the common agreement of the lack 
of any scientiﬁc basis for such racializing discourses.
The nomadism of the Sámi has undoubtedly contributed to their denial of 
a constructive role in the Finnish nation-state project, but the history of their 
exclusion extends further back than Finnish nation making. In Elias Lönnrot’s 
original vision of the historical basis of the Kalevala epic, the Finns and 
the Sámi (the Lapps) are seen as warring enemies. This both represents and 
reproduces the centuries-old hierarchies in which the Sámi, some of whom 
used to inhabit southern and central parts of present-day Finland up to the 16th 
or 17th centuries, were from early on distinguished from the ‘Finnish tribes’, 
that is, the regional groups that came to constitute the Finnish people (det 
ﬁnska folket). According to Jouko Vahtola, nomadic hunting was not a factor 
in the categorization that has existed at least since the Bronze Age. Those that 
have been called the Lapps were different ethnically, that is, linguistically 
and racially (Vahtola 1999: 111–113; see also Sammallahti 1999). Still, Seija 
Tuulentie emphasizes that the othering of the Sámi does not mean that they 
would be regarded as enemies of the Finns. The Sámi identity, according to 
Tuulentie (2001: 99, 273), complements Finnish identity. As such, its most 
characteristic feature is its constitution in the framework of Finnish national 
identity and its position as ‘our’ minority.
Karelians as Finns and Non-Finns
In the Finnish politics of culture and construction of national mythology, the 
treatment of the Sámi has been radically different from the central symbolic 
position granted to the Karelians – and to some extent, the Ingrians – across 
Finland’s eastern border. The Karelians are seen as having given the Finns 
the folk poetry that forms the foundation of the Finnish national epic, the 
Kalevala. Yet, the national romantic conceptualization of the Karelians as 
the ‘cradle’ of what has been deﬁned as ‘Finnish culture’ demonstrates that 
the Karelians have also been othered and primitivized into a people without 
history.
Unlike the Finns, who are considered modern, both the Sámi and the 
Karelians have been regarded as living in tradition and in nature. While the 
Sámi are a primitive Other on the margins of Finnish settlement in the north, 
the Karelians (especially Viena or Archangel Karelians in Russia) have 
been primitivized and exoticized by othering them to their assigned role of 
reﬂecting ancient Finnishness and serving as a present-day representation 
of it. Their traditional culture thus stands for the history of the Finns, thus 
depriving them of a history independent of Finnish nation making. In this 
role, the Karelians have simultaneously been regarded as Finnish and yet 
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fundamentally distinct from the Finns by being characterized as Homeric 
ﬁgures, innocent and noble savages, and a perpetually indigent people in need 
of Finnish-based – but not Russian-based – enlightenment and modernity. 
According to Seppo Knuuttila, they are noble as the truly civilized, but still 
belong to the category of nature rather than that of civilization (Knuuttila 
1994: 106–107; see also Tarkka 1989; Varpio 2002).
The distinction made between Finland and Karelia can be described in op-
positional pairs. Finland is rich, but Karelia is poor. Finns live in culture and 
history, while Karelians live in nature and tradition. Finns are modern, while 
Karelians are traditional. While the Finns have a nation that has developed 
into a state, the Karelians, as put by Topelius, are “children who lag behind 
the Finns in national development” (quoted in Sihvo 1994: 28). Both the 
Sámi and the Karelians have been othered on the grounds of lacking the key 
elements in deﬁning Finnishness: history, national development, modernity, 
and nation-state identity.
According to Kaija Heikkinen, the long line of portrayals of Karelia 
continues to reproduce an arrangement in which Karelians are seen as part 
of the category of Finns, in accordance with the ideological construction of 
Finnishness (Heikkinen 2003: 158; see also Heikkinen 1989: 37). Indeed, 
located on both sides of the present-day Finnish eastern border, Karelia is 
emphatically seen to constitute a segment of the Finnish national space 
– even though most of its territory or population has never belonged to the 
Finnish state, and a large area of Finnish-speaking Karelia that was once 
part of the Finnish state was ceded to the Soviet Union in the Second World 
War. Simultaneously, Karelia has been seen to contain elements that are 
deemed alien to it.
The perception of Karelia as Finnish has a number of interrelated his-
torical roots. Ever since the time of Mikael Agricola, the main reformer in 
Sweden’s Finnish-speaking areas in the 16th century, the literati have paid 
attention to Karelian folk poetry and regarded it as representative of the 
oldest layers of Finnish-language folk poetry. This interest eventually led 
to the compilation of the Kalevala epic by Elias Lönnrot in the 1830s. As a 
Finnish national symbol, the epic established Karelia – especially Viena or 
Archangel Karelia, the main geographical source of the epic materials – as 
the ‘origin’ or ‘cradle’ of Finnish culture. To be sure, this corresponds well 
with the established historical links between Finnish settlement and Viena 
Karelian culture, especially in folk poetry (Siikala 2002a: 38–42; see also 
Pöllä 1995). The historical facts are not, however, geopolitically neutral. As 
phrased by Hannes Sihvo, Lönnrot’s work joined the Kalevala and Karelia 
together “seamlessly” (Sihvo 1969: 29), which meant that Karelia was in 
increasing ways seen as part of Finland. The cultural linking of Karelia to 
Finland gained momentum thanks to National Romanticism and Karelian-
ism of the late 19th century, when nationalistically oriented artists, scholars 
and intellectuals, members of the Finnish upper class and educated elite, 
traveled there from Helsinki to look for the “origins of Finnishness”, “origi-
nal Kalevala life”, and “former Finnish ‘Golden Age’” (Sihvo 1969; Sihvo 
1999: 183–185). They sought to use what they saw as material in the crea-
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tion and consolidation of Finnish national arts in a period that came to be 
called its ‘Golden Era’. In this process, “neo-romanticist paintings (Akseli 
Gallen-Kallela), realist photography (I. K. Inha), bombastic musical com-
positions (Jean Sibelius) and political writings about Greater Finland (Ilmari 
Kianto) together created a picture of Finland originating from the Karelian 
backwoods” (Lehtinen 1994: 149).
Another foundation for Karelia’s belonging to Finland lies in 18th-century 
comparative linguistics, which established the idea of the Finno-Ugric fam-
ily of languages. This aroused ethnographic interest in documenting and 
studying the language, folk poetry, customs, religion, rituals and mythology 
of the populations speaking these languages. This scholarship can be – and 
certainly is – lauded for indispensable collections of historical information 
and premodern mythology. Still, the collected materials have not merely been 
objects of historical study. In addition, scholars have been seeking in these 
materials “the fundamental character of Finnish culture” (Siikala 1994: 9). 
They have been keen on establishing cultural links of identity-political sig-
niﬁcance between the ethnographic past and the scholarly present. Especially 
with regard to the idea of the Finno-Ugric family of languages and nations, 
ethnography – including folklore scholarship – has not only described simi-
larities or differences between populations, their cultures, religious ideas and 
beliefs, worldviews and histories, but established lineages that have become 
some of the key elements of identity in the construction of Finnishness and 
the identity space of Finnish nationalism and national culture.
The linguistic connection and its politicized meanings have had serious 
repercussions even in the foreign policy of the Finnish state, since the inter-
est in the ethnography of the ‘kin peoples’ was from early on linked to the 
idea of deﬁning Finland’s geographical extensions. Because the Finnish-
speaking Karelians were given a central symbolic position in the making of 
Finnish-language national culture, they were emphatically viewed as Finns 
– despite the fact that the people in Russian Karelia identiﬁed themselves 
as Russians and regarded the visiting Finnish literati, as well as the other 
people living in Finland, as Swedes, in accordance with the centuries-old 
political borders between Sweden and Russia (see e.g. Sihvo 1969: 24–25; 
Pöllä 1991: 169; Björn 1993: 166). The fact that the Finnish literati identi-
ﬁed the Finnish-speaking Karelians as Finns – and their culture as that of 
the ‘ancient Finns’ – made Karelia an irredenta, a territory that had been 
‘unnaturally’ separated from its Finnish-language context and which, there-
fore, should be ‘reunited’ with Finland (Sihvo 1969: 38; cf. Sedergren 1996; 
Jukarainen 2004: 30–36).
For a number of scholars and activists in the mid-19th century, Lönnrot’s 
work in collecting folk poetry became an argument for questioning the ex-
isting political border between the Grand Duchy of Finland and the rest of 
the Russian Empire. The political meaning given to linguistic and cultural 
afﬁnity came to be expressed in aspirations for joining all of Karelia to 
Finland and, eventually, for creating a joint political unit that would join 
the Finnish-speaking and Finnish-related people and areas into one nation 
– under the same government, that of the Finnish state. The idea of a Greater 
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Finland became highly inﬂuential in the nationalistic politics of the late 1910s 
through the early 1940s (see e.g. Alapuro 1973: 91–101; Manninen 1980; 
Ahti 1999: 127f.; Sihvo 1999: 195–196; Bazegski & Laine 2000: 42–45; Pi-
miä 2003: 74).14 The idea was ﬁrst presented in 1844 by two student activists 
who, together with the young journalist Zachris Topelius, were inﬂuenced by 
the thoughts of J. G. Herder and argued that the Finnish people can only be 
united when Finland is ‘complete’, containing also Eastern Karelia in Russia. 
The geographical extensions of Finnishness were laid out in greater detail by, 
among others, August Ahlqvist, Professor of Finnish language, who, under 
the pen name A. Oksanen, published in 1860 a poem entitled Suomen valta 
(The Realm of Finland). According to this text, which was highly inﬂuential 
in the Finnish nationalist movement up to the Second World War, the ter-
ritory that belongs to the Finns of Finland on the grounds of linguistic and 
cultural afﬁnity extends from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Onega in Aunus 
(Olonets) Karelia, and from the Gulf of Bothnia to the White Sea beyond 
Viena Karelia.
Such extensions for Finland and Finnishness have remained an unfulﬁlled 
dream, except for a short period during the Finnish-Soviet conﬂict in World 
War II, when Finland occupied parts of Eastern Karelia across the Soviet 
border with the intention of annexing them to Finland (see Manninen 1980). 
At that time, scholars were sent out to collect information about local Finn-
ish-related folk culture, in order to preserve it in museums and archives as 
well as to create national consciousness among the un-exiled local population 
(see Laine 1993). Yet, the collecting of traditional verbal art, or folklore, was 
not the only means in the pursuit to legitimate the inclusion of this territory 
in the Finnish state. More weight was placed on geography and botany to 
provide ‘natural’ grounds for the argument for ‘natural’ borders (Laine 1993). 
This was in direct line with the argument presented by Topelius, according 
to whom Finland must have ‘natural’ borders, founded upon elements of ge-
ography, geology and ﬂora and fauna (see Tiitta 1994). A. V. Ervasti, among 
others, spoke for the same notion in his travelogues from Karelia (Ervasti 
1884: 212; see also Nygård 1978: 21–22; Varpio 1997: 95; Valenius 1998: 
34; Ahti 1999: 128).
In the ﬁnal turmoils of the Second World War, Finland lost a great part 
of Karelia to the Soviet Union, which led to one of the largest evacuation 
campaigns in European history, as well as to an immeasurable amount of 
national nostalgia on the Finnish side of the new border. Many Finnish geopo-
litical discourses of the post-war years, as argued by Anssi Paasi, “are drawn 
together by one theme, the question of the location of the Finnish-Russian 
border (Paasi 2000: 91; see also Alasuutari & Ruuska 1999: 120–123). After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the question of the Finns’ rights to reclaim 
the lost Karelian territories became a heated topic. Yet, as noted by Pertti 
Joenniemi, “the state actors have been reluctant to engage themselves in talks 
on restitution of those parts of Karelia ceded to the Soviet Union in the Paris 
Treaty of 1947”, while the issue “remains mainly of interest to Finnish civil 
society” (Joenniemi 1998: 183). The closely related question of Karelia’s 
Finnishness is a prime example of the complexities in the politics of identity 
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– in the competition between neighboring states over territories and over the 
territorial identiﬁcations and political loyalties of their populations. Karelia’s 
Finnishness is in Finland founded upon the discursive practice of asserting 
national authority over areas that are regarded as having traditionally been 
within the Finnish-speaking cultural sphere. Such assertions have strongly 
denied the validity of all other deﬁnitions of these areas’ cultural and politi-
cal history, as well as competing deﬁnitions of heritage.
While there has been a strong interest in asserting national authority over 
Karelia, the role and position given to it in the making of Finnish national 
culture has at the same time been that of a symbolic center and a cultural 
Other. Since Karelia is seen to represent the oldest layers of Finnish culture 
and folk poetry, the national value attached to it is highly past-oriented 
– which has by no means decreased in the post-World War II longing for the 
lost territories. As phrased by Lotte Tarkka (1989), Karelia’s landscape is 
that of Finnish national nostalgia. The past-oriented image of Karelia is an 
image appropriated in early 19th-century Finland for the writing of Finnish 
national (non-Swedish, non-Russian) history, and it is continued and further 
consolidated in present-day ethnographically oriented tourism that provides 
for opportunities for Finns and tourists in Finland to visit those places in 
Russian Karelia that have been symbolically central in the history of Finn-
ish nation-making (Lehtinen 1994: 155; Anttonen & Kuusi 1999: 297–305; 
Virtanen 1999; Stark 2002). The main motif in this tourism is visiting the 
‘folklore-villages’ or ‘Rune Villages’ in which Elias Lönnrot collected folk 
poetry in the 1800s (see e.g. Nieminen 1995). Following Lönnrot’s footsteps 
is the basic metaphor for the touristic experience, which combines historical 
comparisons with cheap shopping, hiking and ethnographic recording. An-
other related motif is the presence of Finnish and German military forces in 
the same area in the early 1940s. There is a growing interest in visiting such 
war sites, inaccessible to foreigners until the early 1990s, as well as the me-
morials that have been erected there recently (cf. Raivo 2000: 144–147).
Such heritage tourism may boost the economy in the impoverished regions 
of Viena or Archangel Karelia, but as described and discussed by Laura Stark, 
it may also have negative repercussions when it privileges and favors only 
one ethnic group in the trans-ethnic infrastructures of the local communities 
(see Stark 2002). The inclusion of Karelians in the category of the Finns and 
the objectiﬁcation of their culture as ‘our past’ represents a local variation 
in the global discourse on ‘cultural roots’, in which the focus is placed on 
“recording and gathering the heritage of related peoples in the process of ex-
tinction” (Salminen 2003: 276). Historically, ever since the mid-1800s, this 
discourse has been framed in a geopolitically charged competition between 
Finnish civilization and Russian/Slavic civilization over the deﬁnition of 
the area as well as its economic utilization. The competition has been about 
Karelia’s history and prehistory (see Sihvo 1999: 190–194), the question 
of who gets to civilize and modernize its ‘natural state’ (Tarkka 1989: 246) 
and the changing meanings of the Finnish-Russian border (see Paasi 1994, 
2000; Alanen & Eskelinen 2000; Bazegski & Laine 2000; Brednikova 2000). 
From this perspective, one may hope that the strong identity-political and 
143
Cultural Homogeneity and the National Uniﬁcation of a Political Community
even stronger economic interests expressed within the Finnish civil society 
do not conﬂict with the local production of identity, based on a rather dif-
ferent approach to Karelian history, modernity and the question of cultural 
diversity in the area’s cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic heritage.15 
Instead of a disputed boundary and a hinterland, Pertti Joenniemi sees the 
European integration bringing an opportunity for Karelia: a transformation 
into a transborder frontier that is “part of a continuous economic, social and 
cultural landscape” (Joenniemi 1998: 198).
Innate Unity in Prehistory
Yet another kind of cultural othering has been projected onto the Swedish 
speakers, who have conventionally been seen as – and criticized for – be-
longing to a higher social class than ‘the ordinary Finns’, to use an expres-
sion that has become common in recent years for denoting Finnish speakers. 
The marked distinction has continued to be drawn regardless of the various 
attempts to consolidate the cultural and political link between the Swedish-
speaking and the Finnish-speaking populations. In many everyday contexts, 
Swedish speakers are distinguished from Finnish speakers by calling the 
former Finland’s Swedes and the latter simply Finns. ‘Finn’ and ‘Finnish’ 
tend to denote only Finnish speakers, thus making all others non-Finns.
The position of the Swedish language and its speakers continues to be one 
of the core issues in the making of the Finnish nation and in conceptualizing 
Finnishness and Finnish culture. Swedish was the ofﬁcial language of the 
autonomous state in the 19th century, but gradually Finnish gained ground 
and surpassed it in national signiﬁcance.16 Since Swedish was the language 
of state in the Finnish-speaking areas for centuries, many Finnish speakers 
adopted Swedish as their ﬁrst language. This may be suggested as one of the 
reasons why Swedish speakers in Finland cannot in any ‘objective’ terms be 
regarded as constituting an ethnic group of their own. Yet, the relationship 
of the Swedish speakers to the Finnish speakers has been dealt with in ways 
that have ethnicized the differences. When Finnish speakers are regarded as 
an ethnicity, the Swedish speakers become their ethnic Other – that which 
needs to be distinguished from the category of the ‘Finn’ and which therefore 
becomes a constitutive element in the construction of this category. On the 
other hand, the collective identiﬁcation of the Swedish speakers – as well 
as their collective efforts in gaining and/or preserving their political and 
linguistic rights – has adopted elements from the discourse of ethnicity and 
its representational practices. The Swedish speakers have become an ethnic 
group in their ethnopolitical and language political self-deﬁnition.
Yet, the ethnicization of the Swedish speakers has also been intentionally 
prevented with language policy. As pointed out by Alapuro (1997a: 24), the 
maintaining of Swedish as a national language after Finland became inde-
pendent prevented the Swedish-speaking agriculturists, ﬁshermen and work-
ing class from discrimination. They were thus spared from having to organize 
ethnic movements, unlike many other linguistic minorities elsewhere in the 
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world. Similarly, according to John Westerholm, the making of Swedish into 
a national language was a means to prevent irredentism and oppose the call 
for making the Swedish-speaking areas in Finland autonomous cantons in the 
Swiss manner. By granting equal linguistic rights, the dominant population 
‘bought’ the loyalty of its minority (Westerholm 1999: 282).
One of the basic questions regarding the relationship between Finnish 
and Swedish speakers has been, and continues to be, how a national com-
munity can have two national languages. The intimate link established 
between the national units, its territory and its language, is one of the key 
points in Herderian nationalism, and its main political function is not only 
to indicate cultural homogeneity in the national community but also to con-
vey its political unity. Accordingly, the national movement in Finland has 
since the 19th century strongly rallied for the ideology of ‘one nation, one 
language’, as well as for ‘one nation, one mind’. This has created a concep-
tion, held even today among many Finnish speakers, that Finland’s ofﬁcial 
bilingualism is somehow ‘unnatural’, since only a small minority, less than 
6 % of the population, speaks the other of the two languages as their ﬁrst 
language. It is by no means uncommon to hear Finnish speakers complain 
how the large majority is obliged to study in school the language of a small 
minority. Ofﬁcial bilingualism is even seen as signaling the continuation of 
‘Swedish colonization’.
The position of the Swedish speakers in Finland, and their role in the 
production of the category of the national, must be seen in the historical 
framework established in the process of the state and nation building of the 
early and mid-1800s. In the new political situation, the making of the Finnish 
nation meant, ﬁrst and foremost, the construction of an idea of Finnishness 
that would be recognized as fundamentally different from both Russianness 
and Swedishness. This political goal was epitomized in the famous slogan 
“Swedes we are not, Russians we do not wish to become, let us therefore be 
Finns”, which has been commonly, either correctly or incorrectly, attributed 
to the political emigrant Adolf Ivar Arwidsson (1791–1858). For some 19th-
century nationalists (Fennomans) and their descendants, this eventually came 
to also include the Swedishness (or alleged Swedishness) of the country’s 
Swedish-speaking population. The slogan also laid down the foundation 
for the discursive practice of deﬁning Finnishness through negation: on the 
basis of what it is not and what it is separated from, giving Finland a border 
identity between Sweden and Russia. The political logic of this boundary 
making was to institutionalize a language of symbolism that would unite 
the population under a single national identity. In practice it also meant the 
marginalization of some of the culturally and linguistically heterogeneous 
elements of this population.
Ideologically, the construction of Finnishness meant the establishment of a 
national culture that would be recognized as being founded only on ‘Finnish’ 
elements. At the same time, as put by the political scientist Teija Tiilikainen, 
“the focal political principles of the Swedish era were handed down in the 
structures of the administration and legislation that Finland was entitled to 
maintain” (Tiilikainen 1998: 120). Yet, the symbolic signiﬁcance of these 
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political institutions was downplayed, while the symbolic signiﬁcance of 
‘Finnish’ history and Finnish-language folklore was emphasized (Engman 
1999: 169). In addition to being indicative of the selective and politically 
motivated nature of national symbolism, this contributed to the development 
of the notion that nationally signiﬁcant Finnish culture is only constituted 
by the history and culture of the Finnish speakers. For such a conception the 
nationalist activists also sought acknowledgment from abroad, for example, 
with help of the Kalevala epic, which was raised to the status of a national 
symbol immediately upon its publication (in 1835) and adopted as “a magna 
carta to nationhood” (Engman 1999: 168).
Although the Finnish state was established before the emergence of the 
national movement called Fennomania, patriotic and ‘Fennophilic’ ideas 
had been presented before this. These were aired, for example, in written 
accounts on economic-historical issues in towns and parishes, and in 18th-
century works by such historians as Daniel Juslenius (1676–1752) and Hen-
rik Gabriel Porthan (1739–1804). To some extent they carried on the order 
given to the clergy by the Council on Antiquities, founded in 1666 upon the 
decree issued by the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf, to obtain information 
about ‘ancient relics’, which meant, among other things, historical narratives, 
old beliefs, folk poetry, songs, and archeological treasures (see Chapter 5). 
The explicit goal of the antiquarian campaign – modeled after similar actions 
taken elsewhere in Europe – was to use local history to glorify the Swedish 
state, but it was at the same time a direct response to a similar call made 
earlier by King Kristian IV of Denmark. As such, it was part of the conﬂict 
of power between the two Nordic kingdoms. The ‘colonization’ of history 
was simultaneous with the European colonization of lands across seas.
The early interest in Finnish issues became of great signiﬁcance in the 19th 
century, as one of the key elements of Fennoman nationalism was the projec-
tion of its own history far back in the prehistory of the state. The Herderian 
link between language, history and the nation was not the only politico-philo-
sophical foundation in this. The German philosopher G. W. Hegel’s ideas 
of the national spirit, the spirit of the people (Volksgeist) that has developed 
in the course of history (see Karkama 1999: 148), and the conception of an 
exemplary heroic age in the ancient past were also instrumental. Accordingly, 
various historical and quasi-historical ideas of the (Finnish-speaking) Finns’ 
Golden Age as a once powerful and wealthy people – a lost kingdom – were 
produced. The imaginary national history depicted in the Kalevala epic served 
the same purpose of providing a myth of origin that would present Finland as 
a primordial and an innate national unit, founded upon a common language 
– Finnish. The rhetorical device of projecting the foundation of the Finnish 
nation into prehistory made it appear as if the nation had existed ﬁrst, before 
the emergence of the state, and had existed since time immemorial. The state 
came to be seen as having formed as a result of a natural – albeit an arduous 
– national development. Especially for J. V. Snellman, the leading ﬁgure in the 
Fennoman movement in the 1840s and 1850s, this was a struggle for regain-
ing political power to an innate entity that was a chosen people, a nation by 
the grace of God (see Kemiläinen 1980: 4), but whose nationness had been 
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suppressed for centuries by forced Christianization and Western civilization 
(see Snellman 1928: 12; see also Skyttä & Skyttä 1981: 128).
The projection of nationalism into prehistory (especially into the prehis-
tory of the state) was based on the idea and belief that the Finnish nation 
is not so much constituted by a political organization, common jurisdiction 
and centrally governed economic structure as it is by a common language, 
culture and history – in other words, by common genealogy. The perceived 
unity of language and culture purportedly contained the historical project 
of the nation-state, in which, in Hegelian terms, the agent-subject was the 
historically developed national spirit within the individuals (see Karkama 
1999). In the decades to come, both in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, the ‘cultural’ argument would be used much more vigorously than 
the idea of a political contract between different social classes and interest 
groups to produce a sense of national unity. Such a ‘cultural’ projection has 
also played an important role in the conceptualization of Finland and Finnish 
culture (more precisely, the culture of the Finnish speakers) as homogeneous, 
as it has emphasized the intimate link between language, territory, bloodlines, 
national consciousness and worldview.
It was the search for national political unity that turned the nationalist in-
tellectuals of the 19th century to prehistory, away from actual, documented 
history, which was regarded as not national and therefore not symbolically 
useful. This history was ‘plagued’ by foreign domination (Sweden) and a 
foreign religion (Catholicism). The denial of both the ‘foreign’ history and the 
hegemony of contemporary Swedish-language culture politically motivated 
the nationalists to make a symbolic turn to the uneducated Finnish-speak-
ing population, who came to be viewed as the ‘people’ as both ethnos and 
demos. As argued by the Fennoman leader Yrjö Koskinen (later Yrjö Sakari 
Yrjö-Koskinen, originally Georg Zacharias Forsman, 1830–1903), the Finnish 
‘people’ had a history that could be adopted as national history; accordingly, 
his textbook on Finnish history from 1869, Oppikirja Suomen kansan histo-
riassa, presents the ethnically deﬁned Finnish people as a historical subject 
(Majander 2000: 501). Koskinen’s radical program stressed the idea that a 
nationally signiﬁcant Finnish culture is constituted by the culture and history 
of the Finnish speakers only. All others are Others.
The symbolic turn was exempliﬁed in the historians’ quest for ‘Finnish’ 
themes and motifs in Finland’s ‘foreign’ history. Koskinen called for writing 
a new national history that would seek evidence of ‘Finnish national aspira-
tions’ and ‘Finnish heroism’. As noted by Mikko Majander, with reference 
to the tropic analysis of historical narratives by Hayden White (e.g. 1987), 
such themes and motifs would serve the function of synecdoche; they would 
witness of the innate capacity of the Finns to provide competent men for im-
portant tasks in society (Majander 2000: 508–509). One of the early examples 
of the new trend was the interest in the peasant uprising called the Club War 
(1596–1597). Koskinen’s doctoral dissertation from 1858 (republished in 
1877) – the second dissertation written in the Finnish language – offered an 
interpretation in which the Finnishness of the rebelling peasants and their 
struggle to maintain their freedom and Protestant religion were some of the 
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central points. The spirit of national independence that Koskinen saw in the 
actions of the rebelling peasants is indicative of his Hegelian frame of refer-
ence (see e.g. Koskinen 1877: 590–591).
I will discuss in a forthcoming book (see also Anttonen 2004b) how a 
similar process of historicization and heroization was applied to the narra-
tive of the ‘birth’ of Finland, depicting the killing of Bishop Henrik, the al-
legedly ﬁrst Christian bishop, in connection with the allegedly ﬁrst crusade 
to Finland from Sweden in 1156. Over the centuries, both in Catholic times 
and during the Enlightenment, this incident (or rather, the clerical legends 
and popular narratives concerning it) had been viewed as an example of the 
stubbornness and hardheadedness of the Finns to accepting Christianity – and 
by extension, other tokens of Westernness and modernity. In the course of 
the new nationalistic history writing, the bishop’s murder gradually came to 
symbolize the desire of the ‘free Finnish peasant’ to liberate Finland from 
the ‘foreign’ religion of Catholicism.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the Swedish historian Erik Gustaf Geijer 
(1783–1847) presented similar ideas concerning the meaning of the Catho-
lic era in Sweden. Geijer had argued that the medieval Catholic Church had 
destroyed the previous social organization that had rested on democracy and 
equality. Reformation, therefore, meant the restoration of the democratic in-
stitutions of the peasant society (Stråth 1994: 57). The Protestant denial of 
Catholicism’s political and cultural heritage was, thus, part of the common 
transnational grammar of nation making in the Nordic countries. In this re-
spect, the making of Finnishness in Finland did not differ from the making 
of Swedishness in Sweden.
Symbolic Lack of Class Hierarchies, and the Elite as Others
For the Fennoman nationalists, the making of the Finnish nation meant the 
political integration of Swedish speakers and Finnish speakers, as well as that 
of the different social classes within the territorial unit. This entailed, among 
other things, the adoption of Finnish as a state language and the symbolic 
use of the ‘people’s culture’ or ‘folk tradition’ in the construction of the na-
tional heritage. This would not, however, mean that civilization in Finland 
should be based on the cultural achievements of the Finnish-speaking folk. 
The national signiﬁcance ascribed to selected representations of folk culture 
did not mean that the elite would reject their education-based culture for the 
culture of the uneducated. Echoing the views of J.V. Snellman, Gabriel Rein 
emphasized in his Presidential Address to the Finnish Literature Society in 
March 1842 that he identiﬁed himself ﬁrst as a member of the intelligentsia 
and second as a Finn. The educated elite remained distinct from the ‘people’ 
but identiﬁed with it in the project for a national language and culture, in the 
name of consolidating the national entity.
This positioning eventually produced a double-sided discourse of both 
creating and dismantling class differences, which to a great extent character-
izes Finnish society even today. The double-sided discourse can be regarded 
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as a mixture of elitism and populism – or it can be seen as an indication of 
the elite’s ambivalence, as Alapuro has suggested (1998). Snellman and 
Rein’s position eventually came to be regarded as elitism, because, as put 
by Alapuro, in accordance with the populism of Fennoman nationalism, 
“the educated class had to be culturally one with the people” (Alapuro 1999: 
114). Accordingly, the Fennomans started to include themselves in the same 
category of ‘Finnishness’ that they had constructed for the ‘people’, and by 
doing so, they placed both the ‘people’ and themselves in opposition to the 
‘foreign’ upper class that spoke a ‘foreign’ language (Alapuro 1998: 181). 
Language and class thus became major factors for distinguishing between 
not only ‘Finnishness’ from ‘Swedishness’ in Finland but also between the 
people (as both ethnos and demos) and those excluded from it.
Satu Apo considers it quite a miracle how the performers of folk poetry, 
“quadrupled Others” across the dividing lines of language, culture, social 
class and race, could have provided illusions of a united Finnish people and 
culture (Apo 1998: 94; cf. Valenius 2004: 189). One can try to explain this 
‘miracle’ by pointing to some of the key ideological elements in the produc-
tion of folkloric national culture and symbolism in Finland. These elements 
include the use of folk tradition in the construction of national ancestry and 
the discursive practice of drawing politically desirable links to the ancient 
speakers of Finnish and Finnish-related languages. What is most characteristic 
in these elements, as far as social dynamics is concerned, is that they bypass 
the question of social stratiﬁcation. The trend of drawing ancestral links from 
the Finnish speaking agrarian ‘folk’ of the earlier centuries to the present-day 
‘ordinary Finns’ is a discursive act in the art of creating solidarity that is sup-
posed to transgress markers of social class within a given language group. 
The same applies to the similarly common tendency to speak of only the 
Finnish speakers of earlier centuries and millennia – or the ancient speakers 
of Finno-Ugric languages – as the forefathers of present-day Finns.
As put by Gaela Keryell, there was a rhetorical turn in which the Others 
of the 19th century became the Ancestors of the 20th (Keryell 1999: 264; see 
also Maure 1996: 68–69). Because of the wish to be “culturally one with 
the people”, as noted by Alapuro, the Fennoman elite started to perceive the 
peasants as ‘us’. In the discourse on the national in the imagined national 
community, ‘their’ oral culture and folklore became ‘our’ traditions and herit-
age. The elite, in other words, created a symbolic image of themselves as if 
originating from the (Finnish-speaking) people and claimed both participa-
tion and ownership in the people’s culture that they had raised to a central 
position in national symbolism (see also Sulkunen 2004: 26–27).17
One can also examine these processes with regard to language myths. Ac-
cording to the taxonomy suggested by Vivien Law, language myths can be 
grouped into language-intrinsic myths and language-extrinsic myths. The 
former include beliefs about a language’s purity, elegance, euphoniousness, 
expressiveness, and its lexical resources, such as the size of its vocabulary 
(Law 1998: 175, 188). The latter include beliefs about a language’s origins, 
antiquity, genetic afﬁliations, destiny, and its match to its speakers or to Nature 
(Law 1998: 175). The language-extrinsic myths are intertwined with ethnic 
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myths, myths of origin, of descent, of homeland, etc., and thus equate the 
category of the ethnos with that of a particular language. According to Law, 
language-intrinsic myths connect with inclusive nationalism, while language-
extrinsic myths are both favored and deployed in exclusive nationalism (Law 
1998: 195–196).
Fennoman nationalism did not merely contribute to the changing of the 
state language of Finland from Swedish to Finnish. Because of close links to 
particular ethnopolitically charged theories of linguistic relations, the gradual 
change of state language was accompanied by a change in the ideological 
position of language in the nation-state. In the mid-1800s, the Finnish lan-
guage was, despite the claims for language-intrinsic myths, still regarded by 
most educated people as unﬁt for education, civilization and modern artistic 
expression. The use of selected representations of folk tradition, such as 
the Kalevala epic, to argue for the suitability of Finnish for these purposes 
both modernized and antiquated the Finnish language – or more precisely, 
modernized it by antiquating it. While it was lexically developed to meet 
the requirements of a state language as well as communication in modern 
industry, trade and education, it was at the same time embedded with lan-
guage-extrinsic myths about its origins and antiquity, as well as the origins 
and antiquity of its speakers. ‘Ancient Finns’ – the authors of the antiquated 
genres of oral poetry (cf. Stewart 1991: 7) – became the predominant im-
age of ancestry, history and authenticity, signaling the history of the kind of 
Finnishness that was to constitute a crucial part of the symbolic capital in 
the construction of the country’s modernity.
The both modernized and antiquated Finnish language became one of the 
most central ideological ‘glues’ within the nation-state, and the myths about 
it became some of the central elements in the ideological construction of 
Finnishness and the making of the Finnish speakers the ‘core nation’ in the 
nation-state. In addition to its new position as a state language, the Finnish 
language received its modern legitimization from its alleged antiqueness and 
its ethnic-genetic afﬁliations.
In other words, in addition to the Herderian idea of the ‘folk’ being ro-
mantically regarded as a site of cultural authenticity, the social and political 
signiﬁcance given to the representations of the ‘folk’ was based on their 
assumed role in the making of ‘Finnish’ national heritage, the constitution 
of which had now, instead of the Swedish speakers, become the privilege 
of the Finnish speakers. On the one hand, as described by Apo (1998), the 
“four-times-othered performers of folk poetry” of the 19th century, especially 
in Karelia, represented to the elite the margins of society, the Other in terms 
of class and culture. Yet, they came to be valorized as the keepers of the 
heritage of the ancient Finns, the Ancestors (Keryell 1999: 264). Their local 
traditions were now seen as the survivals of an age-old national patrimony. 
The connection across the centuries and millennia was the antiquated Finnish 
language, which in addition to antiquity pointed to modernity, as the anti-
quated representations of Finnish-language culture could be used to argue 
for the Finnish-speakers’ modern capabilities.
One of the political consequences and manifestations of these heritage 
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discourses is the present-day tendency among Finnish-speakers to negate any 
privileged statuses within the language group. Instead of social stratiﬁcation, 
there is a common emphasis on political consensus, cultural homogeneity, 
lack of class differences, and lack of cultural hierarchies in taste (e.g. Mäkelä 
1985; Karkama & Koivisto 1997). In addition to the belief in ‘democratic’ 
access to upward social mobility, high value is placed on social equality and 
the wish to avoid – or fear to express – elitism, as this is regarded as caus-
ing social tension. Especially since the 1960s, when many of the presently 
inﬂuential homogenizing processes were launched by the Social Democratic 
welfare state, the idea of social equality has become one of the most loaded 
political concepts.18 For the same reason no (Finnish-speaking) intellectual 
in Finland dares to count him or herself in the class of intelligentsia, because 
that would be regarded as indicating snobbism, social distinction, and lack 
of solidarity within the language group (see e.g. Alasuutari 1998: 154). Ac-
cording to Pertti Karkama and Hanne Koivisto (1997: 10), there is a reserved 
or a negative attitude to intellectuals in the society. Indeed, researchers may 
turn intellectuals and intellectualism into objects of study, but few Finnish-
speaking intellectuals feel at ease with the notion of designating themselves as 
intellectuals. Intellectual discourse on Finnishness is criticized – by intellec-
tuals themselves – for exemplifying an elitist interest in drawing a distinction 
between themselves and the ‘ordinary people’. Indeed, according to Pertti 
Alasuutari (1998: 165), attributions given to the ‘ordinary people’ – unlike in 
other countries such as Britain, Germany and France – constitute in Finland 
the core contents of the stereotypical category of the national.
These are some of the reasons why the Finnish-speaking elite are not re-
garded as a ‘real’ elite, and the members of such an elite tend to negate their 
own privileged position. Since the Swedish-speaking elite are regarded as 
a ‘real’ elite, such categorizations speak for the continuation of a language-
based dichotomy – and myth – according to which members of the elite in 
Finland are foreign and foreign-based and speak foreign languages. Ethnic 
solidarity among Finnish speakers is expected to both describe and prescribe 
the assumed lack of class differences within the language group, but at the 
same time it describes and prescribes lack of class solidarity across the lan-
guage boundary. Class differences are strongly emphasized when language 
is a factor, but de-emphasized within a language group.
This dichotomy has its historical basis in the 19th-century nation-building 
process. Yrjö Blomstedt characterizes the historical situation of the 1850s 
as being drawn by two opposite and dialectic social forces: Finnishness as 
a ‘democratic force’ and Swedishness as an ‘aristocratic force’ (Blomstedt 
1980: 300). Since this opposition encapsulates a wider framework, one can 
infer that the Swedish-speaking elite came to appear ‘more elite’ than any 
Finnish-speaking one because the Swedish speakers’ elite positions, due to 
the linkage with the ‘aristocratic force’, came to be regarded as being heredi-
tary, while the elite positions of the Finnish-speakers could be regarded as 
resulting from upward social mobility, permitted by increasing democracy. 
Even in an elite position, a Finnish speaker would embody the democratic 
idea of the people, the amalgamation of ethnos and demos.
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This bias is reﬂected in the emerging national politics of heritage and 
the selection of folkloric representations as heritage symbols. Heritage, as 
discussed by Regina Bendix, is associated with the preservation and cel-
ebration of ethnicity, locality, and history (Bendix 2000: 38) and with the 
idea of the absence of power – as is the Fennoman idea of Finnishness and 
its representations. Heredity, however, is embedded with power – as are the 
Swedish speakers that are distinguished from the idea of Finnishness. As 
put by Bendix, heritage appears more democratic than heredity, doing away 
with “the particulars of history and heredity, who governed and who was 
governed” (Bendix 2000: 42). When Finnish speakers, as distinct from the 
Swedish speakers, are associated with heritage and not heredity, they appear 
without hierarchies. The assumed lack of social hierarchies within the lan-
guage group is then supposed to speak for national unity and homogeneity 
– as well as to consolidate the ethnopolitical idea that the ‘democratic’ and 
‘non-hierarchical’ Finnish speakers constitute the core nation within the bi-
lingual nation-state.
However, the idea of heredity is also adopted for the Finnish speakers, 
but again in a ‘democratic’ sense in contrast to the Swedish speakers and 
foreign nobility. This is the process that Regina Bendix refers to by call-
ing attention to the ways in which the idea of heredity has been transferred 
from genetic to cultural ‘bodies’ in national projects. The heredity of blood 
lines and the conceptualization of the Finnish speakers as a genetic category 
foreground the sense of sameness and the consequently assumed ethnic soli-
darity, which is also expected to encourage political consensus within the 
civic-territorially conceptualized nation-state. While meeting these ends, it 
simultaneously creates hierarchies and a sense of power vis-à-vis those that 
are actively denied a part in it.
A Nation Divided?
It has been my purpose in this chapter to discuss thematically how homoge-
neity has been historically produced through discourse, with both language 
and action, in Finland. Some of these homogenizing processes have been 
so successful that their end results have been taken for granted as national 
characteristics. Yet, some others are likely to reveal that the political unity 
that has been aimed at has not been achieved. The Fennoman nationalist call 
for ‘one nation, one mind’ may have been symbolically signiﬁcant for creat-
ing political unity – based on both assumed and imposed cultural sameness 
– but it appears to have created only a rhetorical image of such unity.
There have been a number of national projects of homogenization that have 
at the same time been national projects of uniﬁcation. The project established 
by the Fennoman intelligentsia in the mid-1800s aimed at unifying the bulk 
of the population through the identiﬁcation of the Swedish-speaking elite in 
the same nation with the Finnish-speaking majority. This project included 
the comprehensive education of this majority and the creation of a national 
culture in its language. The project of unifying the people after the Civil War 
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of 1918 aimed at bridging the marked class divisions that the war and the 
political developments prior to it had created and brought to the front stage. 
This eventually meant the integration of the political far Left to the conﬁnes 
and constraints of parliamentary democracy, mainly because it was considered 
the best strategy with regard to national security. As put by Alapuro, “A large 
part of the Communist party – a legacy of the failed revolution in 1918 – was 
integrated into the Finnish political system, thereby reinforcing the internal 
cohesion of Finnish society in the face of Soviet pressure” (Alapuro 1999: 
119). Class divisions have been further bridged with various sociopolitical 
measures, such as eradicating the mobile agricultural labor force in the early 
20th century and the comprehensive school reform in the 1970s. National unity 
has been further built rhetorically through repeated narratives of historical 
events in which collective participation is said to indicate the innate quality 
of the Finns in their ability to unite when facing an outside threat.
However, the many national projects of uniﬁcation have hardly reached a 
point where they are no longer found to be necessary. Although class is not a 
big divider today, language still is. Language and culture have been presented, 
in the Herderian fashion, as uniting factors, but the problematic relationship 
between the ethnic-genealogical and the civic-territorial conceptions of the 
nation continues to be a source of suppressed conﬂict. The idea of Finnishness 
continues to be – and perhaps is in increasing ways – divided over the ques-
tion of whether the ‘real’ Finnish religion in the national sense is Lutheran 
Protestantism or pre-Christian paganism. The highly valued political con-
sensus in the country can be taken to signal fear of the re-emergence of class 
divisions among Finnish speakers – that is, among those who are expected 
to embrace ‘intrinsic’ ethnic solidarity. Instead of the nation being uniﬁed, 
it is characterized by a perpetual fear of being divided – perhaps because of 
the traumatic memory of the 1918 Civil War (see e.g. Peltonen 1996, 2003). 
The potential for such a division was one of the major concerns in the 1994 
referendum on the country’s membership in the European Union.
The observable fact that there are many national projects meant to unite the 
Finnish people can be interpreted as a sign that speaks for the lack of such 
unity, rather than indicating its successful presence. The rhetoric of uniformity 
and homogeneity tends to cover up the fact that membership in ‘the national 
We’ has been determined in rather complex and even contradictory ways. It 
has mainly emphasized the unity and homogeneity of the Finnish speakers 
and at the same time constructed a number of Others not only outside but also 
inside the political boundaries of the nation-state. The idea of homogeneity 
thus conceals, in the name of national and cultural unity, the many dividing 
lines that continue to exist in the collectivity of the nation.
It would be tempting to conclude from this that the people in Finland make 
up a population that is preoccupied with its own unity. This would, however, 
be yet another attempt at capturing multitude in a single characterization. 
Yet, the history of the nation can be described – and of course, constructed 
– as a series of unifying and homogenizing projects that share the observ-
able characteristic of symbols of unity being eagerly consumed. The divided 
nature of the nation has not only increased attempts at national uniﬁcation 
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and homogenization but has also increased the production and consumption 
of collective symbolism.
This consumption also characterizes the representation of folk tradition 
and the use of such representations in constructing modernity. In fact, folk 
traditions provide for some of the central commodities in the modern con-
sumption of symbols of unity and homogeneity in the collectivity of the 
nation. At the same time, folklore and the oral traditions of the ‘people’, 
whether conceptualized as an ethnos or demos, a social class or a democratic 
constituent, have played an important role in the construction of sameness 
in a nation-state’s cultural and political heritage.
A number of scholars (see e.g. Bakhtin 1981:147) have discussed the 
modern tendency to ﬁrst imagine a most preferred future and project it into a 
mythical past, which then becomes the tradition that the people in the present 
feel they have lost. Such a process of historical inversion, mythologization 
and construction of tradition and heritage characterizes the reception of the 
Kalevala epic in Finland, as one of the major aspects in the use of its his-
torical or mythical interpretation has been its adoption as a political symbol 
of national unity.
The Kalevala epic, intentionally edited into a novel-like genealogy of the 
Finnish nation by its compiler, Elias Lönnrot, is a narrative of national unity 
on a number of levels. First, it is a narrative about the unity of a heroic people, 
the people of Kaleva, against a single enemy, the people of Pohjola. Second, 
its textualization process symbolizes national integrity, as it is compiled of 
elements deriving from different geographical areas in what is claimed to 
be the national territory. Third, it is compiled in a way that is meant to give 
the impression that instead of coming from the compiler’s desk, it has come 
from the ‘people’. The ‘people’ in the historic-political context of 19th-century 
Finnish nationalism did not merely refer to the illiterate ‘folk’ as distinct from 
the educated classes, but also the Finnish-speaking population which was to 
be integrated both politically and culturally into the autonomous nation-state 
and the category of the Finns – and which as such was expected, within the 
emerging modern democratic political culture, to give political legitimacy 
to those in charge of the administration of the state.
As a product that appeared to have come from the ‘people’, the Kalevala 
epic was meant to speak for the people’s innate cultural capacity and encour-
age the ‘people’s’ role in the building of the Finnish nation-state and in the 
writing of its national history. Accordingly, the epic came to be used by the 
nationalists and their various organizations in enlightenment and folk educa-
tion as a symbol with which they would argue for national unity and at the 
same time present themselves as the guarantors of this unity. Throughout 
the 20th century, the epic continued to provide a mythical image of prehis-
toric origins, which was, on the one hand, presented as a lost tradition but 
was supposed to offer a model for an aspired political reality and future, on 
the other. The unity that the Kalevala was taken to illustrate was used as a 
rhetorical image with which political and cultural activists could argue for 
common interests and values between such conﬂicting interest groups as the 
elite and the lower classes, the Swedish-speaking and the Finnish-speaking 
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sections of the population, and across the class difference between the op-
posite parties of the 1918 Civil War.
However, instead of indicating national unity, the use of the Kalevala as a 
political symbol of national unity has rather paradoxically suggested a lack 
of such unity. The historical interpretation of the Kalevala both derives from 
and further supports the idea that Finland as a political unit is united on the 
basis of intrinsic links between language, history, genes and national tradi-
tion. Because of this, the nation is also expected to be one in political terms, 
but the political reality – including the presence of two national languages 
and various ethnic Others – does not support this expectation. Together with 
other national symbols, the Kalevala is expected to signal that the nation that 
‘belongs together’ in linguistic, cultural and even biological terms must also 
be united in a political sense. If the political unity is lacking, the symbols 
of linguistic, cultural and genetic unity are expected to create such politi-
cal unity. If they cannot do this, they are expected to at least inspire people 
with hope for such unity. It is the element of hope or wishful thinking for 
the unity of those that ‘should be united’ that makes such symbols appeal-
ing for repeated consumption, for example as folkloric and heritage-political 
representations, publications and performances. Indeed, symbols of unity are 
eagerly consumed in community-making projects. In Finland, the political 
divisions within the nation have not only increased attempts at national uni-
ﬁcation and homogenization but also increased the production, consumption 
and commodiﬁcation of collective symbolism. In this, that which is made to 
symbolically encourage unity is already seen as its fulﬁllment.
155
Folk Tradition, History and the ‘The Story of Finland’
Internationally, the most important work on the role of research on folk tradition in Finnish nation making and Fennoman nationalism is William 
A. Wilson’s Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland (Wilson 1976). 
The book provides an outstanding and unsurpassed record of the extent to 
which 19th and 20th-century folklorists in Finland participated in political 
and militaristic propaganda concerning the Finnish nation, its history and 
folk traditions, national characteristics and geographic extensions. It well 
deserves the place it was given in the international discussion on folklore 
and politics in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, some of the book’s theoretical weaknesses have only come to 
light in the course of the new perspectives on nationalism and the narrative 
construction of the national developed in the social sciences in the 1990s. 
Instead of critically analyzing 19th-century Romantic Nationalism, founded 
upon the ideas of Herder, or even considering other inﬂuential politico-philo-
sophical doctrines, such as those by Hegel, Wilson recounts the history of 
nationalistically oriented literary activism in 19th-century Finland from a 
conspicuously Herderian perspective. He sees the role of folklore in Finn-
ish nationalism as following the course of events that Herder described for 
Germany (e.g. Wilson 1976: 30). Accordingly, his “principal concern” in the 
book is to examine “the Finns’ attempt, through folklore, to discover their 
past” (Wilson 1976: 6).
Because of this narrative agenda, the introductory section on 19th-century 
developments (entitled ‘The Road to Independence’) – which were originally 
meant to be Wilson’s main focus in the book (see Wilson 1987: 408) – is 
more of a celebration of the national signiﬁcance of folklore and folklore 
scholarship in Finland than an actual analysis of their political role in Finn-
ish society. It functions as a means for Wilson to show his love for folklore 
scholarship and his respect for Finland (see Wilson 1987). Without in any 
way questioning the overall value of Wilson’s seminal work, I wish to point 
here to a particular account of Finnish history that appears in the preface of 
the book. Describing the historical process by which Finland was annexed 
to the Russian Empire, Wilson writes as follows:
9. Folk Tradition, History and ‘The Story of 
Finland’
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Fragmented as they [the Finns] were into several dialect groups and lack-
ing the binding ties of a common literature and a written record of their 
national past, they were ill-prepared to face the century of Russian rule 
and attempted Russiﬁcation of their culture which lay ahead. Yet in a 
little over a century they had coalesced and won their freedom. (Wilson 
1976: ix.)
This account conveys a number of arguments that are worth examining. First, 
it presents the Finns as one historical subject speaking one language, but 
fragmented into dialect groups. Elsewhere in the book, somewhat differ-
ently, Wilson (e.g. 1976: 27) says that the Finns were “divided into separate 
linguistic camps”. Secondly, the Finns have a national past but no written 
record of it. Third, they have their own culture (note the singular), but this 
faces Russiﬁcation. Fourth, they came together and became free.
Wilson’s account corresponds well to a commonly held notion – a politi-
cal myth, or an ‘ethnomyth’ (see Rihtman-Auguštin 2000) – that the nation-
building process in 19th-century Finland followed Herder’s ideas for what has 
since then been called cultural, romantic, ethnic or autonomist nationalism. 
According to this notion, the emergence of nationalism in Finland was a 
call for independence by an oppressed people with an indigenous culture, a 
folk tradition that speaks for the innate unity of the Finnish folk. The Finns 
are seen as making up a primordial but dormant nation whose history prior 
to its political independence constitutes a narrative about being on the road 
to that independence. This image thus conveys a heroic narrative about the 
Finns’ historical project for modern nationhood.
From an ethnopolitical perspective, what is especially noteworthy in Wil-
son’s arguments is that they at the same time both include and exclude the 
Swedish speakers from the category of the Finns. The notion of the people 
speaking one language but being fragmented into dialect groups refers to the 
Finnish speakers only. The same applies to the notion that the Finns had no 
written record of their past. However, those who are said to have coalesced 
are the Finnish speakers and the Swedish speakers. In addition, Wilson in-
cludes the Swedish speakers in the category of the Finns by describing the 
mostly literary-oriented nationalist activities of the educated Swedish speak-
ers. These were “aspiring young nationalists” who brought “the wealth of 
[folk] poetry” to “the attention of their countrymen” (Wilson 1976: 31; see 
also Wilson 1996: 47).
Wilson is far from being alone in conceptualizing the Finns in a way that 
both includes and excludes the Swedish speakers. In fact, this is a paradox 
that characterizes much of the 19th-century (and in many ways still continuing) 
Fennoman perspective on Finnish national culture. It manifests the wish to 
acknowledge the contribution of the educated Swedish speakers in the making 
of Finnish-language folk tradition part of Finnish national culture, but it also 
manifests the simultaneous desire to deﬁne this national culture in ways that 
only acknowledge Finnish-language cultural products as its representations. 
Much of the national value of these ‘Finnish’ cultural products derives from 
placing them in opposition to the role of both Swedish-language culture and 
other ‘foreign’, such as Russian, elements and inﬂuences.
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This opposition has contributed to making Finland a country in which the 
idea of ethnic homogeneity and the sense of ethnic solidarity (mainly between 
Finnish speakers) continue to play a signiﬁcant role in the construction of 
the national and the selection of its representations and symbols of unity. 
Although Finland is ofﬁcially bilingual, with the inﬂuence of the Swedish 
speakers far exceeding their present number in percentage, popular discourses 
on Finnish identity are characterized by the Herderian notion of an intimate 
link between the nation and the Finnish language (see also Saukkonen 1999). 
In the connection made between language, nation, history, folk tradition and 
cultural identity, it is mainly the Finnish language as well as the (constructed 
and reconstructed) pasts of the Finnish speakers that are to be shared in or-
der for the Finns to make a nation and have a cultural identity of their own. 
Such a perspective tends to position the Swedish speakers, among others, as 
the ‘heteroglossic Other’ (Law 1998: 270, n. 4) and exclude their pasts from 
that which is to be shared.
A Model for Nation Building
The opposition constructed between Finnishness and its constitutive Others 
yields a heroic ethno-nationalistic narrative of a struggle for independence 
that draws in decisive ways on folklore. This is a narrative that portrays 
the emergence of nationalism and nation building in Finland as a call for 
cultural and linguistic rights (and eventually political independence) by an 
oppressed and subordinated people. The ‘people’ here means the Finnish 
speakers, whose nationhood is, in Herderian fashion, regarded as being 
inscribed in their orally transmitted cultural traditions and the literary rep-
resentations made of these. The narrative paints a picture of the Finns as a 
people that has constituted a Finnish-speaking nation since prehistory but 
which has been subjected to foreign domination and colonization throughout 
the thousand-year long historical period. In light of this narrative, the politi-
cal independence gained in 1917 appears as a return to and a restoration of 
an allegedly original state of affairs, which in many scholarly imaginations, 
as discussed by Wilson (1976), is presented as an independent pre-Chris-
tian state or a kingdom existing before the historical period. Thus, instead 
of cultural capacity, the Finns only appeared to lack their original political 
power and sovereignty.
One of the numerous expressions of such a narrative was published in 
1996 in the 80th anniversary issue of the weekly Suomen Kuvalehti, the most 
inﬂuential political periodical in today’s Finland. The editor Tapani Ruokanen 
writes: “Our nation was born long before Finland gained political independ-
ence. It emerged from history: from the collective experiences of the people, 
common language, culture, values.” (Ruokanen 1996: 3, my translation.) 
Ruokanen’s idea of the immemorial Finnish nation is monolingual and cul-
turally homogeneous. As such, it can be juxtaposed with the similar image 
portrayed by Zachris Topelius, albeit that for Topelius – rallying for ‘one 
nation, two languages’ instead of ‘one nation, one language’ – Finland was 
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a multilingual instead of a monolingual country. According to Topelius, the 
Finnish nation had existed since the dawn of history, because God united the 
people living in Finland into one nation, and God has kept them together even 
though they speak different languages (Topelius 1985 [1875]: 17–18).
Ruokanen’s perspective distinguishes between the historical foundation 
of the nation and the political independence of the state, but still it implies 
that the historical foundation of the nation led to political independence. Es-
pecially after Finland became an independent state (1917) and nationalistic 
history writing gained special force, the history and prehistory of Finland 
and the Finns came to be conceived of as a teleological narrative of a nation 
that had for centuries determinably moved towards political independence 
(Tommila 1983: vii; Engman 1999: 169; cf. Kalela 1993: 38).
The teleological narrative about the Finnish-speaking Finns’ road to in-
dependence has also yielded an interpretation that Finland, because of its 
successful ethno-nationalist struggle, provides an apt model to be followed 
by other nations and ethnic minorities that lack a written history but aspire 
towards cultural and/or political independence. These populations mainly 
include the Finno-Ugric ‘kindred peoples’ in Russia, but the model is also 
said to apply to the making of states and national cultures in Asia and Africa. 
The idea was developed by Lauri Honko (see e.g. Honko 1980c: 42, 61) and 
adopted soon afterwards by a number of other scholars (see e.g. Hurskainen 
1992). It also comes forward strongly in one of Honko’s last articles:
New nations wanted to have a history of their own, but its ingredients were 
not to be found in the documents kept by the conqueror. Other resources 
were needed, including folk poetry. In a sense, the story of Finland began 
to be carried out in many African and Asian countries, but while the Finns 
had a century’s time to build up a cultural foundation for independence, a 
state in Africa or Asia only had up to two decades at its disposal. (Honko 
2002: 7, my translation.)
Since it is not speciﬁed which countries in Africa and Asia have carried out 
‘the story of Finland’, this is not a call for a comparative analysis in politi-
cal development. Instead, the purpose appears to be to present Finland as a 
model of principle. The idea to be modeled is that the Finns – meaning the 
Finnish-speakers – lacked written history and therefore have “discovered 
their past through folklore”, as William Wilson phrased it. Such a notion 
has found general acceptance, since a great number of present-day Finn-
ish folklore scholars explicitly share and reiterate it.19 Its popularity is by 
no means surprising as it basically repeats one of the fundamental tenets of 
the study of oral tradition, as articulated by Jan Vansina: “Where there is 
no writing, or almost none, oral traditions must bear the brunt of historical 
reconstruction.” (Vansina 1985: 199.) Yet, when applied to Finland and its 
history of nation making, the application of this idea argues that ethnogra-
phy on folk traditions has provided the Finns the necessary foundation for 
a national cultural identity, which has then supported the building up of a 
political identity. Folklore thus compensates for the lack of written (national) 
history, and folkloric collections in archives and museums provide national 
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symbols of unity and character as well as sources of historical knowledge 
and political legitimization.
The logic behind the suggested global application of the ‘Finnish model’ 
comes from the wider Western notion that the political independence and 
decolonization of Third World countries in the mid-20th century has followed 
– and is expected to follow – the Herderian models allegedly employed in 
many of the European nation-states in the 19th century (e.g. Wilson 1998: 443). 
Such a notion does not merely point to the European origins of nationalism 
and nation-state making, but appears to locate Europe as the source of moder-
nity and democracy as well as the model for legitimate state membership and 
civilized political cohesion. It also provides Finnish folklorists with an export 
product on a global scale: inherent know-how on the collecting and organ-
izing of folklore in tradition archives and on the textual practices of making 
folklore collections into tokens and monuments of national patrimony.
The geopolitical charge of such a role may be compared with that of 19th-
century Greek folklorists. As discussed by Michael Herzfeld, the nationalists 
in Greece in the 19th century, among them those who created the discipline of 
folklore, searched for traces of ancient heritage in order to obtain historical 
justiﬁcation and intellectual reinforcement for nation building. This had a 
clear geopolitical aspect to it, as the search aimed at providing the independ-
ent Greek nation-state proof of direct descent in the Hellenic tradition and a 
corresponding role in European civilization (Herzfeld 1982). The geopolitical 
nature of this identiﬁcation has also been elaborated by Jonathan Friedman, 
who has discussed how Greece was identiﬁed in the expanding polity and 
economy of Western Europe as the legitimate ancestor, and as such, the em-
bodiment of the essence of European modernity (Friedman 1994b: 122).
When we compare the neo-Hellenic nationalization of Greece with na-
tion building in the Nordic countries, we can observe that Greece was a 
periphery seen with symbolic signiﬁcance in the construction of the center. 
The Nordic countries have also been incorporated into the expanding West 
as peripheries, but with much less symbolic value in the making of Europe 
– except as modernity’s exotic edges and more recently, in an attempt to re-
deﬁne the periphery, in the role of promoting the social democratic welfare 
state, ‘modern’ gender roles, moderate class distinctions and transparency 
in public policies and decision-making. The modernization of these coun-
tries, especially Finland and Norway – which, unlike Sweden and Denmark, 
have never been European super-powers on any scale – has manifested a 
geopolitical perspective emerging from their peripheral and symbolically 
less signiﬁcant position. Accordingly, their nationalism carries elements 
that are indicative of a tendency to deﬁne selfhood as more or less distinct 
from European-ness and Western modernity. The relatively strong academic 
status of traditional folkloristics – unlike in Sweden, the most modern of the 
modern Nordic states (see Löfgren 1993b) – also bears witness to the ways 
in which modernity is produced in these countries within particular geopo-
litical conﬁgurations.
As far as the role of folklore studies in these conﬁgurations is concerned, 
the Finnish, Nordic or European practices may be compared for example to 
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Latin America. According to Néstor García Canclini, “many folkloric studies 
in Latin America were born through the same impulses that gave rise to them 
in Europe; on the one hand, the need to root the formation of new nations 
in their identity of their past; on the other hand, the Romantic inclination to 
rescue popular sentiments in the face of the Enlightenment and liberal cos-
mopolitanism” (García Canclini 1995: 150). García Canclini acknowledges 
that Latin America adopted a ‘Finnish model’ in folklore scholarship and in 
the apprehension of the popular as tradition. As a consequence, a vast body 
of empirical knowledge has been produced about “ethnic groups and their 
cultural expressions: religiosity, rituals, medicine, ﬁestas, and handicrafts. In 
many works a profound interpenetration with the Indian and mestizo world 
can be seen, an effort to give it a place within national culture.” (García 
Canclini 1995: 149.) But García Canclini sees a major problem concerning 
the scientiﬁc quality of this European trajectory:
The inﬂuence of the Finnish school on folklorists – under the slogan 
‘Leave theory behind; what is important is to collect’ – promoted a 
ﬂat empiricism in the cataloging of materials, the analytical treatment 
of information, and a poor contextual interpretation of the facts, even 
among the most conscientious authors. Therefore, most of the books on 
traditional handicrafts, ﬁestas, poetry, and music enumerate and exalt 
popular products without locating them in the logic present in social 
relations. (García Canclini 1995: 151.)
This quotation suggests that there is much more to the global politics of 
folklore than the narrative of Finland and its study of folklore as a universal 
model for postcolonial nation making. At the same time, it may be necessary 
to emphasize that it is not necessarily my purpose to object to the political 
logics of folkloristic discourse within nationalism. Yet, the constructed char-
acter of such logics calls for a more precise analysis of the ways in which na-
tional histories are created, how the nation is projected into its own prehistory 
and how particular conﬁgurations of center–periphery relations are created, 
transmitted and maintained – for example, in the context of the geopolitical 
and security political interests of the state. Instead of conceptualizing history 
as a narrative with a plot, regardless of how patriotic or morally appealing 
that might be, I seek to examine the social and political dynamics in which 
selections are made as to what counts as history or ‘roots’, whose history that 
is, and what arguments are employed to make the link between the present 
and the imagined past. Instead of merely stating that nationalist intellectuals 
were ‘in search of their roots’ or for ‘a better understanding of the self’, we 
can examine how certain landscapes and social practices (especially when 
they lie across the national borders) are appropriated into histories of the 
intellectual elites, projected ideologically onto those that come to constitute 
the ‘people’ for such elites, and are conceptualized as sites of their ancestry 
and heritage. Research into heritage politics and the study of political men-
talities have a common task in investigating what sort of cultural models are 
being employed for such processes of thought and argumentation.
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Folk Tradition as ‘People’s’ Culture
In making links between language, nation, history and cultural identity, the 
19th-century – originally Swedish-speaking – national movement employed 
a variety of representations of Finnish-language folk tradition and peasant 
culture. Many of them continue to be used in national symbolism and rhetoric 
today to denote the national heritage of the (Finnish-speaking) Finns. Yet, 
despite the fact that the Herderian perspective presupposes a decisive role 
for folk tradition in the constitution of the nation, the extent to which such 
representations of the national have actually contributed to Finnish nation 
building and especially to the country’s political independence is a matter of 
debate. The signiﬁcance and political force of folkloric national symbolism 
tends to be overemphasized by those who participate in the production of 
such symbols and who assign themselves, also in the name of scholarship, 
to publicly persuade of their meaning.20
It is undeniable that the attempts to consolidate Finnishness characterized 
the development of Finnish society in the 19th century. Yet, the extent to which 
Finland’s relation to the Russian Empire was that of a victim is open for 
discussion. Matti Klinge has stressed that the national culture of the Grand 
Duchy of Finland was built in the spirit of loyalty to the Russian Emperor, 
not of protest (see e.g. Klinge 1988a, 1997). Anti-revolutionary conserva-
tism was exempliﬁed by the stronghold of folklore collecting, the Finnish 
Literature Society (see Klinge 1988b; cf. Sulkunen 2004: 22). Emperor Alex-
ander II in fact supported the Fennoman movement, partially as a reward for 
loyalty shown in Finland for Russia during the Crimean War in the 1850s 
and partially as a means to ward off political and ideological inﬂuence from 
Sweden. The ideology of Scandinavism and the Swedish anti-Russian senti-
ments were regarded as a much bigger threat in Russia than Finnish interest 
in promoting the Finnish language (e.g. Liikanen 1995: 103). The latter was 
actually seen as providing a barrier to the consolidation of the former, as far 
as Finland was concerned (Skyttä & Skyttä 1981: 212). Throughout the 19th 
century, the Fennoman nationalists consented to the power of the Emperor, 
while the mainly Swedish-speaking liberals, who opposed the Fennoman 
nationalists especially for their anti-Swedish language program, spoke for 
strict constitutionalism and were in favor of economic and religious liberties 
(Tiilikainen 1998: 127–131, 142–145).21
The construction of Finnishness and Finnish nation-state identity in the 
19th century, especially towards the end of that century, reﬂected a general 
opposition to the censorship policies imposed on Finnish political life by the 
Russian Empire. As a consequence, many popular images of threat against 
Finnish sovereignty continue to be located across the country’s eastern border. 
Yet, as far as the future and social position of the Finnish language and its 
speakers is concerned, an even more decisive factor has been its relation to 
the position of the Swedish language and its speakers in the Finnish territory. 
Discussion on this relationship has continued to ﬂourish to this day.
It was characteristic of the autonomous Finnish state in the 19th century that, 
instead of political institutions being in the hands of those who represented 
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the Russian Empire and the highest political power in it, the Finnish state was 
administered by a Swedish-speaking elite. The laws that had kept Swedish 
as the ofﬁcial language after the establishment of the Grand Duchy granted 
this status. The Swedish speakers made up the most active section of popula-
tion in the nationalist movement (later known as the Fennoman movement) 
of the 1840s and 1850s. On the other side of the great social division within 
the autonomous state were the ‘people’, who for the nationalist Fennomans 
appeared as a distinct group of mostly uneducated Finnish speakers. They 
constituted the majority of the population.
The mutual relationship between these two population groups and so-
cial classes was determined by a number of factors. Risto Alapuro (1997a: 
18–19, 1999: 113–114) emphasizes that since the hegemonic position of the 
elite was not based on land ownership, the elite depended upon the support 
of the ‘people’ in order to secure not only its own cultural and political he-
gemony but also the state and its political institutions against the assimila-
tion policies of the Russian Empire. This also meant that the elite, instead 
of executing the politics of oppression, had to be attentive to the demands 
of the landowning peasants.
Especially for J. V. Snellman, the making of the Finnish nation meant the 
political integration of Swedish speakers and Finnish speakers, as well as that 
of the different social classes within the territorial unit. As state administra-
tors, the Swedish-speaking elite identiﬁed with the state and saw it as their 
political task to unite with the ‘people’. This identiﬁcation had at least two 
political goals. The ﬁrst was to make the Finnish-speaking sections of the 
population loyal to the state and yield from them political legitimacy to those 
in charge of state administration (Alapuro & Stenius 1987; Alapuro 1999). 
The second was to better secure the unit’s political institutions from potential 
integration with the rest of the Russian Empire (Alavuotunki 1990: 9–10). 
The latter aspect was also stressed by Yrjö Koskinen (Rommi 1980: 313).
As pointed out by Alapuro and Stenius (1987), the adoption of the ma-
jority’s language (Finnish) as the state language was regarded as the most 
productive means to achieve these ends. This entailed turning against the 
hegemony of Swedish-language culture and the power position of the Swed-
ish speakers in society. The ‘people’, on the other hand, had to be endowed 
with political power, their level of education and civilization had to be raised, 
and their language had to be developed to meet the requirements of a future 
state language, a language of civilization.
The mostly Swedish-speaking Fennoman nationalists constructed nation-
hood with an enlightenment project that took, in the spirit of both Herder 
and Hegel, a symbolic turn to the ‘people’. The people’s culture – especially 
orally transmitted folk poetry – was appropriated to speak at the same time 
for both the long and ancient history of the national and the potentiality of 
Finnish as a modern language of literature and civilization. This argumen-
tative role was a crucial basis for the eventual establishing of the sphere of 
folk tradition as well as its research, collecting and public display as some 
of the central symbolic elements in the Finnish civic religion and the con-
solidation of national loyalties. Folk tradition served both history and the 
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future. Still, the elite would not replace their cultural achievements with the 
‘people’s culture’ that they were elevating to national signiﬁcance. No effort 
was made to preserve or continue folk traditions where these existed. Instead, 
a nationalizing discourse was created that constructed and reconstructed an-
tiquity for a markedly modern purpose. The educated nationalists documented 
folklore and put its representations – texts, material objects, architecture – in 
the service of the interrelated projects of nation making and the production 
of modernity: to speak for the nation and the national as well as to speak for 
the ‘people’ in the national and political sense of the word. ‘Tradition’ thus 
received its meaning in the context of producing modernity, in the making of 
modern political culture, as part of the modern discourses on society, state, 
class and national integration and the nature of modernity.
Here, folkloristic images came to serve both the national and the interna-
tional marketing of the country. The most important product in this regard 
was the Kalevala epic that Lönnrot compiled from Finnish-Karelian folk 
poetry. In addition to becoming the Finnish national epic and gradually one 
of the country’s most distinctive domestic symbols, its publication in 1835 
was also acknowledged in literary circles abroad and contributed to making 
the concept of Finland internationally known. The epic was soon translated 
– in part or in full – into some of the major European languages (for a com-
plete list, see Anttonen & Kuusi 1999: 151–165). In the latter part of the 
19th century, many Finnish products in ﬁne arts, crafts, modern industry and 
commerce were strongly embedded with folkloristic symbolism in name 
and/or style (see Anttonen & Kuusi 1999: 290–297). Finland’s participa-
tion in World Exhibitions also became instrumental in this (see Smeds 1996; 
MacKeith & Smeds 1993). The political argument in the displays, especially 
abroad, was that Finland was a nation of its own, regardless of the fact that 
it was part of the Russian Empire. This was in line with the constitutionalist 
conception – which was much disputed especially in Russia – that ‘in the 
law of nations’ Finland was a state that was in a union with Russia (Tiilikai-
nen 1998: 129).
In addition to drawing categorical boundaries towards Russia, nationalistic 
symbolism was employed to construct Finnishness as distinct from two other 
major directions. These were Swedishness (of Sweden) as a spatial Other, and 
medieval Catholicism as a temporal Other, both of which had been present 
in the country’s medieval history that now came to represent a non-national 
element. Under the leadership of Yrjö Koskinen, Fennoman nationalists, 
formally organized as the Finnish Party since 1872, chose to foreground the 
symbolic signiﬁcance of ‘Finnish’ elements in the country’s documented but 
‘foreign’ history. This trend contributed to the growing notion that nationally 
signiﬁcant Finnish culture is mainly constituted by the history and culture of 
the Finnish speakers. Although the famous slogan ‘Let us be Finns’ by the 
Swedish-speaking nationalist activists in the early 1800s was meant to unite 
the heterogeneous elements of the population under a single national identity, 
it came to symbolize the aspirations for a culture that would be recognized 
as being founded on ‘Finnish’ elements only. For Koskinen, it would also 
require the elimination of bilingualism (Rommi 1980: 307).
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However, despite the Fennoman project of making only ‘Finnish’ ele-
ments stand for the national, Finnish society in the 19th century continued to 
develop and strengthen its autonomous status as a nation-state in ways that 
were not all ‘Finnish’ in the Fennoman sense of the term. Finland had inher-
ited a number of social and political institutions from the Swedish rule. Teija 
Tiilikainen, among others, has emphasized that when the Finnish provinces 
were annexed to the Russian Empire and made into a Grand Duchy, “the focal 
political principles of the Swedish era were handed down in the structures 
of the administration and legislation that Finland was entitled to maintain” 
(Tiilikainen 1998: 120). These structures included the constitutional status 
of the Lutheran Church and faith, granted in the Porvoo Diet in 1809. The 
class structure dominated by extensive peasant land ownership was another 
legacy of the Swedish political and social system (Alapuro 1997a, 1999). 
Similarly, Max Engman has argued that
[t]he emphasis on Finnish language, folklore, history and symbols should 
not (...) overshadow the fact that Yrjö-Koskinen and his followers wanted 
to preserve the central institutions of the Swedish period: autonomy, 
laws, judicial system, social structure, Lutheran faith and educational 
traditions; concerning such matters, there was no Finnish alternative. 
(Engman 1999: 169.)
This demonstrates that the ‘Finnish alternatives’ in history, literature and folk 
tradition – meaning mainly the cultural practices (non- or semi-Christian 
religious beliefs, verbal arts, agricultural means and tools, vernacular archi-
tecture, etc.) of the rural Finnish-speaking population – did not, in precise 
terms, lay the foundation for national culture or the eventual political inde-
pendence. Rather, folkloric symbolism served in the production of politically 
preferred distinctions and that way contributed to the consolidation of the 
already existing notion that Finland (as declared by Emperor Alexander I in 
1809) constituted a nation of its own. Since the constitutional status of the 
autonomous Grand Duchy was a matter of dispute with the representatives 
of the Imperial administration (see Jussila 1987, 1999), Finnish nation build-
ing was comprised of actions that were to strengthen the country’s separate 
identity within the Empire and make its rather abstract nationness more 
concrete. This concretization included a set of representations that could be 
jointly labeled national culture and/or national literature. The role that Finn-
ish-language folk tradition had in this was to provide such representations.
In this discourse, the political institutions that represented documented 
and factual historical continuity did not carry the necessary ideological 
signiﬁcance in the making of ‘Finnish’ national symbols. Such historical 
continuity was to be found elsewhere, in the culture of the Finnish-speaking 
‘folk’, not in the culture of those in search of the ‘folk’. The allegedly ancient 
culture of the folk came to stand for ancestry and heritage in a national sense, 
while the historical continuities of the country’s political institutions were 
denied this function in national rhetorics. A distinction was drawn between 
the traditions of the state and the traditions of the nation, as ‘national tradi-
tion’ came to refer to folkloric symbolism concerning the non-Christian or 
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semi-Christian and syncretistic religious beliefs, verbal lore and vernacular 
architecture of the rural Finnish-speaking population.
Still, the value of the folkloric representations was not only in their refer-
ence to history, ancestry and heritage. Even more important was the emerg-
ing notion and belief that such constructions of history and heritage could 
prove that Finnish speakers, too, can contribute to ‘national life’ and modern 
civilization. Because of this agenda, the central goal in the discourse on 
folk tradition was not its preservation as indigenous culture. Neither was it 
the promotion of cultural diversity. Instead, folklore was nationalized and 
made into a metonymy of a culturally homogenizing and politically unify-
ing national community. Oral tradition was transformed through folkloristic 
collecting and its entextualization practices into ‘pre-literate’ literature, into 
written epics and other types of published collections – and eventually, into 
consumables of national tradition, history and heritage.
It is worth emphasizing that for Snellman, the value of folk tradition was 
not in its alleged capacity to manifest a ‘natural’ and therefore an unhistorical 
nation, as was argued by Herder. Instead, the value of folk tradition was in 
its potential to indicate the presence of a national spirit, which he considered 
to lead individuals to make “moral and rational social contracts” (Karkama 
1999: 148) and thus promote national development and civilization (see 
also Karkama 2001: 188, 200–201). In addition to pointing to nationalized 
antiquity, the value of folk tradition lay thus in its capacity to promote and 
enhance modernity and a modern civil society. We could therefore argue, in 
present-day terms, that Hegel’s idea of Volksgeist contained for Snellman 
more historical and political agency than Herder’s cultural concept of the 
Volk. The former was seen as a force for historical change, while the lat-
ter, as discussed by Wilson (1976: 28–29), conveyed the idea that national 
characters – best expressed in language and folk poetry that are allegedly 
unspoiled by foreign inﬂuence – indicate cultural and political units that are 
to be defended against outside inﬂuences.
For the later generations of Fennomans, the use of folk tradition, such as the 
Kalevala epic, continued to stand for the antiquarian foundation of national 
civilization. The latter half of the 19th century was the period in which the 
study of folklore was established as an independent branch of scholarship, but 
the leadership in the Fennoman movement only saw symbolic and political 
value in the enterprise; representations of folklore served to legitimate both 
the national movement and the national polity (Sulkunen 2004: 204–205, 
216–218). At the same time, the use of folkloric symbolism increased in a 
variety of organizational activities and commercial contexts (see Anttonen 
& Kuusi 1999: 290–297).
This was not, however, the only way in which folklore was political. Since 
folk tradition and the Kalevala were seen as coming from the ‘people’, the 
purpose of the use of folkloric elements as national symbols was linked to 
the argument that the Fennomans as a political party spoke on behalf of the 
people, and that they – better than anyone else – represented the people’s will 
(see Liikanen 1995: 170–171, 280–282 et passim; Liikanen 1997; Sulkunen 
2004: 169–171). Folklore functioned as a means to construct symbolically 
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and ideologically the ‘people’, who to a gradually increasing extent came 
to be regarded as the democratic holders of representational power in the 
modernizing state and the emerging civil society. Because of this civic-ter-
ritorial principle in constructing nationhood, folkloric symbols became an 
issue in the competition over political representation, in speaking for and on 
behalf of people and social classes.
Language and Culture Point to the East
One of the basic reasons why the Kalevala epic was soon after its publica-
tion raised to the status of a national symbol was that the history read from it, 
supported by a historical interpretation of the rest of the folk poetry, served 
as an instrument, in the words of Robert Foster (1991: 241), “for uncovering 
and recovering an authentic and ancient deﬁnition of the national community 
as a distinct people”. Yet, in addition to speaking for the (Finnish-speaking) 
Finns’ distinctiveness as a people, it provided support for the emerging myth 
of origin that would present Finland as an innate national unit. In order to 
promote this myth, Lönnrot made the epic into a narrative about mythical 
incidents that he saw as being of historical importance. For him – and eventu-
ally for many others – they spoke of Finnish and Karelian national antiquity. 
In this antiquity, prior to the advent of Christianity and the establishment 
of Swedish rule, the Finns had constituted one tribe comparable to a nation 
– pure and authentic in the Fennoman sense of Finnishness. In accordance 
with the dominant philological methods of his time, Lönnrot created a textual 
representation of that allegedly original state by removing what he regarded 
as later inﬂuences.
Yet, even though Finland was regarded as a nation of old, Fennoman na-
tionalists considered it unfulﬁlled in terms of its ‘real’ and original nature. 
Geographic extensions were one aspect of this. The Greater Finland ideology, 
inﬂuential since the 1860s and especially during the 1920s and 1930s, aimed 
to include all Finnish-speaking areas within Finland’s political boundaries 
(see e.g. Sihvo 1973: 352; Wilson 1976: 137–161). Today, the popular re-
sentment against the Swedish language among many Finnish speakers in-
dicates a tendency to regard the development of the national position of the 
Finnish language as unﬁnished and incomplete. Despite its ofﬁcial status as 
a domestic language, and the international reputation of Finnish bilingual-
ism as a model for other countries with linguistic minorities (especially for 
the minority groups, see Saari 1999: 273), Swedish continues to be viewed 
as a sign of foreignness in the Finnish-speaking nation. Examples of this 
can be encountered on a daily basis. According to Mirja Saari, a number of 
opinion polls show that one in every third Finnish speaker has reservations 
about Finland-Swedes or the status of the Swedish language in Finland 
(Saari 1999: 272).
Thus, rather ironically, although it was the Fennoman-minded Swedish 
speakers who were the original agents of Finnish nation making, with a pur-
pose of integrating the two linguistic groups of Swedish and Finnish speakers 
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into one national culture and create equality between the two languages, the 
Fennoman nationalist idea about Finland came to concern mainly the Finnish 
language and its speakers – and in many ways exclude the Swedish language 
and its speakers. In her recent history of the Finnish Literature Society, the 
stronghold of the Fennoman movement, Irma Sulkunen locates the beginning 
of this process in the early 1870s, when Snellman withdrew from his position 
as the president of the Society and Yrjö Koskinen’s more strictly Finnish-
oriented language policy gained hegemony (Sulkunen 2004: 169ff.).
Another important factor in this development was the scientiﬁc discovery 
of Finno-Ugric language kinship, which became an established linguistic 
category by the early 19th century (see Korhonen 1986: 28–33). This dis-
covery gradually outdated the scholarly attempts at locating the origin of 
Finnish in the ‘holy languages’ of Hebrew, Greek and Latin (see Korhonen 
1986: 25–27). Instead of the Europe of ancient civilizations, the history of the 
Finnish language now pointed east, to Russia, Siberia and Asia. This was not 
only a scientiﬁc reorientation, but marked the emergence of new language 
myths of primordiality.
In addition to becoming a dividing element in the relationship between the 
Swedish and Finnish languages in Finland, and by extension also elsewhere 
in northern Europe, the discovery of the kinship of Finno-Ugric languages 
resulted in the development of the academic ﬁelds of linguistics and ethnog-
raphy, in which the relationship of Finnish language and culture with the rest 
of the Finno-Ugric family of languages was studied comparatively and was 
further consolidated. According to Kaisa Häkkinen, the linguistic kinship is 
the cornerstone of research on Finnish prehistory (Häkkinen 1997: 333–334). 
One of the leading pioneers in this development was Matthias Alexander 
Castrén, whose goal was to prove that there were historical-genetic relations 
between the Finno-Ugric peoples – even though it would mean, as he wrote to 
Snellman in 1846, “we are the offspring of those despised Mongols” (Korho-
nen 1986: 60). Indeed, as Castrén had feared, his ﬁndings, which established 
for a long time the idea that the Finnish nation had its cultural cradle in the 
east, contributed to the eventual rise of racial theories about the ‘Mongolian’ 
character of the Finns towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning 
of the 20th (see Kemiläinen 1998: 65–66 et passim).
The linguistic discovery and the subsequent cultural interest in the popu-
lations speaking Finno-Ugric languages did not merely concern historical 
developments. In addition, it came to be linked to emerging language-ex-
trinsic myths (see Law 1998) that established preferred relations between 
particular ethnicities and nationalities. Among other things, these linguistic 
and cultural relations also sparked an interest in the idea of a pan-Finnic 
tribe, constituted by all people speaking Finnish and related languages. For 
Castrén, this served to indicate that the Finns are not alone in this world but 
“we are in kinship relations to at least one-sixth of the human population” 
(Snellman 1931: 119, my translation). In 1924 the right-wing nationalist 
Academic Karelia Society counted that there were 19 million of ‘us’, that is, 
members of ‘the Finno-Ugric tribe’. This bears witness to the inclination to 
conceptualize the linguistic category as a political entity.
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Today, the militaristic aspirations for the expansion of Finnish political 
territory, kindled by the Greater Finland ideology, seem like past phenom-
ena. There is a growing trend to “avoid any inference that the present-day 
speakers of Finno-Ugrian languages have more in common with each other 
in terms of an unbroken, vertical inheritance of culture than they do with their 
neighbors of several centuries who may not speak Finno-Ugrian languages 
but with whom they have had close and regular contacts” (Branch 1993: 36). 
Still, a tendency continues – also among scholars – to place the origins of 
Finnish ancestry, national heritage, mentality and even genes in the assumed 
ancient origins of the Finnish language and the prehistory of the speakers of 
Finno-Ugric languages. In this discourse, the terms ‘ancestor’ and ‘forefather’ 
tend to be reserved for the Finno-Ugric elements in the history of the Finnish 
language and Finnish religious beliefs.22 Cultural similarities with the other 
populations speaking Finno-Ugric languages denote family relations, while 
cultural similarities across linguistic categories denote borrowings – foreign 
inﬂuences instead of inherited tradition. A difference is drawn between a 
heritage of civilization and a heritage of culture. The spread of (Western) 
civilization appears as historical change, while (Finno-Ugric) heritage denotes 
an unmediated descent and inheritance of belief and knowledge.
Such rhetoric of ancestry undermines the role and signiﬁcance of other his-
torical sources in the constitution of the Finnish language and the population 
of Finland. Apparently, the political value of this rhetoric is to function as a 
means of producing national unity that homogenizes the diverse origins of the 
population into an image of a single origin, all having the same forefathers 
and ancestors in a cultural sense, if not in biology. At the same time, there is 
a different strategy for creating a sense of national unity across the linguistic 
division. For example, Elias Lönnrot, both in his work and his personality, is 
widely celebrated for his exceptional ability to mediate between the Finnish 
speakers and the Swedish speakers, as well as between the uneducated ‘folk’ 
and the educated elite (e.g. Karkama 2001: 88). The Finno-Ugric links, how-
ever, appear to exist without a need for such mediation by individual agency, 
even though, as put by Lauri Honko, “The distance between Finnish and 
Khanty approximates that between Swedish and Sanskrit” (Honko 1995: 139). 
The “fragile bond” or distant afﬁnity perceived between Finnish and related 
languages, as well as the people who speak these languages, by no means 
negate the politically charged and morally grounded desires to speak on behalf 
of the Finno-Ugric minorities in Russia and support their “battle for ethnic 
survival” (Honko 1995: 140ff.). On the contrary, such desires – some of them 
based on a rather rigid distinction made between Finno-Ugric and Russian 
identities among these populations – serve to indicate the presence of active 
mediation between the cultural practices of the Finno-Ugric peoples and the 
Finnish discourses on the heritage of culture. Links are discursively asserted 
especially when the cultural traditions of a Finno-Ugric population and the 
research on these serve as sources for experiencing symbolic union and com-
mon belonging (see e.g. Siikala 1997: 58–60; Siikala 2000: 57, 76–77).
Regarding the political charge of Finnish research on the populations 
speaking Finno-Ugric languages in Russia, Timo Salminen has argued in 
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his recent dissertation that in the late 19th century, Russia and Siberia were 
viewed as “Finland’s scientiﬁc lands of conquest”. According to Salminen, 
this constituted a parallel to “West European colonialist policies, even though 
the Finns felt they were involved in recording and gathering the heritage of 
related peoples in the process of extinction” (Salminen 2003: 276; cf. Pimiä 
2003: 82). It remains to be debated, however, whether this is an either-or or 
both-and issue, and whether this approach in any way characterizes present-
day Finnish ethnographic research activities across the Russian border (see 
e.g. Survo 2001).
Another consequence of the establishing of the Finno-Ugric language 
relationship since the late 18th century was a stronger link between a Finn 
and a Finnish speaker. For educated Finns in the 18th century, a Finn was a 
person who was born and raised in Finland, regardless of whether he spoke 
Finnish, Swedish or Latin (see e.g. Manninen 2000: 81–82, 88–89; Man-
ninen 2002: 12). The same applied to the upper ranks of civil servants in the 
Grand Duchy of Finland in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, among whom, 
according to Kristiina Kalleinen, nationality was not linked with any particu-
lar language (Kalleinen 2002). For Elias Lönnrot, however, the term ‘Finn’ 
designated all those who speak the Finnish language, regardless of whether 
they lived in Finland, Russia, Sweden or Norway (Sihvo 1969: 39). Accord-
ingly, when the political unit of the autonomous Grand Duchy established its 
cultural identity, and the educated elite of the Fennoman nationalists made 
their symbolic turn to the ‘people’, the nomination of the Finns came to have 
two meanings. On the one hand, it inclusively denoted both the Finnish and 
the Swedish speakers as common nationals, and on the other, the Finnish 
speakers exclusively. The national history and antiquity sought after in folk 
tradition was mainly provided by the culture of the Finnish speakers, those 
that were ‘ethnically’, ‘genetically’ or ‘ancestrally’ Finns. The Swedish 
speakers would establish their own folk tradition, which would not speak for 
the nation but only for the distinct culture (and more recently, for the ethnic 
identity) of the Swedish speakers.
History and Periphery as Prerequisites for a Nation
When examining the role of folk tradition in the symbolic production of the 
Finnish nation, we need to address the methodological question concerning 
the relationship between historical reconstruction and history as a present-
day construction of the past. In addition to being sensitive to the political 
nature of the concept of history, we must alert ourselves to the intertextual 
links that the discourses on history share with discourses on the modern, such 
as the politics of modernity. What constitutes history? How is history made 
an issue of ownership? How are given reconstructions of the past linked to 
preferred cultural and political relationships and ideological constructions 
of modernity?
Some historians in Finland have recently suggested that instead of the 
Finnish state being established as an end result of a successful nationalist 
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(or ethno-nationalist) struggle, as the Romantic Nationalist narrative would 
have it, the state was formed ﬁrst, practically as a ‘gift’ from Emperor Alex-
ander I (see e.g. Klinge 1997; Engman 1999). This perspective follows the 
constitutionalist tradition of political thought that has argued, especially since 
the 1860s, that Finland was annexed to Russia in the form of a province but 
became a state through a mutually binding contract made in 1809 between 
the Finnish Estates and the Emperor of Russia (Tiilikainen 1998: 128–129). 
Forming the nation and establishing for it a distinctive cultural and political 
identity – which could then be used to consolidate the unit’s nature as a state 
– were some of the new state and nation’s initial political agendas.
In a similar vein, Risto Alapuro has pointed out that the national movement 
in Finland, unlike many other such movements in Europe, did not need to 
argue for a state-unit because it already existed (Alapuro 1997a: 18). What it 
did need to argue for, though, was history. History was considered the mark 
of civilization for a modern nation, and in Hegelian thinking national history, 
especially the heroic age in its antiquity, served to indicate the presence of 
the national spirit, which would guide peoples in their state formation.
In addition to the progression to nationhood from a heroic age in antiquity, 
history meant the presence and function of political institutions. In an evo-
lutionary framework, peoples without history in the ‘higher’ national sense 
of the term were regarded as standing on a lower step of development. As 
stated by M. A. Castrén in his inaugural speech on being appointed to the 
chair of Finnish language in 1851, ethnography was the new science for the 
study of their history (Castrén 1857: 8; see also Vuorela 1977: 20; Isaksson 
1997: 61; Pentikäinen 1997: 233; Isaksson 2001: 205). Instead of progression 
to nationhood, history in their context meant (evidence of) the continuation 
of immemorial oral traditions and traditional practices.
Finland as a ‘Finnish’ conception was in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century 
considered by many intellectuals to lack a history of its own. One of these 
intellectuals was Zachris Topelius the younger, who in a public lecture in 
1843 stated that a national history would require the self-consciousness of 
nationality and the existence of judicial and political institutions. According to 
Topelius (1845: 214–217), the Finnish people did not have these before 1809. 
Almost two decades earlier, the historian and philosopher J. J. Tengström 
had presented similar ideas but with reference to both Swedish and Finnish 
speakers (see Tengström 1931: 311–312). Even though Topelius changed 
his opinion and in many of his later literary works set out to depict ‘Finnish’ 
elements in pre-1809 history, the idea of the Finnish people – meaning the 
Finnish-speakers – lacking their own history remained inﬂuential. It is evi-
dent, for example, in the above-mentioned conceptualization of ethnography 
as a means to serve as the nation’s history writing.
It is an unquestionable fact that the collecting of folk tradition has provided 
a signiﬁcant share of cultural history where written history was lacking. In-
deed, the value of folk poetry has since the 18th century been mainly placed 
on its ability to yield information on the history and culture of the common 
people. However, since history was in 19th-century nationalism regarded as a 
major ingredient in making a people a nation, classifying the Finnish-speaking 
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Finns as a people without history in the ‘higher’ national (or Hegelian) sense 
of the term would go against the explicit political goal of making Finland 
a recognized national unit. Therefore, it was instrumental for the Hegelian-
minded Fennomans to argue that the Finns (the Finnish speakers) have a 
national spirit and are able to create a ‘national life’. In this project, ethnog-
raphy on Finnish culture – in addition to providing the history of those who 
had no history – was expected to unearth the antique layers of the nation’s 
‘childhood’. This antiquity, and the historical progression away from it, would 
then serve to legitimate the idea of Finland as a modern nation with history 
– a nation in which, in Hegelian terms, the agent-subject was the historically 
developed national spirit guiding individuals (see Karkama 1999).
Because of this political logic, Finnish ethnography and folklore collecting 
was not a mere quest for cultural survivals or the history of those without his-
tory. Neither was it a mere nostalgic project to collect emblems of tradition 
threatened to fall into oblivion, even though, as Seppo Knuuttila has pointed 
out, collectors and researchers of Finnish folklore have tended to engage in 
the rhetoric of decadence, locate themselves on the threshold of an ending 
era and witness the loss of immemorial traditions (Knuuttila 1994: 18–20). 
Despite the discourse on modernity as loss, Finnish ethnography has been 
committed to modernization, the spread of literacy and civilization, educa-
tion and science, patriotic service of the modern nation-state – and to the use 
of these qualities as means of creating distinction.
Both this modernization and the related antiquation of Finnish language 
and tradition have been processes that set themselves against Matti Klinge’s 
claim that Finnish national identity was built in the 19th century on landscape 
and poetry instead of history (e.g. Klinge 2003: 69). The romantic interest in 
landscapes and folk poetry appears to bypass and contradict history as the tem-
porality of political institutions. Still, the image of the Finnish nation, in the 
Fennoman sense, was built upon a landscape of history that was regarded as 
opening up from Finnish-language folk poetry and its representations – even 
if this image was not in all details historically accurate. The in many ways 
modern (and antique) epic that Elias Lönnrot compiled from folk poetry was 
regarded as providing the nation with a history – as if from the perspective 
of the Finnish speakers. History in this context meant the nation’s narrative 
or historical image about itself. At the same time this conveyed the idea that 
history comes in ‘national packages’, as national histories (see Wolf 1982). 
Since the Kalevala was looked upon as a narrative of a nation, as if depicting 
its genealogy in a manner familiar from Virgil’s Aeneid, its existence was 
considered to prove Finland’s nationness.
Among the many types of epics in the world, the Kalevala can be classi-
ﬁed as a traditional one since the bulk of its contents correspond to the oral 
poetry on which its literary form is based. It serves to document some of 
the traditional folk poetry of the Finnish-speaking populations. Yet, at the 
same time it is a modern epic, since one of its major functions in the society 
in which it was published was to contribute to the production of national 
discourse on the basis of its traditionality. Since it was taken to suggest that 
Finland had an antiquity in its prehistory, it actually argued for contemporary 
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Finland’s modernity. The link that it was said to create in time simultane-
ously stood for the distance between the Fennoman present and the past it 
imagined. The bygone-ness of the imagined antiquity was a central element 
in its social value, as it indicated historical movement. With antiquity in its 
past, the Finnish nation could be modern and develop further, unlike the 
peoples without history that were doomed to live in the past, in tradition, in 
absence of progress.
Such peoples were, among others, the Sámi, the Karelians and the Ingrians, 
who are both linguistic relatives and have lived on the margins of Finnish-
ness. Unlike the Sámi, both the Karelians and Ingrians were integrated into 
Finnish nation making by giving them a role in representing Finnish antiquity 
(see also Tarkka 1989; Sihvo 1973: 356–357; Survo 2001). This antiquity 
did not provide them with history in the national – or the Hegelian – sense of 
the term. While Karelians, as characterized by Topelius, are “children who 
lag behind the Finns in national development” (quoted in Sihvo 1994: 28; 
see also Castrén 1857: 1–2), the Finns have a nation that has developed into 
a state. The ‘kindred peoples’ lack what is central to the deﬁnition of Finn-
ishness: history, national development, modernity, and nation-state identity. 
Their culture points to the history of the (Finnish-speaking) Finns, but they 
are different from the Finns because they have stayed in that history.
It is noteworthy that when Topelius in 1843 gave a lecture on the question 
of whether the Finnish people have a history, he had regarded the (Finnish-
speaking) Finns as political children. According to him, the Finnish people 
mentally constituted a nationality, but in their “thousand-year political child-
hood” they were unable to turn this unit into a state (Topelius 1845: 208, my 
translation23). The (Finnish-speaking) Finns were thus seen as being under-
developed in the art of state formation. Later Topelius replaced the Finns 
with Karelians as such political children. This may be taken to speak for 
the very notion that the Fennomans vehemently opposed: that the historical 
development in the Finnish-speaking Finns’ ability for state formation was 
due to the cultural inﬂuence of the Swedish speakers, thanks to the legacy 
of the Swedish rule (see e.g. Ahtiainen & Tervonen 1996: 34; Kemiläinen 
1998: 160). In any case, Topelius emphasized that the historical progression 
of the Finns provides them with a leading position in ‘their tribe’ – that is, 
among all the peoples speaking languages related to Finnish (Tiitta 1994: 
65; see also Isaksson 2001: 203).
Indeed, when political childhood is projected onto people in the periphery, 
the people in the center begin to look more advanced. The distancing and 
temporal othering of Karelia into a periphery of modernity made Finland the 
possessor of such a periphery. Such a strategy in constructing modernity is by 
no means unique to Finland. During the last two centuries, many instances 
of international and intra-national colonialism have shown that the posses-
sion of a non-modern periphery, and the power over its deﬁnition, makes the 
possessor modern and developed – and competitive in the modern category 
of nations (see e.g. Morris-Suzuki 1998: 17–34). In other words, tradition 
is put on display as an object of a modern gaze in order to make the subject 
of the gaze appear modern and as such, the possessor of the symbolic and 
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political value of the objectiﬁed tradition. Finland is a good example of a 
discursive arena in which such displays are part of a competition over power, 
since the construction of the Finnish periphery has taken place in direct re-
lationship with competing attempts at deﬁning Finland as such a periphery. 
Timo Vihavainen gives an apt description of this:
Nineteenth-century Russian scholars rather unanimously considered 
that the Kalevala reﬂected a very primitive state of society, where larger 
administrative and military units were absent. It did not, in their opinion, 
witness to an ability to create a state in the future either. For such 
Slavophiles as A. F. Hilferding and Nikolai Danilevsky, the conclusion 
was clear: the Finns were doomed to remain under Russian domination 
because they were not able to form a state. They also believed that the 
Finns were constitutionally unable to create a great culture of their 
own, but – this they benevolently granted – they could well be used as 
‘ethnographic material’ for the Russian empire and thus contribute usefully 
to world history. (Vihavainen 1999: 120.)
This quotation shows how Russian intellectuals placed the (Finnish-speak-
ing) Finns in an ethnographic framework that would have its theoretical and 
ideological premise in a clear distinction between the peripheral character of 
its objects, the members of an ethnos, and the modern and developed char-
acter of its subjects, the ethnographers, writers and other educated observers. 
It may appear ironical, but yet perfectly characteristic for ethnography that 
this was the same role that the Finnish ethnographers and other intellectuals 
were willing to impose on the Karelians, Ingrians and other ‘kindred peoples’ 
across the Russian border. The strong interest in heritage production within 
the kinfolk ideology has not been in opposition to the often paternalistic, 
patronizing or even colonizing approach in which Finnish ethnography has 
constructed its object. Instead, it has been another element or face in it. There 
are thus close similarities between Finnish and Russian intellectuals in the 
modern construction of periphery and the discourse on the role of folk tra-
dition in conveying collective mental capacities in cultural production and 
political organization. The premises of argumentation are similar, but the 
political conclusions are quite different.
It may be necessary, however, to also consider the extent to which the 
Finnish discourse on Russian intellectuals’ patronizing attitudes is a rhetorical 
construction of a foreign threat that presents Finland as an innocent victim 
– portrayed often as a maid in danger (see Valenius 2004: 132–163). In such 
constructions, Finnish folk tradition is given a role in national defense by 
allegedly providing proof of how mistaken those people are who have ques-
tioned the cultural skills of the Finnish-speaking Finns. Vihavainen’s article 
serves as an example of the representation of the Kalevala epic as a product 
of a nation that speaks volumes for its cultural capacity:
From the point of view of the 18th-century Enlightenment, the case of 
the Finns was rather discouraging. It was possible to maintain that this 
people had, during the course of history, produced nothing remarkable. 
(…) The Kalevala, appearing in the heyday of romantic thinking, changed 
everything at a single blow. (Vihavainen 1999: 119.)
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Finland is Modern by Having History
The idea of Finland having a history denoting both antiquity and progress 
is also present in the mid-20th century folklorist Martti Haavio’s inﬂuential 
book Viimeiset runonlaulajat (‘The Last Rune Singers’), which depicts in 
highly romantic fashion Karelian and Ingrian folk poetry and its individual 
performers. The book is ﬁlled with overwhelming nostalgia for a culture in 
decadence and its last representatives, but it can be argued that Haavio’s main 
concern is not the nostalgic landscape of the dying culture per se, but the 
value that he sees in it for Finnish modernity and for Finland as a historical 
subject (see also Tarkka 1989: 244). The decadence that Haavio witnesses 
in Karelia and Ingria is not a loss for Finland as a nation-state. For Finland, 
it is a victory.
Haavio explicates this view by stating that the treasure Finland possesses 
in the folk poetry that Karelians and Ingrians have preserved for generations 
has helped Finland understand its antiquity and envisage its further historical 
development (Haavio 1985: 31, quoted also in Tarkka 1989: 244). This can 
be argued to show that even though Haavio includes the Karelian and Ingrian 
landscapes and people in the idea of Finnishness and the ‘Finnish tribe’, he 
also places them outside the modern national sphere of Finland. While Fin-
land has antiquity in its past and progress ahead, the peoples that are seen to 
embody Finland’s antiquity have only tradition – and now, in the decadence 
allegedly caused by diffusing traits of modernity and the Russiﬁcation of their 
area of inhabitance, they face the inevitable loss of this tradition. They lack 
both modernity and progress and are soon to lose tradition. History for them 
is the continuation of indigenous traditions from generation to generation, 
as well as now their eventual loss, while for Finland history is a progressive 
movement from antiquity to the future.
As for M. A. Castrén and many other Finnish ethnographers after him, 
Finland for Haavio has a history that speaks for its status as a nation-state. 
Because of this status, Finnish patriotism draws a conceptual distinction vis-
à-vis those that Finnish nationalism and the heritage political Finno-Ugric 
discourse symbolically unite. This puts the kinfolks’ tradition, which the na-
tion-state of Finland due to its development no longer has, in the role of an 
Other. One could say that it makes the kinfolk into ‘sacred Others’; signiﬁcant 
for the ancient history of the nation and its value in the sacralization of its 
mythology, but still set apart, distanced temporally and even placed on the 
same evolutionary level as nature and barbarism. (For discussions on such 
projections, see Tarkka 1989; Knuuttila 1994; Apo 199824; for the concept 
of sacred, see V. Anttonen 1996 and 2000.) Speaking of the similar exotici-
zation and mythologization of Ingrians, Arno Survo has characterized this 
aspect in Finnish ethnography as the nationalist production of a symbolic 
periphery (see Survo 2001: 26, 225–230).
In addition to making sacred peripheries, there have also been other meth-
odological ways in which ethnography and folklore collecting have served to 
prove that Finnish culture is modern by having history – history as change, 
and as such, as a token of modernization. One of the main aspects in the 
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emerging Finnish ethnography was both to study and further consolidate the 
relationship of Finnish language and culture with the rest of the Finno-Ugric 
family of languages. Comparing Finnish folk poetry with the ethnography 
on kindred peoples, M. A. Castrén concluded that Finnish poetry is abundant 
with “new materials and beliefs”. According to the scientiﬁc methodology 
he established, the only way one can acquire a clear understanding of “the 
form of life of our ancestors” is to compare “the concepts to be found in 
Finnish folk poetry” with “the concepts of inter-related ethnic groups who 
had retained the purity of their original tribal characters” (Castrén 1857: 8; 
see also Vuorela 1977: 20; V. Anttonen 1987: 42). This tenet was eventu-
ally formulated into a “theory according to which kin relationship between 
different Finno-Ugric peoples was not based only on language, but other 
cultural factors as well. The theory implied that beliefs and practices that 
still prevail among technologically and socially ‘less-developed’ other Finno-
Ugric peoples living in Russia and in Siberia can be used to shed light also 
on religious evolution among the Finns as well as among the Hungarians.” 
(V. Anttonen 2005 forthcoming.)
The perceived loss of the ‘original’ forms in Finnish culture as well as of 
its ‘tribal’ characters has created a great deal of nostalgic rhetoric, but this 
loss has also served to indicate that contemporary Finnish culture – even 
among its own Finnish-speaking ‘folk’ – had undergone historical changes 
and has, therefore, been more modern than the culture of the Finnish speakers’ 
linguistic relatives. In fact, the very act of doing ethnography and collect-
ing folklore has proved the relative modernity of the Finns, especially when 
counting in the country’s educated, Swedish-speaking elites. As I have writ-
ten in Chapter 5, oral traditions do not become nationally symbolic merely 
by existing somewhere, but through their transformation into literature and 
literary collections, through their adaptation and entextualization into mate-
rial objects of display to be preserved in nationally signiﬁcant sites, such as 
archives, museums and universities.
Finland was relatively modern as early as the mid-19th century, since the 
institutions of education and cultural documentation were able to send out 
ethnographers to make comparative analyses among the traditional ‘kinfolk’. 
They did not possess the necessary modern institutions, interests, funding or 
technology to engage in such activities. Until recently, they were not even 
expected to, as their role was to encounter the Western scholar from Finland 
in the framework of the close cultural afﬁnity established between ‘their 
tradition’ and ‘our prehistory’. The ﬁeldwork conducted by the Fennoman-
minded Uno Holmberg-Harva among the Udmurts in 1911 exempliﬁes well 
the denial of coevalness (see Fabian 1983) and the drawing of distinction. 
The ﬁeldworker’s (valid) historical interest in “unravelling the origin and 
development of early forms of religion among the peoples speaking Uralic 
languages” (V. Anttonen 2005 forthcoming) is justiﬁed by the conception that 
the Udmurts have lost their ‘own tradition’ due to the pressures of civilization 
(V. Anttonen 1987: 66). The same conception does not, however, apply to the 
ﬁeldworker himself and the national entity that he represents. Even though 
he emphasizes a close cultural afﬁnity and the existence of similar beliefs, 
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these mark a temporal difference and denote progress for those for whom the 
afﬁnity is prehistorical. Modernity is the privilege of the Westerner in search 
of links to nationalized prehistory in the landscape of non-modernity.
Anna-Leena Siikala has recently emphasized that the work of Elias 
Lönnrot and others who in the 19th century mapped Finnish language and 
cultural history must be viewed in the context of models deriving from the 
international tradition of ethnographic research expeditions (Siikala 2002b: 
6–7; Siikala 2003). Siikala’s point can well be seen as relating to one of the 
central factors that distinguish the Finns (both as Finnish speakers and as a 
national category that also includes the Swedish speakers) from the linguis-
tic relatives they study as history and, in the discourses on cultural heritage, 
symbolically identify with.
The ‘postmodern’ conclusion to be drawn from this is that if there is a na-
tionalistic or Fenno-centric ‘story of Finland’ to be promoted internationally, 
concerning the role of folk tradition in the making of the nation-state, it is 
a not a master narrative about an ethnonationalistic struggle and its victory, 
but a story that provides an account of the building up of modern democratic 
institutions, economic infrastructure, systems of comprehensive education, 
modernization of vernacular languages and the cultivation of civilization 
that, among other things, enhances and supports the practice of international 
ethnography and the related interest in the collecting of and studying repre-
sentations of folk tradition. In the history of Finnish nation making, folklore 
has contributed to the construction of modern national identity as modern 
but antiqued cultural texts. The representation of these, as culture to be lost 
in modernization but valorized as the democratic heritage of the nation’s 
Finnish speakers, has served the processes of state-making, democratiza-
tion and national uniﬁcation, but also those of national homogenization and 
the construction of ethnic and linguistic Others both within and around the 
national sphere.
The more recent process of Finland’s participation in European integration 
and the expansion of the European Union can be regarded as being consist-
ent with the country’s nationalization and modernization. The persistent 
discourse on the Finno-Ugric heritage, for example, has not translated into 
political acts or agitation against EU membership or globalization. On the 
contrary, the Finno-Ugric discourse on heritage and antiquity contributes to 
the ideological role ascribed to the category of folk tradition as proof of the 
Finns’ capability to become modern and European. This is radically different 
from the present-day situation in Hungary, where the Finno-Ugric linguistic 
theory and its cultural implications have come to be contested, especially in 
right-wing politics, as allegedly imposing on the Hungarians – ﬁrst by the 
Habsburg regime and later by the Soviets – a belief in their primitive and 
non-European origins (The Controversy n.d.; Marsovszky n.d.; Marsovszky, 
personal communication, 2 June 2004). Instead of denoting the primitive-
ness of the present-day Finns, or linking their modern culture with Siberian 
hunter-gatherer nomads, the Finno-Ugric discourse in Finland rests on the 
antiquation of that heritage, which locates its foundation in the prehistory of 
the modern Finns. Thus, instead of tying Finns to their allegedly peripheral 
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prehistory, representations of Finno-Ugric heritage discourse and mythol-
ogy serve the national project of producing modern progress and distinction 
vis-à-vis the linguistic kin across the Russian border, and accordingly, the 
allignment of the country with the European political center.
This points directly to my main argument in this book, which is that in 
folkloristic discourse, tradition has not meant indigenous practices to be 
continued, preserved or revitalized, but instead, the concept has stood for 
representations of national antiquity that are to be valorized and nostalgized 
but also to be left behind in order to have them speak for a national capacity 
for historical progress towards statehood and modernity. Tradition has stood 
for reports and representations to be used for symbolic discourses with a 
modern political agenda. These symbolic and political discourses have then 
become some of the great traditions of nationalized modernity, signifying the 
ways in which tradition as both non-modern and modern cultural production 
has become not only accessible but also thinkable through modernity.
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Notes
1  ‘Now’ is a rather relative and elusive concept. The sense of ‘modern’ requires at 
least some permanence for the sense of ‘now’, but as pointed out by Ahmed Zewail, 
the shortest measurable unit of time, a nanosecond – one billionth of a second – has 
come and gone before we ﬁnish uttering the word ‘now’ (Zewail 2002: 2).
2  The broad and even boundless territory of folklore has come to serve for many 
folklorists as evidence of the discipline’s vitality and of its central position in both 
academe and the rest of society. Some others have, however, felt that this has obscured 
the object of research (e.g. Virtanen 1993: 264). Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has 
noted that such terms as the folk group “live rhetorically”, but “are dead analytically”. 
“Attenuated to the point that folk group can refer to anyone, the notion is devoid of 
agency and analytic consequence, which is, of course, very consequential. Its sole 
purpose is to identify the enterprise as a folkloristic one.” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 
1998: 308.)
3  The transnational symbols that all nations are expected to have include the national 
anthem, the national ﬂag, the national spirit, the national song, the national instrument, 
the national ﬂower, etc. As regards the transnationalism of nationalism, it is also 
worth noting, as pointed out by Robert Foster (1991: 248) that the nation-state is a 
cultural form originally produced in Europe and then diffused throughout the world 
by processes of industrialization (see Gellner 1983), print-capitalism (see Anderson 
1983), and colonialism (see Chatterjee 1986, 1993).
4  According to the American folklorist Alan Jabbour, “The word folklore conjures up 
many things to Americans. And no wonder: it compounds two venerable English 
words.” (Jabbour 1988: 7.) During the 20th century in many non-English speaking 
countries, the term folklore replaced its diverse vernacular variants as the name of the 
academic discipline – for the apparent beneﬁt gained in international standardization. 
That this constituted a novelty can also be taken as a metacomment on the discipline 
itself, as the foreignness of the term connotes modernity and presents the discipline 
as a stately modern enterprise.
5  Although the etymology of the word ‘ecumene’ leads to the religious concept of 
ecumenicalism, signifying unity and cooperation between the Christian churches, as 
a cultural concept it denotes regions of persistent interaction and exchange. Yet, as 
emphasized by Hannerz (1991: 107), an ecumene is not necessarily egalitarian but is 
made of centers and peripheries. Note how the previous name of the European Union 
monetary unit, the Ecu, an abbreviation of European Currency Unit and French for 
‘coat-of-arms’ as well as ‘coin’, created a connotation through these symbolic and 
linguistic references of the idea of a European ecumene.
6  For an extensive historical study on the concept and idea of Europe, see Mikkeli 
1994 and 1998. For discussion on the European Union and European identity, see e.g. 
American Ethnologist 1991; Macdonald 1993; Haller & Richter 1994; Delanty 1995; 
Wintle 1996; Anderson 2000; Shore 2000; Ethnologia Europaea 1999; Etnologia 
Europaea 2002.
7  For a discussion on localism and the production of culture and tradition on the margins 
of Scotland, see Nadel-Klein 1991; for a discussion on the making of folk culture in 
Newfoundland in the context of state policies and the world capitalist system, see 
Sider 1986.
8  Air and water travel across national boundaries, but water is international only in 
the concept of ‘international waters’, that is, water areas that lie beyond national 
boundaries and national water lines. Since air molecules cannot be nationalized on the 
basis of their place of origin, their travel across national boundaries is not regarded 
as an international event. Air is, therefore, international only in a metaphorical sense, 
denoting the atmosphere that people with different origins are felt to create when 
coming together.
9  The neutrality of statistics for showing ‘plain ﬁgures’ is often illusory. The above 
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number of the Sámi indicates only those who are registered as Sámi by language. 
When language is not the criteria, their number is estimated to be approximately 
6, 400 (Pentikäinen & Hiltunen 1997: 99) or 6, 900 (Tuulentie 2001: 18, 78–79). The 
number of eligible voters in the Sámi Parliament elections in early October 1999 
was 5,120. In the 2003 elections it was 5,147.
10  Regarding the same research agenda, see also Saukkonen 1998a: 220–222; Saukkonen 
1999: 68–73, 116.
11  Jus sanguinis (law of blood) means the legal principle according to which a person’s 
nationality is determined at birth by the nationality of his or her parents. In contrast, 
jus soli (law of soil) means the legal principle according to which a person’s nationality 
is determined at birth by the territory in which he or she is born. Germany is a classic 
example of the former, the USA of the latter (see e.g. Alasuutari 1998: 159; Alasuutari 
& Ruuska 1999: 47–49).
12  The law that requires main applicants (but not dependants) to prove competence in 
either Finnish or Swedish came into force in 2003.
13  The act on the Sámi language from 1992 guarantees that Sámi may be used in legal 
proceedings as well as in state and municipal administration in the areas of the Sámi 
Homeland, where the Sámi have cultural autonomy.
14  After Finland became an independent state, Northern Norway, because of its 
Finnish-speaking population, was also within the desired extensions of Finland and 
Finnishness (see Ryymin 1998, 2003).
15  In 2002, according to the Ofﬁcial Government Server of the Republic of Karelia, 
73,6% of the total population of 716, 400 were Russians, 10% were Karelians, 3,6% 
Ukrainians, 2,3% Finns, 7% Belarusians and Vepps 0,8%. (Karelia n.d.)
16  Since the language manifesto of 1863, Finnish could be used when dealing with 
the authorities. From 1883 onwards civil servants were obliged to use Finnish 
when issuing documents, and in 1892 Finnish became an ofﬁcial language equal to 
Swedish. In 1906 Finnish became the ﬁrst ofﬁcial language, placing Swedish second. 
After Finland gained independence as a state, the position of the Swedish language 
in society was guaranteed in the 1919 constitution and in the 1922 speech act. The 
Swedish language is not a minority language in legal terms, but a second national 
language besides Finnish.
17  The image of mutual bonding was shattered in the 1918 Civil War and in the political 
processes leading to it (see e.g. Sarajas 1962; Alapuro 1998; Apo 1998; Saukkonen 
1999: 223–226). Yet, it has been reconstructed in the subsequent processes of creating 
national unity and homogeneity.
18  Homogeneity has also been valued negatively as indicating lack of variation in 
communicative signs (Tarasti 1990), lack of reﬂexivity and language play (Alapuro 
1997b), and testifying to a low-context culture (Stenius 1995; Ehrnrooth 1996; Anttila 
1993, 1996).
19  See e.g. Honko 1980: 42, 61; Apo 1998: 93; Apo, Nenola & Stark-Arola 1998: 16; 
Jääskeläinen 1998: 42; Karkama 2001: 240; Pentikäinen 1997: 233; Pentikäinen 
1999b: 317–318; Siikala 1998: 194.
20  According to William Wilson, for example, the role of folk tradition has been decisive 
in establishing Finland as a sovereign political unit (Wilson 1976; see also Wilson 
1998: 443–444). Lauri Honko has written that “In a way, Herder’s wishful thinking 
came true in Finland. An epic created a nation.” (Honko 2003: 8.)
21  The Fennoman movement by no means represented the perspectives of the entire 
population. The Swedish-speaking liberals, who were the main opponents of the 
Fennomans since the 1860s, opposed the idea of a dominant Finnish-language culture, 
and wanted to continue the Swedish cultural and political heritage in order to secure 
the consolidation of political institutions in Finland. While the Fennomans took many 
of their symbols of national unity from the Kalevala and other representations of folk 
poetry, the liberals established the Maiden of Finland (or the Finnish Maid) as the 
personiﬁcation of Finland. This was adopted for much wider use than the Fennoman 
and national romantic Kalevala ﬁgures (see Reitala 1983; Valenius 2004).
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22  Ulla-Maija Kulonen, Professor of Finno-Ugric Linguistics at the University of 
Helsinki, stated in her inauguration lecture in May 1999 (entitled, in English, ‘At the 
Roots of Finnishness’) that the study of the etymology, structure and development 
of Uralic languages increases our knowledge of the roots of our language and the 
origin of our intangible heritage (Kulonen 1999, my italics).
23  In the original Swedish text, Topelius writes that “ﬁnska folket har gått i tusenårig 
politisk barndom, utan att förmå i staten förverkliga den enhet, som andligen omslöt 
detsama i nationaliteten ”(Topelius 1845: 208).
24  Some of this criticism has focused on blaming Haavio for not describing the performers 
of folk poetry as representatives of their own times, as ordinary agriculturalists, tenant 
farmers, cattle tenders, masters and mistresses or male and female farm aids, mothers 
and fathers – that is, as people falling more or less in the same category of human 
beings with Haavio (e.g. Apo 1998: 96). Viewing them through the imagery of Greek 
Antiquity as mediators of ancient heritage is, according to Apo, to distance them into 
representatives of Otherness.
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